


# stanovništvo

Godina LXI / broj 1 / januar–jun 2023 | Volume LXI / No. 1 / January–June 2023

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Centar za demografska istraživanja  
Institut društvenih nauka  
Društvo demografa Srbije

Center for Demographic Research  
Institute of Social Sciences  
Association of Demographers of Serbia



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Centar za demografska istraživanja  
Institut društvenih nauka

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Uvodna reč urednika povodom 60 godina Stanovništva

## Od štamparske prese do veb-platfome

*Stanovništvo* je jedan od najdugovečnijih svetskih časopisa u oblasti nauke o stanovništvu s obzirom na to da izlazi u kontinuitetu već 60 godina. U tom periodu, prošao je različite faze koje, na neki način, koincidiraju sa fazama kroz koje je prolazio Institut društvenih nauka (IDN) odnosno celo društvo. U prvim decenijama uzleta, vezanim za entuzijazam osnivača Centra za demografska istraživanja (CDI) – akademika Miloša Macure, dr Dušana Breznika i dr Miroslava Raševića – koji je bio usko skopčan sa prosperitetom tadašnje države, procvat demografije kod nas odigravao se upravo na stranicama ovog časopisa. Stoga ne iznenađuje da su radove u *Stanovništvu* objavljivali i neki od najznačajnijih svetskih demografa toga vremena, kao što su: Frank Lorimer, Eugene Hammel, Edward Rosset, Massimo Livi-Bacci, Zdenek Pavlik i Robert Cliquet. Potonja kriza i raspad Jugoslavije odrazili su se i na obim i dinamiku objavljenih priloga, što je bilo očekivano s obzirom na to da se prvobitna gravitaciona sfera časopisa svela praktično na istraživače iz Srbije.

*Stanovništvo* je potom uspešno ušlo u novu fazu razvoja prateći promene u svetskoj naučnoj publicistici zahvaljujući, pre svih, dugogodišnjoj urednici dr Mirjani Rašević. Nakon demokratskih promena u Srbiji 2000. godine i ponovnog uključenja zemlje u svetske naučne tokove, *Stanovništvo* se postepeno vraćalo na mesto najuticajnijeg časopisa u oblasti nauke o stanovništvu u regionu Jugoslavije. O tome svedoči ne samo rejting časopisa u citatnim bazama, već i zastupljenost radova vodećih demografa i istraživača iz srodnih disciplina iz ovog regiona.

Nova faza podrazumevala je i uvođenje elektronske verzije časopisa od 2002. godine i njegovo uključenje u svetske indeksne baze, kao što je *Scopus* od 2007. godine. Dr Rašević je na vreme prepoznala proces diversifikacije disciplina u savremenoj demografiji i njen intenzivan razvoj kao izrazito interdisciplinarnu nauku, otvorivši časopis za čitav dijapazon komplementarnih uglova proučavanja demografskih pojava i procesa. Time je *Stanovništvo* pokazalo spremnost da odgovori na zahteve vremena i ponovo se nametne kao vodeći regionalni časopis za razvoj demografske naučne misli.

Preuzeti takvo nasleđe i uređivati časopis tokom poslednjih 12 godina predstavljalo je za mene osobitu čast i odgovornost, ali i veliki profesionalni izazov. U tom periodu, cilj je bio nastaviti započetu transformaciju u pogledu tematskog obuhvata i uspostaviti digitalno izdanje *Stanovništva* prema smernicama Narodne biblioteke Srbije. Sa razvojem interneta i pratećih IT servisa, elektronska verzija postajala je sve značajnija, što je zahtevalo promene i u uređivačkoj politici i u radu redakcije, koji se postepeno sve više odvijao u virtuelnom domenu.

Kao rezultat tog procesa, sledeći princip otvorene nauke, uredništvo *Stanovništva* je početkom 2019. godine samostalno uspostavilo veb-platfomu za elektronsko uređivanje i izdavanje, zasnovanu na *open source* softveru *Open Journal Systems* (OJS), čime je započela nova era u razvoju časopisa. Platforma, s jedne strane, omogućuje kreiranje časopisa kroz virtuelnu interakciju autora, recenzentata, lektora, dizajnera i uredništva – od podnošenja rukopisa do objavljivanja

– a s druge pruža čitaocima elektronsku verziju svih publikovanih priloga. Pored povećanja efikasnosti rada redakcije, takav koncept značajno povećava vidljivost i citiranost članaka budući da već sada omogućuje indeksiranje časopisa od strane deset međunarodnih lista, odgovarajući tako na zahteve vremena.

Tim za elektronsko uređivanje i izdavanje, pored glavnog urednika, čine perspektivni mladi saradnici CDI kao asistenti i urednici produkcije. Kako bi se obezbedio što bolji kvalitet jezika, *Stanovništvo* se oslanja na tim lektora, koji od 2018. godine uključuje i izvornog govornika engleskog jezika, dok je vizuelno-grafički identitet časopisa potpuno redizajniran 2021. godine. U toku je i digitalizacija svih starih brojeva. Trenutno su u elektronskom formatu dostupni svi prilozima objavljeni u poslednjih 25 godina, odnosno od 1998. godine do danas.

Čitav ovaj proces transformacije ka savremenom veb-izdanju časopisa snažno je podržan od strane rukovodstva IDN-a na čelu sa direktorom, dr Goranom Bašićem, u sklopu procesa unapređenja celokupne izdavačke delatnosti Instituta, čime je potvrđena vrednost i status časopisa, kao jednog od zaštitnih znakova IDN-a, ali i važnost ulaganja u njegov dalji razvoj. Jedan od pokazatelja uspešnosti i uticajnosti *Stanovništva* svakako je i dugogodišnja stabilnost njegovog impakt faktora na *Scimago Journal Ranking* listi, kao i uključjenje časopisa u ERIH plus listu 2022. godine. U toku je evaluacija *Stanovništva* od strane indeksne baze *Clarivate Web of Science*. Uključenje u tu bazu predstavlja jedan od važnijih dugoročnih ciljeva časopisa.

Međunarodni profil koji *Stanovništvo* gradi u ovom veku primećuje se i kroz porast broja stranih autora i radova na engleskom jeziku, pri čemu je taj status i formalno priznat od strane resornog Ministarstva koje sufinansira njegovo izdavanje. Istovremeno, časopis ne odustaje

od svoje početne vizije – da predstavlja svojevrsan forum za sve koji se bave populacionim studijama u regionu i susjednim zemljama, uključujući istraživače, studente, proizvođače podataka i sve korisnike demografskih znanja. Tome doprinosi i multidisciplinarni sastav redakcije, čiji su članovi među vodećim istraživačima u svojim oblastima, i kojima je zajedničko vanredno poznavanje demografskih i srodnih društvenih procesa i njihova kontekstualizacija u regionalnom i evropskom okviru.

Očuvanje dugovečnosti i renomea časopisa prirodno će se nametati kao odgovornost svim budućim redakcijama i urednicima. Najvažniji uslov za to svakako je neprekidno unapređenje kvaliteta objavljenog sadržaja, što se već pokazalo kao značajan izazov u uslovima zapaženog rasta globalne i regionalne konkurencije, koja je bila nezamisliva do pre svega par decenija. Prvi stepenik ka tom cilju je utvrđivanje statusa regionalnog lidera kroz jačanje rejtinga ne samo u kvantitativnom domenu, merljivom kroz razne impakt faktore, već i u opštoj prepoznatljivosti i ugledu časopisa koji su decenijama strpljivo gradile generacije naših najznačajnijih istraživača u oblasti nauke o stanovništvu.

Prvu svesku iz 1963. i ovu iz 2023. godine, koju najverovatnije „interaktivno čitate“ na nekom elektronskom uređaju, naoko povezuje samo naziv časopisa. Ipak, čini se da je ključna poveznica dva vremena odnosno njihovih autora i čitalaca upravo kvalitet priloga i entuzijazam redakcije. Iako ostvareno tehničko unapređenje nemalo doprinosi kvalitetu, a ne samo promeni formata, verujem da će dalji razvoj naučne misli presudno zavisiti od naše želje da napredujemo i ostavimo „ramena našim potomcima“ kao što smo mi „porasli na ramenima naših predaka i savremenika“.

**Vladimir Nikitović, glavni urednik**



**Članci**

**Articles**





# The inception of demographic theory in Serbia

Boško Mijatović<sup>1</sup> 

## EXTENDED SUMMARY

This text contains an account of the first work on theoretical demography in Serbia, which was written in 1862 by Kosta Cukić, a doctor of philosophy from Heidelberg and the first widely recognised Serbian economist. He dealt with this topic in the second volume of his State Economy textbook, the title of which was Economic Policy. Writing about population problems in economic textbooks was a common European practice at that time. Although he wrote for a textbook, his work was not a retelling of generally accepted theories, but a critical discussion of issues that had not been resolved in contemporary science. Therefore, his work can be considered original in the full sense of the word. In the theoretical sense, Cukić relied on Malthus, but also provided significantly different perspectives on many issues. He accepted Malthus's position that the amount of food is a limiting factor in population growth and that natural fertility is very high due to people's strong sexual drive. But there were also important differences: in Cukić's theoretical framework, the iron law of wages does not apply, i.e. wages do not always strive for the existential minimum, as Malthus argued. Cukić also argues that capital affects fertility, since it affects the amount of available resources. Cukić was not a pessimist like Malthus, and instead observed a significant population growth in Europe at the time, without mass famine and pestilence. As we can see, Cukić dealt a lot with Malthus and his theory. This is understandable considering that Malthus was the preeminent theoretician whose work focused on the population problem in those decades, and therefore determination according to his theory and discussion with him was inevitable for anyone who intended to write about population problems. Cukić also dealt with population policy and those aspects of it that were available to the governments of the time: immigration, emigration, and marriage. The basis of his views was strong and consistent liberalism in every respect. Cukić advocated for expanding personal freedoms, such as free decision-making about marriage, and free immigration to the country and emigration from it. In some places

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he would set minimum technical conditions. "Personal freedom... is the ideal of the political consciousness of the present time". Accordingly, he claimed that "citizens are not just means for governmental purposes", but on the contrary, it is the government's duty to "facilitate and support the aspirations of citizens to particular and general happiness", thus repeating John Locke's idea that the state exists for the sake of citizens, and not citizens for the sake of the state. Cukić belonged to a wide circle of authors in the mid-19th century who fundamentally rejected Malthus's theory: on the one hand, economists who claimed that technological progress and a deepened division of labour would lead to economic progress that would forever postpone the existential crisis that Malthus feared; and on the other, demographers who believed that workers would control their fertility to preserve living standards to a greater extent than Malthus thought possible. Towards the end of the 19th century, the decline of fertility in Western countries provided strong evidence in favour of the latter.

## **KEYWORDS**

population growth, Malthus, food as a limiting factor, fertility, controls

# **Početak demografske teorije u Srbiji**

## **REZIME**

Ovaj tekst sadrži prikaz prvog rada o teorijskoj demografiji u Srbiji napisanog 1862. godine. Autor je Kosta Cukić, doktor filozofije iz Hajdelberga, prvi ozbiljni srpski ekonomista.

U teorijskom delu Cukić se oslanjao na Maltusa, ali i razlikovao. Prihvatio je Maltusov stav da je količina hrane ograničavajući faktor rasta stanovništva, a i da je prirodna plodnost veoma visoka zbog snažnog seksualnog nagona ljudi. Ali su postojale i bitne razlike: kod Cukića ne važi gvozdeni zakon najamnina, odnosno one ne teže uvek egzistencijalnom minimumu, kao kod Maltusa; zatim, kod Cukića, i kapital utiče na plodnost, budući da utiče na količinu raspoloživih resursa. Cukić nije bio pesimista poput Maltusa, već je primetio znatan porast stanovništva u tadašnjoj Evropi, bez masovne gladi i pošasti.

Cukić se bavio i populacionom politikom. Osnova njegovih stavova je liberalizam u svakom pogledu, veoma snažan i dosledan. Cukić se zalaže za proširenje polja slobode, za slobodno odlučivanje o braku i za slobodno useljavanje u zemlju i iseljavanje iz nje.

Cukić je sredinom XIX veka pripadao širokom krugu autora koji su suštinski odbacivali Maltusovu teoriju: s jedne strane, ekonomistima koji su tvrdili da će tehnološki napredak i produbljena podela rada dovesti do ekonomskog napretka koji će zauvek odložiti egzistencijalnu krizu koje se Maltus plašio; s druge strane, demografima koji su verovali da će radnici više kontrolisati svoju plodnost kako bi očuvali životni standard nego što je Maltus mislio da je moguće. Krajem XIX veka, pad fertiliteta u zapadnim zemljama bio je snažan dokaz u korist ovih poslednjih.

## **KLJUČNE REČI**

populacioni rast, Maltus, hrana kao ograničavajući faktor, fertilitet, kontrole

U ovom tekstu želim da ukažem na same početke razvoja demografske nauke u Srbiji XIX veka vezane za delo Koste Cukića, prvog srpskog pisca iz oblasti demografske teorije, stavljajući ga u kontekst tadašnje populacione teorije u Evropi i ilustrujući ga, povremeno, srpskim prilikama.

Kao i u svetu, u Srbiji devetnaestog veka dosta je rano poklonjena pažnja kretanju stanovništva, pošto se verovalo da snaga jedne države u turbulentnim vremenima, kakva su uvek, počiva prvenstveno na broju stanovnika i broju vojnika. Drugi razlog bio je poreski, jer su popisi bili jedini način da se ustanovi relativno tačan iznos poreskih osnovica (imovina, dohodak). Opštiji i verovatno najvažniji razlog bila je slaba naseljenost Srbije prvih decenija XIX veka, posle rata i iseljavanja u XVIII veku i početkom XIX veka. Srbija je tokom XIX veka imala jednu od najviših stopa populacionog rasta u Evropi. Cukić je, polazeći od rezultata popisa, računao da se broj stanovnika Srbije udvostručuje za 40 godina, odnosno da raste otprilike po stopi od 2% godišnje.<sup>1</sup>

Stoga se već 1834. organizuje prvi popis stanovništva u Srbiji, a vođenje matičnih knjiga postalo je za crkve obavezno 1836. godine, što je omogućilo praćenje vitalne statistike (rođenja, umiranja, bračnost itd.). Oko 1850. godine javljaju se prvi pisci na demografske teme: kasniji ministar finansija i namesnik Jovan Gavrilović sa kraćim tekstovima o rezultatima prethodnih popisa, i Vladimir Jakšić<sup>2</sup> tokom više decenija sa svojim opsežnim radom na srpskoj statistici (*Državopisi*),

uključujući organizaciju i sprovođenje popisa stanovništva i saopštavanje njihovih rezultata (Vuletić 2017). Takva orijentacija na prikupljanje i objavljivanje podataka u Srbiji pratila je praksu vodećih zemalja, kasneći za prvim modernim popisima Velike Britanije i Francuske samo tri decenije.

## 1 MALTUSOVA REVOLUCIJA

U sledećoj fazi razvoja demografije, javlja se analiza prikupljenog statističkog materijala i trud na ustanovljavanju zakonitosti kretanja stanovništva. Utemeljivačem moderne populacione teorije obično se smatra Tomas Maltus, koji je svojim delom *Esej o principima stanovništva* (1798/1998) uticao na kontroverze tokom sledećih decenija, pa i na Kostu Cukića, prvog ozbiljnog srpskog pisca iz demografske oblasti. Maltus je formulisao tezu o vezi populacionog rasta i rasta proizvodnje egzistencijalnih dobara, prvenstveno hrane, s tim da proizvodnja hrane u krajnjoj liniji ograničava mogući rast stanovništva.

Kako slikovito reče:

*Moć stanovništva je toliko superiorna nad moći zemlje da proizvede egzistenciju za ljude, pa prerana smrt mora da u jednom ili drugom obliku poseti ljudsku rasu. Poroci čovečanstva su aktivni i sposobni akteri depopulacije. Oni su prethodnici u velikoj vojsci razaranja i često sami završavaju užasan posao. Ali ako ne uspeju u ovom ratu istrebljenja, bolesna godišnja doba, epidemije, poštast i kuga napreduju u sjajnom nizu i zbrišu hiljade i desetine hiljada. Ako uspeh i dalje bude nepotpun, ogromna neizbežna glad vreba u pozadini, i jednim snažnim udarcem izjednačava stanovništvo sa hranom na svetu (Malthus 1798/1998: 44).*

<sup>1</sup> Sve Cukićeve reči i citati, osim posebno navedenih, potiču iz: Cukić (1862), odeljak *Staranje o broju radnika*.

<sup>2</sup> Cukićev kolega iz Hajdelberga, lični prijatelj i podređeni u ministarstvu finansija. Cukić ga je postavio za upravnika novoosnovane statistike u Ministarstvu finansija.

Drugim rečima, populacioni rast je striktno ograničen nivoom proizvodnje egzistencijalnih dobara. Kada taj nivo poraste, raste i stanovništvo. Ali, dalji rast stanovništva preko povećanja hrane dugoročno je neodrživ, jer bi došlo do opadanja količine hrane po stanovniku, što neminovno vodi u siromaštvo. Nasuprot tome, po Maltusu, na scenu stupaju dve kontrole. Prva je *preventivna*, koja vodi smanjenju rađanja, a čine je seksualno uzdržavanje, odlaganje braka, celibat i slično. Ali, to obično nije dovoljno, već je potrebno nešto jače – *pozitivna kontrola*, kako je zvao Maltus – a čine je beda, rat, glad, epidemije i slično, kao načini povećanja mortaliteta. Na kraju se uspostavlja nova ravnoteža između proizvodnje hrane i brojnosti stanovništva, sa manje brojnom populacijom, s tim da je životni standard radnog dela populacije ponovo na egzistencijalnom nivou.

Ovim stavovima Maltus se suprotstavio do tada preovlađujućim optimističkim uverenjima da je rast stanovništva uvek dobra stvar i da ga automatski prati rast proizvodnje egzistencijalnih dobara. Ovim optimistima pripadali su merkantilisti, fiziokrate, pa delimično i Adam Smit (Schumpeter 1954). Maltusov pesimistički uvid – da rast stanovništva može naići na katastrofalne prepreke – bio je ozbiljno upozorenje generacijama pripadnika društvenih nauka tog i sledećih vremena. Kasnije se pokazalo da njegova teorija ipak nije tačna i da daje pogrešne prognoze, jer je rast stanovništva u svetu sve sporiji i jer uvećana proizvodnja hrane lako može da ishrani uvećano svetsko stanovništvo. No, i danas postoji neomaltuzijanska teorija koja zagovara dalje usporavanje populacionog rasta zbog potencijalnog iscrpljivanja resursa zemlje (Meadows et al. 1972; Ehrlich 1968).

## 2 CUKIĆ

Kosta Cukić (1826–1879)<sup>3</sup> je hajdelberški doktor filozofije, prvi ozbiljan srpski ekonomista. U svom trotomnom udžbeniku *Državna ekonomija*, Cukić je posvetio jedan tom pitanju kako da država najbolje pomogne „narodnom kućenju”, odnosno povećanju materijalnog blagostanja naroda. Ovaj tom objavljen je 1862. godine pod nazivom *Ekonomna policija* (ekonomska politika), u vreme dok je Cukić bio ministar finansija i prosvete u vladi kneza Mihaila. Ostala dva publikovana su jednu deceniju ranije.<sup>4</sup>

Razmatrajući faktore proizvodnje, pre svega rad i kapital, Cukić pominje staro uverenje („odavna se misli”) da je najveća dužnost vlade da radi na uvećanju stanovništva u zemlji, a iz tri razloga: (1) uvećanja broja i stanovnika i vojnika uvećava i snagu države, (2) uvećanja poreskih prihoda države, ukoliko proizvodnja raste bar koliko i stanovništvo, i (3) što se primetilo da je bar do nekog stepena s rastom stanovništva povezan i veći razvitak privrede i narodnog blagostanja.

Sam Cukić se, međutim, nije slagao sa ovim klasičnim mišljenjem, već je video nužnost, sledeći Maltusa, da rast stanovništva bude u granicama raspoloživih sredstava. Pominjao je mogućnost da stanovništvo brže raste od proizvodnje i da se smanjuje proizvodnja po stanovniku. Tako bi se pogoršavalo stanje u zemlji, što nije smatrao dobrim. Kako reče, povećanje gustine stanovništva može biti dobro samo onda kada se ekonomsko stanje naroda unapređuje ili bar ne pogoršava.

<sup>3</sup> Više o Cukiću u: Mijatović (2002).

<sup>4</sup> Ovaj udžbenik pisan je arhaičnim jezikom i predvučkovskom ćirilicom, pa je zato današnjim čitaocima nerazumljiv i nekorisćen. Sada se priprema njegovo objavljivanje u osavremenjenom obliku.

O uslovima uvećanja stanovništva, Cukić, na osnovu „opšteg i pojedinačnog iskustva”, kaže:

*„Naklonost jednog pola ljudskog k drugome i težnja za životom u familiji” vodi samo po sebi brzom umnožavanju stanovništva, ukoliko neke spoljne prepreke na tom putu ne stoje, a to mogu biti:*

- *uzdržavanje ljudi od braka „ako se osigurali nisu od čega će svoju porodicu hraniti”,*
- *veće umiranje kada se narod „oskudno hrani”,*
- *što je veći broj zaključenih „lakomislenih brakova”<sup>5</sup> i s tim povezan rast stanovništva, toliko više ljudi od „bede i bolesti pomre”, i ljudstvo se ne uvećava, jer ni sredstva izdržavanja nisu uvećana.<sup>6</sup>*

Ovde prepoznamo Maltusovu logiku, kao i preventivnu i pozitivnu kontrolu.

Pošto se stanovništvo naročito u „radećoj klasi naroda” uvećava, to veličina stanovništva zavisi od veličine radničke zarade (najamnine) i od veličine narodnog kapitala. Ovim je Cukić povezao model Maltusa sa njemu savremenom teorijom ekonomskog rasta. Maltusovom determinističkom modelu određivanja stanovništva samo (egzistencijalnom) najamninom dodao je još jedan faktor – kapital. Kako Cukić reče: od novoprodučenih dobara samo se jedan manji deo uštedi, pa se zato kapital sporo uvećava, a time i proizvodnja i stanovništvo sporo rastu.

<sup>5</sup> Pod lakomislenim brakovima tada su se podrazumevali brakovi u kojima roditelji nisu unapred razmišljali o tome kako će izdržavati decu.

<sup>6</sup> Cukić ovde eksplicitno koristi Maltusovu podelu na preventivnu i pozitivnu kontrolu stanovništva, dodajući druge okolnosti koje mogu uzrok biti „neplodnoće” brakova i slabog povećanja stanovništva, kao što su nezdrav vazduh, „razvratnost života” itd.

U skladu s ovim, Cukić iznosi svoje poglede na dve pomenute teorije određivanja stanovništva i tvrdi: da se ne može reći da sa svakom (uvećanom) generacijom stanovništva sledi isto toliko uvećanje proizvodnje i kapitala („kao što populacioniste, protivnici Maltusa, misle”),<sup>7</sup> što znači da se ne slaže sa idejom da je populacioni rast vodeća promenljiva koju proizvodnja (i kapital) pasivno, ali uspešno, uvek prate. Ali, isto tako nije se slagao ni sa Maltusovim uverenjem da se kretanje stanovništva upravlja samo po količini proizvoda u zemlji, tj. da determinacija ide u suprotnom pravcu – od proizvodnje ka stanovništvu. Cukić je kao drugu determinantu dodavao kapital, jer je verovao da bez kapitala nema ni proizvodnje, ni civilizovanog života.<sup>8</sup>

Cukić pominje i poznati Maltusov primer u kome proizvodnja hrane raste po aritmetičkoj progresiji (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 itd.), a stanovništvo po geometrijskoj (1, 2, 4, 8, 16 itd.), tvrdeći da se takvo kruto pravilo rasta proizvodnje hrane ne sme postaviti jer ona zavisi od mnogih faktora: svojstava zemljišta, nivoa razvoja poljoprivrede i slično. Jednako pravilo za sve zemlje ne može biti istinito. Štaviše, Cukić je izrazio rezervu prema Maltusovoj teoriji i na empirijskom planu, tvrdeći da uvećanje proizvodnje hrane u svetu u poslednjih 80 godina čini suvišnom brigu da li će je biti dovoljno za sve. Iako se stanovništvo veoma uvećalo, hrane je bilo dovoljno.

<sup>7</sup> Ovde Cukić (1862: 24) misli na Kondorsea, Godvina, Kenea i druge koji su verovali u moć progresa kao načina da se izbegnu efekti preteranog populacionog rasta.

<sup>8</sup> Maltus je, pojednostavljujući model, verovatno imao na umu samo proizvodnju poljoprivrede, u kojoj vlada zakon opadajućih prinosa, dok je Cukić uočio industrijsku revoluciju i dodao kapital kao faktor proizvodnje. I Maltus je kasnije uključio kapital u svoj model ekonomskog (i populacionog) rasta.

Da bi ovo ilustrovao, Cukić navodi i podatak da je posle Napoleonovih ratova stanovništvo u Evropi redovno raslo za 12.000 do 12.400 stanovnika na milion stanovnika (oko 1,25% godišnje) i da je taj napredak samo povremeno narušavan (glad 1816, 1817. i 1846, kolera 1830. i 1848. godine, pa i pobune i ratovi). Tadašnja demografska literatura koju je Cukić koristio obuhvata sledeće autore: Malthus (1798/1998), Schmidt (1836), Hoffmann (1835), Archinard (1838/2018), Quetelet (1835) i Bernoulli (1840). Pored njih, Cukić je koristio više ekonomskih udžbenika i tekstova, među kojima je citirao dva kojima demografija nije primarni fokus: Thiers (1848) i Mill (1848/2004).

Još jedna razlika između Maltusa i Cukića tiče se Maltusovog uverenja da važi tzv. „gvozdeni zakon nadnica“ koje uvek teže egzistencijalnom nivou. Čim se povećaju iznad tog nivoa, javlja se protivteža kroz povećanje stanovništva koje povećava ponudu radne snage i obara nadnice na egzistencijalni nivo. Kod Cukića ne postoji isti mehanizam, već samo potreba da najamnine obezbede „da se njome sve potrebe življenja cele radničke klase namiriti mogu, inače bi se količina radnika dotle smanjivala dok ne bi slabija konkurencija s njihove strane najamnicu opet naviše poterala“ (Cukić 1851: 99). Ovaj stav podseća na Maltusov, ali postoje bar dve važne razlike: prvo, Cukić ne govori o egzistencijalnim, minimalnim nadnicama, već fleksibilnije o „svim potrebama življenja“, što sugerise viši nivo; i drugo, dok Maltus govori o varijacijama broja stanovnika u zavisnosti od visine nadnice, dotle Cukić govori o varijacijama broja radnika, što nije isto: broj radnika može biti smanjen na tržištu rada, a da stanovništvo nije smanjeno, jer se jedan deo radnika može povući sa tržišta

radne snage i, na primer, otići da radi na sopstvenom imanju.

Ovim stavovima Cukić, u stvari, odbacuje jezgro Maltusove doktrine o „gvozdenom zakonu nadnica“ i o siromaštvu koje neminovno sledi. Istovremeno, videli smo, ne veruje ni u zaostajanje proizvodnje hrane u svetu, pa time nije ni pesimista u pogledu mogućnosti neometanog rasta stanovništva.

Zanimljivo je da je Cukić, prateći Maltusa, verovao da je velika sklonost rađanju konstantna, pa je rekao: „Da se ljudstvo u geometrijskoj progresiji priplođava, sasvim je osnovano, bar pod običnim okolnostima“ (Cukić 1862: 25). Ovaj stav je verovatno prirodan za vreme od pre dva veka, kada je stopa fertiliteta prelazila 5 (u Engleskoj) i deca se rađala masovno. Istorija ih je ipak demantovala i donela demografsku tranziciju, sa opadanjem stopa rađanja i umiranja i usporavanjem rasta, pa i opadanjem broja stanovnika u brojnim zemljama. Deca su vremenom postala dragocena retkost u velikom broju zemalja.

Svaka ozbiljna teorija podrazumeva, ukoliko je moguće, empirijsku verifikaciju. Cukić je pokušao da odbrani svoju teoriju kroz analizu populacionih razlika po zemljama i krajevima, i dao interesantna zapažanja. Počeo je konstatacijom da u bogatijim zemljama nije toliko opasno da će se uravnoteženost prihoda i broja stanovnika lako narušiti,<sup>9</sup> a i broj ljudi sporije napreduje u gusto naseljenim zemljama. Bogatiji, obrazovani narodi imaju veće potrebe života u porodici, pa su lakomisleno zaključeni brakovi ređi. To se vidi iz činjenice da je u tim zemljama manje brakova, odnosno da se brakovi uglavnom zaključuju u starijim godinama. Sve ovo, kaže Cukić, samo je potvrda osnovnog pravila „da jačina i

<sup>9</sup> Aludira na ravnotežnu poziciju kod Maltusa.



naraštaj žiteljstva naročito od količine sredstava izdržavanja zavise”.

Najmanje brojno je stanovništvo tamo, kaže Cukić, gde je najmanje kapitala na zanimanje radnika utrošeno, tj. gde je novoformiranoj ili sa strane doseljenoj porodici najteže da zaradi sredstva za život. Ovome su uzrok naročito: a) hladnije zemlje i bregoviti predeli manje hrane proizvode, udaljeni su od živih trgovačkih mesta, zato su i slabije naseljeni. (Cukić vidi izuzetke, kao u Švajcarskoj gde nalazi brdovite predele sa mnogim fabrikama, pa i gustom naseljenošću); b) slab ekonomski razvitak, koji stvara manje dohotka i zato manje ljudi u takvoj zemlji može živeti; v) neaktivna vlada, koja ne unapređuje ekonomski život, i g) „nerad i glupost naroda”.

Ovaj nerad Cukić je ilustrirao praznovanjem mnogih radnih dana u godini. Katolička i pravoslavna crkva ne samo što imaju dosta propisanih praznika, navodi Cukić, nego narodi naročito pravoslavne vere imaju mnoge lične, kućne, opštinske i narodne praznike i mnoge po sujeverju neradne dane tako da, što zbog toga, što zbog rđavog vremena, zbog vanrednih događaja u kući i okolini, zbog drugih neekonomskih poslova i zbog slabe volje za rad, jedva 100 dana preko godine ostanu da se ponešto može uraditi, kaže Cukić. I po katoličkoj crkvi ne radi se puna tri meseca u godini, a u protestantskoj crkvi ima samo 58 neradnih dana.

S druge strane, najbrojnije je stanovništvo tamo, po Cukiću: a) gde su predeli vrlo plodni ili gde se jako dobro obrađuju, 2) gde mnogo zanata<sup>10</sup> ima i gde je prodaja zanatskih proizvoda sasvim laka.

Kako se vidi, navodi Cukić, rast stanovništva rezultat je „više u sukob dejstvujući sila”. Što je populacija veća, to su uslovi za povećanje proizvodnje i potro-

šnje naroda veći, jer tada se produbljuje podela rada<sup>11</sup> cirkulacija dobara se, zbog manjih transportnih troškova, ubrzava i potrebe se naroda povećavaju, jer mnogi ljudi zajedno žive. Takođe, znanja i nauke, kao i veština i vrednoća podstiču se i šire. Stoga su u gusto naseljenim zemljama i predelima prosečni prihodi pojedinaca veći nego u drugim.

Ali, ovi dobri efekti veće gustine stanovništva mogu se očekivati tek onda kada je prirast stanovništva nastao zbog povećanja najamnine i kapitala; bez ovih uslova, navodi Cukić, nalazio bi se radni narod pri gustom stanovništvu u vrlo lošem stanju i morao bi se od krajnje oskudnosti i bede spašavati vrlo skromnim načinom života.

Ovi Cukićevi redovi o naseljenosti stanovništva teško mogu da se prihvate kao dobra naučna argumentacija njegove teze o odnosu gustine naseljenosti i raznih prirodnih, institucionalnih i ljudskih činilaca, mada se ne može reći da nemaju smisla. On je čak pokušao da ih dokaže brojevima, ali mu to ipak nije išlo za rukom. U velikim fusnotama navodio je pregled imovine i stanovništva po engleskim grofovijama, kretanje stanovništva SAD i većih evropskih gradova, uzroke retke ili velike naseljenosti pojedinih zemalja ili provincija kako ih je on video itd., ali su to mahom zdravorazumske impresije, eventualno indicije.

### 3 POLITIKA PREMA BRAKOVIMA

Iz izloženog razmatranja sledi, kaže Cukić, da su mere koje bi vlada preduzimala radi povećanja populacije izlišne i, štaviše, opasne kad bi se tim načinom više ljudi naselilo nego što bi za njih bilo dohotka. Zato je obično dovoljno da vlada samo potpomaganjem i unapređenjem

<sup>10</sup> Obuhvata i industrijske radnike.

<sup>11</sup> Ovo je argument Adama Smita.

ekonomskog života uspe da veći broj ljudi na istom prostoru zemlje može živeti, tj. kada ukloni prepreke koje bi ometale slobodan i prirodan razvitak narodnog blagostanja. Pod ovakvom politikom vlade stanovništvo će rasti onoliko koliko narodni kapitali i prihodi dozvoljavali budu. Ovo je glavni Cukićev stav: najbolje je kada u zemlji raste dohodak (i kapital) i kada se njemu prilagodi rast stanovništva. Brži rast stanovništva od rasta dohotka (i kapitala) donosi bedu, a sporiji gubitke u stanovništvu.

Cukić je uverenja da vlada može uticati na kretanje stanovništva preko brakova, useljavanja i iseljavanja, a poštujući napred navedena osnovna i poželjna pravila iz odnosa dohotka i stanovništva. Zanimljivo je da u okviru politike ne uključuje populacionu politiku u današnjem smislu, odnosno da ne govori o rađanju, umiranju i deci, već o brakovima. Uzrok tome verovatno je činjenica da je ondašnja država malo mogla da utiče na rađanje i umiranje, a znatno više na brakove administrativnim i sličnim putem i, preko brakova, na rađanje i prirast stanovništva.

Kod brakova, Cukić je mišljenja da bi trebalo pristupiti braku liberalno, bez administrativnih uslovljavanja i kazni. Stoga je protiv poreza i drugih dažbina na neženje i neudate, jer se i u svetu od takve politike odustalo.<sup>12</sup> Protiv je i prinudnog neženstva celih klasa naroda, kao vojnika, što se može izbeći ukoliko se uvede narodna vojska ili redovnim vojnicima brak dozvoli i daje češće odsustvo. Protiv je uslovljavanja prava na ženidbu s pravom majstorstva ili s kupovinom zemlje, jer to u takvom slučaju svako malo ranije ili malo kasnije sam učini.

<sup>12</sup> Danas takvi porezi postoje u pojedinim zemljama s niskim fertilitetom.

Cukić je video potencijalni problem samo u situaciji kada u brak ulaze siromašni ljudi pošto oni mogu da u slučaju kakve nesreće (bolest, smrt, požar, poplava) padnu u velikom broju na teret opštine, koja je dužna da ih izdržava. Ipak, Cukić ni ovde nije za stroga rešenja jer bi ona bila nepravedna prema pojedincima, a i „nepolitična“ za društvo. Jer, mnogi vredni radnici, koji u mladosti nemaju ništa, vrlo brzo dođu do priličnog imanja.

Naveo je da nauka po ovom pitanju nema čvrst stav: ona ne odobrava lakomisljeno zaključivanje braka naročito u zemljama gde je radniku teško prehraniti svoju porodicu; ali, isto tako ne odobrava se ni prevelika strogost, koja se ponegde praktikuje. Za ilustraciju je upotrebio reči budućeg predsednika Francuske Tjera „ograničavati plodnost čovečijeg roda pravo je zločinstvo protiv prirode (*un crime contre la nature*)“, ali je za suprotnu stranu u diskusiji iskoristio navodne reči Džona Stjuarta Mila „nemojte se kotiti kao svinje (*do not propagate like swine*)“.<sup>13</sup>

Cukić pominje kao moguće rešenje samo za brakove onih koji nemaju „pravo obštinstva“ njegovo uslovljavanje i, time, prava na sklapanje braka propisivanjem izvesne sume koji bi kandidati morali imati, kao na primer 200 talira imanja ili 50 talira prihoda, ili neki dobar zanat. Kao dobar činovnik (i ministar finansija) setio se da pomene kako bi trebalo sprečiti izigravanje ovog zakona, na primer uzimanjem (kratkoročnog) zajma: samo da se novac pokaže vlastima i odmah vrati zajmodavcu.

Pomenute sume su bile vrlo umerne, što potvrđuje da je Cukić izbegavao

<sup>13</sup> Cukićev citat je pogrešan: u originalu stoji „...they [ljudi] do not, therefore, propagate like swine, but are capable...“ (Mill 1848/2004: 67), tako da rečenica ne znači nikakav poziv ljudima da se uzdržavaju nego tvrđnju da se ljudi ne kote kao svinje već da pokazuju izvestan stepen uzdržanosti, neko više neko manje.

strogu politiku, odnosno da nije hteo da u većoj meri otežava sklapanje brakova, već samo da smanji verovatnoću pojave masovnog opterećenja opštinskih sredstava.

#### 4 USELJENIČKA POLITIKA

Kod imigracione politike, Cukić nije pristalica velikih podsticaja useljavanju, osim naklonosti za političke i religiozne prognanike. On veruje da veliku većinu ostalih čine ljudi siromašnog stanja, „lakomisleni i neradni“, koji naivno veruju da ih u novoj zemlji čekaju „neizmerna blaga“, a bez sopstvenog truda i veština. Zato često propadaju, ili se teško oporavljaju. Stoga im ne treba davati velike poklone pri useljavanju, kao što su besplatni putevi, pozajmica kapitala, posebne premije i slično. Dovoljno je, misli Cukić, da se uklone prepreke slobodnog naseljavanja i useljenicima učine neke manje olakšice, kao oslobođenje od carine pri uvozu sopstvenog nameštaja, zanatskog oruđa, stoke i drugog kapitala.

Cukić je podsetio na velike seobe Srba u Austriju i Rusiju u ranijim vekovima i naveo da svake godine u Srbiju stigne više stotina doseljenika što iz turskih oblasti, što iz Austrije. Ali, samo oni koji zakonskim putem stupe u srpsko državljanstvo uživaju zakonom dozvoljene koristi, tj. po zakonu BN<sup>o</sup> 603 od 1844. godine ne plaćaju uvozne dažbine na dobra sa sobom doneta u Srbiju, a po zakonu BN<sup>o</sup> 1037. od 1858. oslobođeni su od državnog poreza, a time i od opštinskih tereta, za dve godine računajući od njihovog doseljenja u Srbiju. Kako takođe navodi Cukić, prebezima iz Turske davala se i zemlja po zakonu BN<sup>o</sup> 735 od 1861, a i svima siromašnim doseljenicima – seljacima – ustupa se zemljište iz opštinskog fonda po uredbi (šumskoj) BN<sup>o</sup> 732 od 1861. godine.

#### 5 ISELJENIČKA POLITIKA

Po Cukiću, iseljavanje iz države treba svakom ostaviti na slobodnu volju, jer zabrane niti su pravične, niti se mogu s uspehom održati. Ali, pre nego što građanin svoju zemlju napusti, treba da se obrati vlastima za dobijanje iseljeničke dozvole, koja će mu se dati kada se utvrdi da je sve svoje obveze u staroj državi ispunio; zato je nužno, misli Cukić, da pre izdavanja takve dozvole državna vlast u javnim listovima objavi nameru iseljenika i pozove one koji imaju potraživanja od njega da se prijave.<sup>14</sup> Ranije uobičajeno uzimanje nekog dela imanja od iseljenika za državnu kasu, radi osiguranja da će dugovi biti plaćeni, sada je uglavnom prestalo, što samo po sebi, što silom ugovora među državama.<sup>15</sup>

Vlada može težiti, kaže Cukić, da smanji sklonost ka iseljavanju svojih građana, ako joj ono ne ide u račun, mnogim blažim sredstvima. Najvažnije je da ne daje povoda nezadovoljstvu ljudi, jer su se u slobodnim državama uverili da u pravnoj državi ljudi raznog religijskog i političkog mišljenja mogu lepo živeti i da nije pravi put ka dobroj državi da sve građane natera na jednako mišljenje. Dodatno, ugnjetavanja u sitnicama od strane i viših i nižih vlasti, a naročito neobuzdanost i neodgovornost nižih zvaničnika, više nerviraju narod, čine ga nezadovoljnim i podstiču na iseljavanje nego opšte vladine mere.

Cukić je mišljenja da ne treba trpeti izaslanike tuđih država i društva da po narodu putuju i mame ljude ka iseljavanju obećanjima, lažima i sličnim obmanama. Jer, ovi agenti primamljuju

<sup>14</sup> Ovo je problematična ideja, jer je nepismenost stanovništva bila gotovo potpuna.

<sup>15</sup> U Turskoj je bilo zabranjeno seliti se iz jednog pašaluka u drugi; hatišerif od 1833. zabranjuje selidbu naroda iz Turske u Srbiju.

lakomislenu svetinu raznim obećanjima i predstavama sreće koja ih u novoj državi navodno čeka, i pričinili su po Evropi takvim postupcima mnoge nesreće, što su sirotni radnici jedno zlo ostavljali, a gore u novim krajevima nalazili, i tamo propadali. Cukić tvrdi da se treba razjasniti kako stvari stoje, narodu dati na znanje kakve ga koristi i nezgode u stranju zemlji očekuju.

Za veću sigurnost, naročito ukoliko se građanin želi iseliti u neku obližnju zemlju, može se od svakog iseljenika zahtevati da nabavi uverenje prijema od vlasti zemlje u koju se iseljava, pa mu tek potom dati otpust iz srpskog građanstva.

Kako navodi Cukić: „O iseljenicima iz Srbije propisivala je uredba BN<sup>o</sup> 603 od 1844. da pre iseljenja mora svaki dokazati da će u strano podanstvo biti primljen (u praksi ovo nije tako strogo, niti se uopšte može ispunjavati) i da je sve obaveze prema vladi, opštini, zadrugi i inače ispunio“ (Cukić 1862: 40). Inače zakon BN<sup>o</sup> 171 od 1860. vrlo je liberalan i posredno ima smisao da je svakom slobodno zemlju napustiti, kao i da takav iseljenik ili begunac za vreme odsustva nema lično nikakve finansijske obaveze prema svojoj državi, prema BN<sup>o</sup> 1221 od 1860.

## 6 ZAKLJUČCI

Cukić je ozbiljno pisao o pitanjima iz demografske oblasti u svom ekonomskom udžbeniku. To nije bilo neuobičajeno mesto za raspravu o demografskim pitanjima pošto su to radili i drugi autori tadašnjih ekonomskih udžbenika: na primer, pomenuti Rošer (1863) ili Džon Stjuart Mil (1848/2004), pa Svetozar Marković (1875) i Mihailo Vujić (1896). Svi oni su se detaljno bavili kretanjem stanovništva, činocima koji na to utiču i posledicama, pa i Maltusovom teorijom.

Iako je pisao za udžbenik, to nije bilo prepričavanje opšteprihvaćenih teorija, već kritička rasprava o pitanjima koja nisu bila apsolvirana u onovremenoj nauci. Stoga se njegov rad može smatrati originalnim u punom smislu reči.

U teorijskom delu, Cukić se oslanjao na Maltusa, ali se i razlikovao. Prihvatao je Maltusov stav da količina hrane predstavlja ograničavajući faktor razvoja stanovništva, a i da je prirodni fertilitet vrlo visok usled snažnog seksualnog nagona ljudi. Ali, bilo je i važnih razlika: kod Cukića ne važi gvozdeni zakon nadnica, tj. nadnice ne teže uvek egzistencijalnom minimumu, kao kod Maltusa; zatim, kod Cukića i kapital utiče na rađanje pošto utiče na količinu raspoloživih sredstava. Cukić nije bio pesimista kao Maltus, već je nalazio znatan rast stanovništva u onovremenoj Evropi, bez masovne gladi i pomora.

Cukić se, vidimo, dosta bavio Maltusom i njegovom teorijom. To je shvatljivo s obzirom na činjenicu da je Maltus tih decenija bio glavni teoretičar populacione problematike i stoga su određivanje prema njegovoj teoriji i diskusija s njim bili neizbežni za svakoga ko je imao nameru da piše o problemima stanovništva.

Kako smo videli, Cukić se bavio i populacionom politikom, i to onim njenim aspektima koji su bili dostupni onovremenim vladama: imigraciona, emigraciona i bračna pitanja. Osnova njegovih pogleda je liberalizam u svakom pogledu, vrlo snažan i dosledan. Cukić se zalaže za širenje polja sloboda, za slobodno odlučivanje o braku, za slobodno useljavanje u zemlju i iseljavanje iz nje, kako je napred navedeno. Ponegde bi postavio minimalne, tehničke uslove. „Lična sloboda... ideal je politične svesti sadašnjeg vremena“. U skladu s tim tvrdio je da „građani nisu samo tek sredstva za praviteljstvene celi“, nego je naprotiv

dužnost vlasti da „olakšava i potpomaže težnje građana k posebnoj i opštoj sreći,” (Cukić 1851: 106), čime je ponovio ideju Džona Loka da država postoji radi građana, a ne građani radi države.

Cukić je polovinom XIX veka pripadao širokom krugu autora koji su suštinski odbacivali Maltusovu teoriju: s jedne strane, ekonomistima koji su tvrdili da će tehnološki napredak i produbljena

podela rada dovesti do ekonomskog napretka koji će zauvek odložiti egzistencijalnu krizu koje se Maltus plašio; i sa druge, demografima koji su verovali je da će radnici više kontrolisati svoj fertilitet kako bi očuvali životni standard nego što je Maltus mislio da je moguće. Pred kraj XIX veka opadanje fertiliteta u zapadnim zemljama bilo je jak dokaz u prilog ovih drugih (Kreager n.d.).

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# The demographic approach to the quality of official ethnicity data in Serbia – a research proposal

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## ABSTRACT

Demographic studies of the population by ethnicity are gaining new significance. Emigration, intensive aging, and declining fertility have caused changes in demographic trends, particularly in communities of different ethnic backgrounds. Ethnodemographic trends are mostly observed through the lens of official ethnic statistics. The most important factor regarding data quality is the approach towards subjective criteria in the self-declaration of ethnic affiliation in censuses and vital statistical surveys. This paper presents examples of statistical deviations of demographic indicators based on official data on ethnicity and introduces a proposal for research into their quality and use value. Our research proposal is based on previous demographic analyses of ethnicity data and focuses on the demographic framework of statistics of ethnicity in Serbia through data quality analysis. We contend that the results presented in the paper constitute a sufficient argument for a broader methodological discussion regarding the necessity of demographic research into ethnicity data to create a “more objective” demographic picture of minorities. Examining the quality of ethnicity data is very important for analysing indicators of statistically variable minority ethnic groups. The results of the research can form the basis for reviewing the data sources on which policies towards ethnic minorities are formulated.

## KEYWORDS

statistics of ethnicity, quality of data on ethnic characteristics, ethnodemographic trends, statistically variable ethnic groups, Serbia

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Along with the intensive modernisation of general social trends, some modernist theories of ethnicity predicted a decline in the importance of ethnic identification of the population (Eriksen 2010: 2), and that the processes of assimilation and ethnic unification would be deepened to the point of the complete disappearance of ethnicity. However, recent ethnodemographic processes suggest something quite the opposite. Issues of ethnic identity have not only survived as an essential facet of modern life, but the importance of ethnic declaration in certain societies has risen sharply (Simon 2012; Goldstone, Kaufmann and Duffy Toft 2012; Frey 2015). In the 19th century, theorists of nationalism who followed the creation of modern nation-states gave way to newer theories that predicted the replacement of national identities with supranational ones (Kertzer and Arel 2001: 1). After primordial understandings of ethnic identity based on biological kinship (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963), constructivist schools implied the perspective of “emerging ethnicities” arising from certain socio-economic conditions in society (Yancey et al. 1976; Sarna 1978; Bauman 2011). The more recent period is reflected in the instrumentalist or situationalist ideas of the existence of ethnicity as a means of gaining an advantage or fulfilling personal interests (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Gellner 1983; Banton 1983; Banks 1996). Thus, the end of the 20th century marked the revival of the question of ethnicity and nation in public debates and scientific works, both in developing and developed countries.

The concept of ethnic identity has been a controversial issue since the first ethnological studies. Some of today’s understanding of ethnic identity dates

back to the middle of the 19th century, especially through the conflict of two opposing concepts: the German ethnographic school and the French civil (state) approach to ethnic identity (Kertzer and Arel 2001). During the ‘60s and ‘70s, scientific discussions about the ethnic identity of the population reached such proportions that some authors spoke of the emergence of an “ethnicity industry” (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995). In the ethnodemographic statistics of Serbia, data on the ethnic characteristics of the population is obtained through the census and vital statistics by answering a set of ethnoidentity questions, which in this part of Europe are formulated through national (in the ethnic sense), linguistic (according to the concept of mother tongue), and confessional affiliation. As ethnostatistics are used as a basis for ethnodemographic research in Serbia, as well as in other countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, these are closely related to the concept of ethnic identity in demography.

Nowadays, the collection of ethnicity data is a contentious issue in many countries (Simon and Piché 2012), but the study of ethnicity and national minorities has gained new importance and is becoming the backbone of the policies of many modern societies (Gabbert 2015). Mass migrations, intensive aging and the declining fertility of the population have caused changes in the demographic structures of many countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, including Serbia, which, among other things, initiated a re-examination of existing concepts of ethnic identity (Knežević 2011; Simon 2012; Simon, Piché and Gagnon 2015; Knežević and Radić 2016). Current ethnodemographic trends are the result of a large number of different factors. Unequal demographic development



and divergent trends of natural and spatial movement of different national communities are just some of the most significant ethnodemographic processes occurring in Serbia (Radovanović 1995; Knežević 2005). As previously mentioned, issues of national, linguistic and religious<sup>1</sup> identity in Serbia are mostly observed through official censuses and vital statistics, which is often a limiting factor in the demographic research of ethnicity. This is especially important because these issues are woven into the social, legal and political order of most countries. Therefore, there is a need to reconsider both the methodological solutions of ethnic statistics and their application in public policies (Đurić et al. 2014; Bašić and Lutovac 2020). Research into the ethnographic and ethnodemographic characteristics of the population of former Yugoslavia have shown that the results of official statistics cannot be an indicator of real demographic processes in the population, given that there were large regional and ethnic differences, while ethnic factors played a significant role in overall population dynamics (Radovanović 1996). Statistical issues of ethnic identity in multiethnic societies that are reflected in the results of censuses and vital statistics are gaining special importance, especially statistics of ethnicity and ethnodemographic research, but also in issues of public politics. This is especially noticeable in the research of floating ethnic groups, which vary statistically from census to census due to frequent changes in attitudes when declaring ethnic identity in official statistics because of the influ-

ence of various socio-cultural, political or economic factors (Radovanović 1995; Knežević 2017). Therefore, the available official ethnic statistics must be used with caution in demographic research, especially because that data represents a quantitative basis for minority policies.

Within this context, the central part of the paper focuses on the proposal of researching the use value of official ethnicity data through the application of various scientifically based demographic methods and techniques. The examination of long-term demographic trends according to ethnic characteristics of the population in Serbia raises the question of whether census and vital statistics data can be accepted without limitation as a quantitative basis, not only for demographic research, but also for formulating and implementing public policies, especially those defining the legal and political position of minorities. In a broader sense, the subject of the paper revolves around censuses and vital statistics as the main sources of data on the ethnic characteristics of the population of Serbia, which include nationality (in the sense of ethnicity), language (according to the concept of mother tongue), and religion.

The main goal of this paper is to check the quality of ethnicity data<sup>2</sup> that derives from censuses and vital statistics using different demographic approaches. This is done in several segments:

<sup>2</sup> Measuring the changes in the growth index can be a good starting point for checking the quality of ethnicity data. The growth index between two consecutive censuses can vary between 90-110, based on both components of population dynamics and with long-term stable trends of migrations. In the statistics of the Republic of Serbia, however, the growth index for some ethnic groups ranges from 7-1007. Such results have to be additionally and thoroughly looked through and checked with different demographic methods.

<sup>1</sup> Although religion in certain ethnological and anthropological research (as well as in official ethnostatistics) is considered an important ethnic feature of the population of Serbia, this data will not be analysed in this paper due to its long absence in vital statistics.

- Evaluation of the methodological approach to definitions of ethnic characteristics, methods of collecting data, ethnic categorisation within official statistical nomenclatures, processing, as well as the distribution and publication of data;
- Proposal of research that would check the quality of existing ethnostatistics data in Serbia by analysing their use value in demographic research;
- A review of selected documents that define minority issues whose quantitative basis is based on census statistics.

The results of the research into demographic characteristics of the population of Serbia according to ethnic characteristics indicate the need to review the methods of data selection on the basis of which minority policies are formulated and implemented in the Republic of Serbia. This task is based on the idea of applying the demographic approach as an unavoidable methodological corrective in the process of selecting official ethnic statistics data that would be incorporated into official legislation on which many segments of everyday life of minority communities depend. This implies that the research process offers various scientifically based methodological approaches to the analysis of ethnodemographic trends, respecting general and specific theoretical concepts based on the assumption of the diversification of ethnodemographic systems according to the outcomes of reproductive norms and migration processes. As already defined in the objectives of the paper, these tasks cannot be achieved without analysing all methodological approaches to statistics of ethnicity and a critical attitude towards the final data.

The defined goals imply the exhaustive use of ethnicity data from censuses and vital statistics recorded between 1948 and 2021. The expected results of the analysis should indicate the need for demographic approaches, both in ethnodemographic research and the primary selection of basic data on ethnicity in the creation and implementation of public policies aimed at addressing the problems faced by minority communities.

## **2 SELECTED RESULTS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH**

The selected results are based on previous ethnodemographic research of the population of Serbia, published from 2014 to 2019 (Đurić et al. 2014; Knežević and Radić 2016; Knežević 2017; Knežević 2019; Knežević, Radić and Bakić 2019). The results of demographic research by declared nationality in Serbia after the Second World War indicate pronounced differences in population growth and decline, which confirms the previously presented thesis on the necessity of using an analytical approach to census data (Table 1).

The quantitative part of the research is expressed in the results obtained by statistical analysis of census data on the ethnicity of the population of Serbia from 1948 to 2011. The growth index (Table 2) and the standard deviation of the growth index by nationality (Table 3) show that in the inter-census periods, two models of changes in population dynamics are clearly distinguished.

Tabular comparative representations of the dynamics of the population of Serbia according to declared nationality and mother tongue as seen using data from the census between 1953 and 2011 show different levels of deviation according to the stated characteristics (Table 4).

**Table 1** Population of the Republic of Serbia according to declared nationality, 1948–2011<sup>3</sup>

	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991 <sup>1)</sup>	2002 <sup>1)</sup>	2011 <sup>1)</sup>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,527,966</b>	<b>6,979,154</b>	<b>7,642,227</b>	<b>8,446,591</b>	<b>9,313,677</b>	<b>7,759,920</b>	<b>7,498,001</b>	<b>7,186,862</b>
Serbs	4,823,730	5,152,939	5,704,686	6,016,811	6,182,159	6,252,405	6,212,838	5,988,150
Albanians <sup>3)</sup>	532,011	565,513	699,772	984,761	1,303,032	15,406	61,647	5,809
Ashkali	/	/	/	/	/	/	584	997
Bosniaks	/	/	/	/	/	/	136,087	145,278
Bulgarians	59,472	60,146	58,494	53,800	33,455	26,698	20,497	18,543
Bunjevci <sup>4)</sup>	/	/	/	/	/	21,434	20,012	16,706
Vlachs	93,440	28,047	1,368	14,724	25,596	17,804	40,054	35,330
Gorani	/	/	/	/	/	/	4,581	7,767
Greeks <sup>5)</sup>	/	1,279	1,178	840	757	916	572	725
Egyptians	/	/	/	/	/	433	814	1834
Jews <sup>5)</sup>	/	1,054	1,250	1,128	683	1,107	1,158	787
Armenians	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	222
Yugoslavs <sup>6)</sup>	/	/	20,079	123,824	441,941	320,168	80,721	23,303
Hungarians	433,701	441,907	449,587	430,314	390,468	343,800	293,299	253,899
Macedonians	17,917	27,277	36,288	42,675	48,986	45,068	25,047	22,755
Muslims	17,315	81,081	93,467	154,330	215,166	180,222	19,503	22,301
Germans	41,460	46,228	14,533	9,086	5,302	5,172	3,901	4,064
Roma	52,181	58,800	9,826	49,894	110,959	94,492	108,103	147,604
Romanians	63,160	59,705	59,505	57,419	53,693	42,316	34,576	29,332
Russians	13,329	7,829	6,984	4,746	2,761	2,473	2,588	3,247
Ruthenians <sup>2)</sup>	22,667	23,720	25,658	20,608	19,757	18,052	15,905	14,246
Slovaks	73,140	75,027	77,837	76,733	73,207	66,772	59,021	52,750
Slovenians	20,998	20,717	19,957	15,957	12,006	8,001	5,104	4,033
Turks	1,914	54,526	44,434	18,220	13,890	765	522	647
Ukrainians <sup>2)</sup>	/	/	/	5,643	5,520	5,042	5,354	4,903
Croats <sup>4)</sup>	169,864	173,246	196,409	184,913	149,368	97,344	70,602	57,900
Aromanians	/	/	/	/	/	/	293	243
Montenegrins	74,860	86,061	104,753	125,560	147,466	118,934	69,049	38,527
Czechs	6,760	5,948	5,133	4,149	3,225	2,675	2,211	1,824
Šokci <sup>4)</sup>	/	/	/	/	/	1,738	717	607
Šopi	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	142
Other	9,214	7,807	7,267	6,989	17,289	7,166	7,051	9,530
Undeclared	/	/	/	4,486	7,834	10,718	107,732	160,346
Regional	/	/	/	10,409	6,848	4,841	11,485	30,771
Unknown	/	1,994	5,604	30,274	43,222	47,958	75,483	81,740

<sup>3</sup> Periods between censuses are marked with frequent changes in statistical classifications of ethnicity, introduction of new modalities, summarising data for several ethnic groups, changes in definitions of nationalities and ethnic minorities, etc. These were all influenced by ideological and political narratives, especially in cases of attempts to create new ethnic concepts (Janjić 1988; Hayden 1992; Bufon 1997; Josipović 2014; Knežević 2017).

Notes:

- 1) No data for Kosovo and Metohija;
- 2) Until the 1971 census, Ukrainians and Ruthenians were represented collectively;
- 3) In 1991 and 2011 there was incomplete census coverage in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa due to the boycott of the Albanian population;
- 4) Until the 1991 census, Bunjevci and Šokci were shown collectively with Croats;
- 5) In the 1948 census in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a total of 6,853 Jews and 1,830 Greeks were listed, who were not specifically represented by republics but were classified in the category of others;
- 6) In the 1961 census, the Yugoslav modality included citizens who did not declare themselves as one particular nationality or who declared regional affiliation.

Source: Authors' representation based on online data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (RZS 1948–2012).

**Table 2** Growth index of Serbian population according to declared nationality, 1948–2011

	1953/48	1961/53	1971/61	1981/71	1991/81	2002/91	2011/02
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>106.9</b>	<b>109.5</b>	<b>110.5</b>	<b>110.3</b>	<b>83.3</b>	<b>96.6</b>	<b>95.9</b>
Serbs	106.8	110.7	105.5	102.7	101.1	99.4	96.4
Albanians	106.3	123.7	140.7	132.3	1.2	400.1	9.4
Ashkali	/	/	/	/	/	/	170.7
Bosniaks	/	/	/	/	/	/	106.8
Bulgarians	101.1	97.3	92.0	62.2	79.8	76.8	90.5
Bunjevci	/	/	/	/	/	93.4	83.5
Vlachs	30.01	4.9	1076.3	173.8	69.6	225.0	88.2
Gorani	/	/	/	/	/	/	169.5
Greeks	/	92.1	71.3	90.1	121.0	62.4	126.7
Egyptians	/	/	/	/	/	188.0	225.3
Jews	/	118.6	90.2	60.5	162.1	104.7	68.0
Yugoslavs	/	/	616.7	356.9	72.4	25.3	28.9
Hungarians	101.9	101.7	95.7	90.7	88.0	85.4	86.6
Macedonians	152.2	133.0	117.6	114.8	92.0	55.6	90.8
Muslims	468.3	115.3	165.1	139.4	83.8	10.8	114.3
Germans	111.5	31.4	62.5	58.35	97.5	75.4	104.2
Roma	112.7	16.7	507.8	222.4	85.2	114.4	136.5
Romanians	94.5	99.7	96.5	93.5	78.8	81.7	84.8
Russians	58.7	89.2	68.0	58.2	89.6	104.6	125.5
Ruthenians	104.6	108.2	80.3	95.9	91.4	88.1	89.6
Slovaks	102.6	103.7	98.6	95.4	91.2	88.4	89.4
Slovenians	98.7	96.3	80.0	75.2	66.6	63.8	79.0
Ukrainians	/	/	/	97.8	91.3	106.2	91.6
Turks	2,848.8	81.5	41.0	76.2	5.5	68.2	123.9
Croats	102.0	113.4	94.1	80.8	65.2	72.5	82.0
Aromanians	/	/	/	/	/	/	82.9
Montenegrins	115.0	121.7	119.9	117.4	80.7	58.1	55.8
Šokci	/	/	/	/	/	41.3	84.7
Czechs	88.0	86.3	80.8	77.7	82.9	82.7	82.5
<i>Muslims/Bosniaks</i>	468.3	115.3	165.1	139.4	83.8	86.3	107.7
<i>Ruthenians/Ukrainians</i>	104.6	108.2	103.4	95.3	91.4	92.1	90.1
<i>Croats/Bunjevci/Šokci</i>	102.0	113.4	94.1	80.8	80.7	75.8	82.3

Source: Knežević (2017: 445).

**Table 3** Standard deviation of the growth index by nationality, 1948–2011

	StDev		StDev
TOTAL	10.3	Greeks	25.8
<b>Turks</b>	<b>1,052.4</b>	Russians	25.0
<b>Vlachs</b>	<b>377.6</b>	Croats	16.9
<b>Yugoslavs</b>	<b>260.9</b>	Bulgarians	13.5
<b>Roma</b>	<b>160.7</b>	Slovenians	13.4
<b>Muslims/Bosniaks</b>	<b>145.8</b>	Ruthenians	9.7
<b>Albanians</b>	<b>132.2</b>	Romanians	8.1
Jews	37.1	Bunjevci	7.0
Macedonians	31.7	Ukrainians	7.0
Šokci	30.7	Hungarians	7.0
Montenegrins	29.8	Slovaks	6.2
Germans	28.8	Serbs	4.8
Egyptians	26.4	Czechs	3.4

Source: Knežević (2017: 447).

**Table 4** Population of Serbia by declared nationality and mother tongue, 1953–2011

	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	2002	2011
<b>Albanians</b>	<b>565,513</b>	<b>699,772</b>	<b>984,761</b>	<b>1,303,032</b>	<b>15,406</b>	<b>61,647</b>	<b>5,809</b>
<i>Albanian</i>	561,976	684,166	967,416	1,309,197	19,004	63,835	10,040
<b>Bosniaks</b>	/	/	/	/	/	<b>136,087</b>	<b>145,278</b>
<i>Bosnian</i>	/	/	/	/	/	134,749	138,871
<b>Bulgarians</b>	<b>60,146</b>	<b>58,494</b>	<b>53,800</b>	<b>33,455</b>	<b>26,698</b>	<b>20,497</b>	<b>18,543</b>
<i>Bulgarian</i>	59,166	56,325	49,942	35,269	25,408	16,459	13,337
<b>Bunjevci</b>	/	/	/	/	<b>21,434</b>	<b>20,012</b>	<b>16,706</b>
<i>Bunjevački</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/	6,835
<b>Aromanians</b>	/	/	/	/	/	<b>293</b>	<b>243</b>
<i>Aromanian</i>	/	/	/	/	/	114	91
<b>Montenegrins</b>	/	/	/	/	/	/	<b>38,527</b>
<i>Montenegrin</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/	2,519
<b>Czechs</b>	<b>5,948</b>	<b>5,133</b>	<b>4,149</b>	<b>3,225</b>	<b>2,675</b>	<b>2,211</b>	<b>1,824</b>
<i>Czech</i>	4,140	4,295	3,612	1,923	2,036	1,287	810
<b>Gorani</b>	/	/	/	/	/	/	<b>7,767</b>
<i>Goranski</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/	1,636
<b>Greeks</b>	<b>1,279</b>	<b>1,178</b>	<b>840</b>	<b>757</b>	<b>916</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>725</b>
<i>Greek</i>	1,268	1,158	906	798	1,307	421	470
<b>Jews</b>	/	<b>1,250</b>	<b>1,128</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>1,107</b>	<b>1,158</b>	<b>787</b>
<i>Hebrew</i>	/	115	161	39	520	18	28
<b>Armenians</b>	/	/	/	/	/	/	<b>222</b>
<i>Armenian</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/	156
<b>Hungarians</b>	<b>441,907</b>	<b>449,587</b>	<b>430,314</b>	<b>390,468</b>	<b>343,800</b>	<b>293,299</b>	<b>253,899</b>
<i>Hungarian</i>	442,423	449,432	430,621	374,639	348,320	286,508	243,146
<b>Macedonians</b>	<b>27,277</b>	<b>36,288</b>	<b>42,675</b>	<b>48,986</b>	<b>45,068</b>	<b>25,047</b>	<b>22,755</b>
<i>Macedonian</i>	26,937	33,329	36,213	29,421	27,171	14,355	12,706
<b>Germans</b>	<b>46,228</b>	<b>14,533</b>	<b>9,086</b>	<b>5,302</b>	<b>5,172</b>	<b>3,901</b>	<b>4,064</b>
<i>German</i>	46,001	14,474	8,935	3,717	4,246	2,279	2,190
<b>Roma</b>	<b>58,800</b>	<b>9,826</b>	<b>49,894</b>	<b>110,959</b>	<b>94,492</b>	<b>108,103</b>	<b>147,604</b>
<i>Romani</i>	55,324	19,071	50,916	91,443	78,406	82,242	100,668

<b>Romanians</b> <i>Romanian</i>	<b>59,705</b> 66,594	<b>59,505</b> 60,372	<b>57,419</b> 64,832	<b>53,693</b> 56,393	<b>42,316</b> 45,565	<b>34,576</b> 34,515	<b>29,332</b> 29,075
<b>Russians</b> <i>Russian</i>	<b>7,829</b> 6,471	<b>6,984</b> 6,308	<b>4,746</b> 4,266	<b>2,761</b> 1,851	<b>2,473</b> 2,072	<b>2,588</b> 2,199	<b>3,247</b> 3,179
<b>Ruthenians</b> <i>Ruthenian</i>	/	/	<b>20,608</b> 19,209	<b>19,757</b> 16,215	<b>18,052</b> 16,095	<b>15,905</b> 13,458	<b>14,246</b> 11,340
<b>Slovaks</b> <i>Slovak</i>	<b>75,027</b> 73,293	<b>77,837</b> 77,249	<b>76,733</b> 75,511	<b>73,207</b> 67,563	<b>66,772</b> 66,144	<b>59,021</b> 57,498	<b>52,750</b> 49,796
<b>Slovenians</b> <i>Slovenian</i>	<b>20,717</b> 16,389	<b>19,957</b> 16,551	<b>15,957</b> 13,135	<b>12,006</b> 8,396	<b>8,001</b> 7,443	<b>5,104</b> 3,024	<b>4,033</b> 2,269
<b>Serbs</b> <i>Serbian</i>	<b>5,152,939</b> /	<b>5,704,686</b> /	<b>6,016,811</b> 6,412,559	<b>6,182,159</b> /	<b>6,252,405</b> /	<b>6,212,838</b> 6,620,699	<b>5,988,150</b> 6,330,901
<b>Croats</b> <i>Croatian</i>	<b>173,246</b> /	<b>196,409</b> /	<b>184,913</b> 91,500	<b>149,368</b> /	<b>97,344</b> /	<b>70,602</b> 27,588	<b>57,900</b> 19,223
<i>Serbian, Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Croatian</i>	5,364,717	6,056,245		7,108,148	6,847,226		/
<b>Šokci</b> <i>Šokački</i>	/	/	/	/	<b>1,738</b> /	<b>717</b> /	<b>607</b> 363
<b>Šopi</b> <i>Šopski</i>	/	/	/	/	/	/	<b>142</b> 1,482
<b>Turks</b> <i>Turkish</i>	<b>54,526</b> 27,984	<b>44,434</b> 23,796	<b>18,220</b> 15,606	<b>13,890</b> 16,351	<b>765</b> 904	<b>522</b> 432	<b>647</b> 420
<b>Ukrainians</b> <i>Ukrainian</i>	/	/	<b>5,643</b> 4,415	<b>5,520</b> 2,019	<b>5,042</b> 3,256	<b>5,354</b> 2,668	<b>4,903</b> 1,909
<b>Vlachs</b> <i>Vlach</i>	<b>28,047</b> 198,861	<b>1,368</b> 106,656	<b>14,724</b> 139,902	<b>25,596</b> 129,613	<b>17,804</b> 71,534	<b>40,054</b> 54,818	<b>35,330</b> 43,095
<b>Other</b> <i>Other languages</i>	<b>7,807</b> 36,955	<b>7,267</b> 3,031	<b>6,989</b> 17,129	<b>17,289</b> 7,274	<b>7,166</b> 150,619	<b>7,051</b> 14,958	<b>9,530</b> 32,098
<b>Undeclared</b> <i>Undeclared</i>	/	/	<b>4,486</b> /	<b>7,834</b> /	<b>10,718</b> /	<b>107,732</b> /	<b>160,346</b> 46,499
<b>Unknown</b> <i>Unknown</i>	<b>1,994</b> 1,936	<b>5,604</b> 5,585	<b>30,274</b> 39,805	<b>43,222</b> 53,407	<b>47,958</b> 42,295	<b>75,483</b> 63,877	<b>81,740</b> 81,692

Note: In the table, nationality is indicated first, then the corresponding language.

Source: Knežević (2019: 464).

It should be noted that the methodological problems of ethnodemographic studies of floating ethnic groups are especially evident in the harmonisation of census and vital statistics data, on the basis of which demographic indicators and trends are derived. Comparing data from vital statistics on natural increase and census statistics on the absolute increase in the number of members of selected variable ethnic groups in Serbia (Table 5) in the last

inter-census period, we conclude that there is no correlation between these two indicators. That means that this data, although it is the only official source, cannot form the basis for establishing scientifically based demographic trends, on the basis of which it would be possible to draw conclusions, especially those that would directly affect various aspects of legal, political, cultural, and overall social positions of floating ethnic groups.

**Table 5** Natural increase (J) and absolute growth (R) of selected varying ethnic groups in Serbia, 2002–2011

	J	R
Albanians	7,892	-55,838
Montenegrins	-2,139	-30,522
Yugoslavs	383	-57,418
Germans	-812	163
Roma	21,301	39,501
Vlachs	-525	-4,724

Source: Authors' representation based on census and demographic statistics from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (RZS 2002–2011).

Due to the evident statistical oscillations of data on ethnic characteristics in different inter-census periods and current vital statistics, the research proposal implies the use of specific methodological approaches to demographic analysis, as well as the use of standard demographic indicators of natural change and migrations.

Based on the presented results of the research on the variability of the population growth index of Serbia according to declared national affiliation from 1948 to 2011, two models of growth dynamics stand out. The first model is characterised by uniform or slightly variable changes in the growth index in both directions, the causality of which is based on interpretable demographic trends derived from census and vital statistics. The low variability of the growth index of Serbs, Bulgarians, Bunjevci, Hungarians, Macedonians, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Ukrainians, Croats, and Czechs was influenced by relative stability in the expression of national identity in censuses<sup>4</sup> and relatively linear trends of natural increase and

migrations. There is a continuous and steady decline in the observed period of the number of Slovenians, Romanians, Russians, and Czechs, while the population dynamics of Serbs, Macedonians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Croats is characterised by an initial slight increase and then a decline until the end of the observed period (Table 1). On the other hand, based on the results of the analysis of the standard deviation of the growth index, ethnic communities that are characterised by variable models of population dynamics stand out. However, it would be unfounded to attribute any oscillation in population dynamics to floating behaviour in national declaration in censuses. Although the values of standard deviations clearly distinguish variable ethnic groups (Table 3), it should be considered that the range of deviations cannot serve as a complete basis for qualitative separation of floating ethnic groups because it meets only the numerical principle of grouping. Given that the variability of floating ethnic groups is primarily determined by changes in attitudes towards national declaration in censuses (which is caused by a wide range of socio-cultural, political, and economic factors), it is necessary to single out those whose variability could be affected by changes in methodological solutions in statistics of ethnicity, changes in the statistical nomenclature of nationalities, or interstate agreements on population relocation. The basic characteristics of this type of variability are predictability and the possibility of reconstruction of demographic trends (Knežević and Radić 2016; Knežević 2017).

<sup>4</sup> The low variability and linear trends of the growth index of these ethnic groups expressed in the research results do not exclude ethnic mimicry and a

certain number of their members in the circumstances under which censuses were conducted, although these groups cannot be characterised as floating.



Observing the numerical relations between the number of people declared per nationality and the number of inhabitants with the corresponding mother tongue in censuses from 1953 to 2011, it is possible to single out three models of congruence.

The first model is represented by population contingents where the national and linguistic declarations are harmonised with slight deviations. This group includes Albanians<sup>5</sup>, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Germans<sup>6</sup>, and Romanians (whose number in all censuses was slightly lower than the number of inhabitants who declared Romanian to be their mother tongue). In terms of assimilation, acculturation, and other socio-cultural processes, census data on these groups leads to a conclusion of preserved linguistic identities, regardless of the intensity, direction, and causes of demographic processes.

The second model of numerical relations between the national and linguistic affiliation of the population of Serbia is shown by a moderate correlation characterised by a smaller number of inhabitants of the belonging languages in relation to the number of people declared per nationality, in similar proportions, and in almost all censuses. Regardless of the intensity and direction of population dynamics, these trends are expressed

among Slovenians, Czechs, Russians, and Macedonians in Serbia.

The third and most interesting model is presented by floating, statistically variable ethnic groups. The most significant discrepancies were evidenced between national and linguistic affiliation among the Vlachs and Roma. These were also evident among the Turks in the first post-war censuses, while the sharp increase in the number of Greek native speakers in the 1991 census cannot be explained by well-founded ethnodemographic approaches (Knežević 2019).

### **3 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

The methodology of this research proposal is based on the general assumption that the quality of official ethnic data could be verified by certain demographic approaches. In this sense, we provide several starting hypotheses:

- The use value of official statistical data of ethnicity in Serbia is limited;
- The quality of ethnicity data, calculated indicators, and derived trends can be checked within the demographic framework;
- The quality of census and vital statistics data is directly affected by non-demographic factors such as the officially accepted concept of ethnicity, unstable social and political circumstances that construct identity policy, and the adaptability of ethnic statistic methodology to political and social changes;
- Non-demographic factors affect quantitative demographic research that cannot be explained by demographic theory and practice;
- The official database from the census and vital statistics cannot fully

<sup>5</sup> The significant decline in the number of Albanians since 1991 is due to the mass boycott of the census in Republic of Serbia by Kosovo and Metohija Albanians, who used the boycott of the census to meet political goals. The number of Albanians in the 2002 and 2011 censuses refers only to Albanians from Central Serbia, the censuses were not conducted in Kosovo and Metohija provinces.

<sup>6</sup> An important cause of the variability within this ethnic group is the protocol between the governments of former Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Germany on mutual information on the naturalisation of citizens of the two countries from 1954, which regulates emigration and loss of Yugoslav citizenship.



represent an objective basis for ethnodemographic studies, and thus it can't be an objective data source for minority policymaking;

- The results of demographic analysis could be an integral part of the methodology for selecting data for formulating minority policies in the Republic of Serbia.

Demography most often prioritises data collection, classification, and analysis, which is a procedure that is more appropriate for natural sciences than it is for social sciences and humanities. On the other hand, in most social sciences and humanities, in addition to the usual methodological preparations, priority is given to research planning through defining subjects and determining the two-dimensional time-space framework of research. Considering the position of demography in the system of sciences and the pronounced multidisciplinary character of ethnodemographic research, methodological solutions and experiences of other social sciences are included, with special emphasis on correctly defining all problems that arise in the adequate application of available data sources. The demographic method precisely directs the researcher to phase research, from collecting, processing, and arranging data through their demographic analysis to the phase of causal research, which synthesises all known logical thought processes, such as analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalisation, induction, and deduction.

On the other hand, demographic statistics is a special branch of applied statistics that studies the specifics in terms of population data collection, demographic characteristics, and classifications, as well as issues related to the processing and presentation of population data. Although the demographic method

grew out of demographic statistics, it is significantly specific, and in many forms characteristic of demographic science in general and its disciplines, such as ethnodemography (Serdar 1977; Breznik 1988; Pejčić 1995; Knežević 2013).

#### **4 RESEARCH PROPOSAL FOR THE DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITY OF ETHNICITY DATA**

We contend that the presented results serve as a sufficient argument for a broader methodological discussion regarding the necessity of demographic research of ethnicity that would offer a "more objective" demographic perspective of minorities in Serbia. Our research proposal is based on previous experiences and results of demographic analyses of the population of Serbia according to ethnic characteristics and focuses on the demographic framework of ethnic statistics of the population of Serbia through data quality analysis.

After introductory and methodological discussions, the research proposal considers a theoretical review of ethnic identity issues, followed by research into the links between accepted interpretations of ethnic identity and statistical practice, with a focus on the methodological problems of official statistical data of ethnicity.

Therefore, the general structure of the research will primarily respect existing theoretical understandings of ethnic identity, from early debates and conceptualisation through primordial paradigms to the emergence of instrumentalism and ethnic mimicry in response to the common interest of individual ethnic groups in the theoretical framework of rational choice, as well as theoretical understandings of ethnic identity and the creation of the concept of the modern man in multiethnic

societies. The theoretical significance of ethnic identity in demography is reflected in the study of biosocial and ethnodemographic systems (Radovanović 1988) and their interrelationships, and how ethnocultural determinants of society can affect demographic development and existing fertility and migration patterns in society.

A particularly important segment of the research proposal could be the analysis of the existing statistical practice of collecting data on ethnic characteristics of the population, with special emphasis on ethnic statistics experience during the XIX century, as well as methodological issues around ethnic categorisations of official statistics. In addition to the census, the research will include an overview of the records of ethnic characteristics of the population in vital and accessible migration statistics, while observing the existing methodological problems and limitations.

The central part of the study will be the demographic approach that will serve as a methodological corrective for checking the quality of official ethnic data. Using standard and specialised demographic methods and techniques, the paper will examine available data and whether it can form the basis for creating minority policies in Serbia. Using simple demographic indicators such as absolute increase or decrease, or the population growth index, we will notice that there are certain irregularities in the dynamics of the population of Serbia according to ethnic characteristics that cannot be explained by demographic factors. It is a similar situation with the indicators of natural movement, so the research will approach the process of standardisation of rates in order to identify irregularities that occur due to methodological problems in collecting vital statistics according to ethnicity. The paper will also assess the statistical significance of the components

of population dynamics of variable ethnic groups which, due to the oscillation of the total number of groups, are particularly difficult to monitor.

As a form of specific data processing, we propose the index of ethnic fractionalisation (Fearon 2003), which measures the degree of ethnic diversity in a population, as well as statistical tools of standard deviation and cluster analysis (Murtagh and Legendre 2014) on sets of general demographic indicators of population by ethnicity, such as birth rates, mortality rates, and natural increase, as well as population growth indexes, aging, and population concentration, whose results will allow the presentation of variable models of population dynamics. In the absence of adequate data for longitudinal analysis, cohort influences by ethnicity will only be partially considered using the pseudo-cohort method (Radić and Bakić 2018).

After the expected result, which according to the hypotheses implies the relativisation of the quality of ethnic data in demographic terms, the research plan includes a comparative review of selected public policy documents in the field of minority rights in the Republic of Serbia, which rely on official statistics. Given the great importance of official data sources for formulating minority policies and exercising minority rights, it is especially important to investigate which data on ethnic characteristics of the population can form an integral part of minority policies and which statistical and methodological problems are faced by invisible or floating ethnic groups. From all the above, there is a need to create alternative data sources whose function would be to improve the existing statistics of ethnicity. The final part is dedicated to finding alternative solutions for creating the highest quality ethnicity database that could be applied in scientific and political practice.

## 5 CONCLUSION

Selected results of previous surveys based on official ethnostatistics data, primarily national and linguistic affiliation of the population of Serbia, show low use value in demographic research. If they are not adequate for deriving basic demographic indicators, our opinion is that they are not sufficiently usable for other purposes, especially for defining and implementing sensitive public policies concerning the legal, political, and general social position of certain ethnic groups. The expected scientific contribution of the research proposal presented in this paper can be multidimensional. The contribution is based on the improvement of theoretical and methodological thought on the problem of demographic approaches to the study of ethnicity, and also to find new methodological solutions for providing better ethnostatistics. Their complexity goes beyond demographics, and the solutions and applicability offered further enrich the multidisciplinary character of demography in theoretical and practical terms. The analysis of derived demographic indicators unequivocally shows the real possibilities of verifying the use value of official data of ethnicity, which would change the prevailing practices in demography, but also in the application of public data. Demographic analyses of the population according to ethnic characteristics are most often described simply in officially published data, behind which numerous factors of a non-demographic nature are hidden.

On the other hand, one of the results of this research will confirm the relevance of ethnic statistics for certain ethnic groups, while completely unusable statistical material is expected for certain statistical ethnicity modalities. This second result should initiate the improvement of existing statistics, as well as emphasising the use of alternative sources of sensitive data. This is especially important for those ethnic groups that show significant oscillations in population dynamics. In that way, unfounded interpretations and conclusions that form the basis of public or minority policies would be avoided. Those ethnic groups that are often outside the scope of public policies, such as statistically hidden minorities or floating ethnic groups, could become more visible, both to official statistics and to decision-makers.

The practical result of the work can initiate a set of proposals for the improvement of existing ethnic statistics, as well as solutions for the design of alternative sources of ethnic data that could be equally used as a basis for policymaking. Removing methodological obstacles in official ethnic statistics would enable a more objective view of the ethnic structure of the Republic of Serbia, as well as population dynamics of ethnic groups and their spatial dispersion. As demographic trends are one of the basic elements of strategic and planning reports, the results of the work could allow us to overcome the methodological problems of ethnostatistics, enable more objective demographic analysis and, ultimately, improve the coverage of national minorities under public policy measures.

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# Demografski pristup kvalitetu podataka zvanične etnostatistike u Srbiji – predlog istraživanja

## OPŠIRNIJI REZIME

Veliki broj država i danas razmatra da li da prikuplja podatke o etničkoj pripadnosti stanovništva. Međutim, u uslovima velikih socioekonomskih promena, upravo demografska proučavanja stanovništva prema etničkim obeležjima dobijaju novi značaj i postaju okosnica politika mnogih modernih društava. Brojni demografski procesi poput intenzivne emigracije, starenja i dugoročnog opadanje fertiliteta u Republici Srbiji inicirali su promene ukupnih demografskih trendova i struktura i kod mnogih etničkih zajednica. Etnodemografski trendovi, kao i pitanja nacionalnog, jezičkog i verskog identiteta, u multietničkoj sredini kao što je Srbija pretežno se posmatraju na osnovu podataka zvanične etnostatistike. Jedan od značajnijih faktora kvaliteta podataka je primena subjektivnog kriterijuma pri samodeklarisanju etničkih obeležja (nacionalne, verske i jezičke pripadnosti) u popisima i vitalnoj statistici. U širem smislu, predmet rada predstavljaju popisi i vitalna statistika kao glavni izvori podataka o etničkim obeležjima stanovništva Srbije u koja spadaju nacionalna (u etničkom smislu), jezička (prema konceptu maternjeg jezika) i verska pripadnost. Rezultati istraživanja demografskih karakteristika stanovništva Srbije prema etničkim obeležjima preferiraju preispitivanje dosadašnjih metoda odabira izvora podataka, na osnovu kojih se formulišu i implementiraju politike prema manjinskim etničkim zajednicama u Republici Srbiji. U radu je predstavljen jedan od predloga istraživanja kvaliteta etnostatističkih podataka u Srbiji i njihove upotrebne vrednosti u demografskim istraživanjima. Usled evidentnih statističkih oscilacija podataka o etničkim obeležjima u različitim međupopisnim periodima i vitalnoj statistici, u radu će biti korišćeni i specifični metodološki pristupi demografske analize sa upotrebom standardnih demografskih pokazatelja prirodnog i prostornog kretanja stanovništva. Istraživanje uključuje procenu uticaja primenjenih metodoloških rešenja etnostatistike na kvalitet podataka, predlog pristupa demografske analize prema etničkim obeležjima stanovništva, kao i ograničenja pri analizi kauzalnosti dobijenih trendova. Ispitivanje kvaliteta etnostatističkih podataka je posebno važno za analizu pokazatelja statistički varijabilnih manjinskih etničkih grupa, koje su zbog slabog kvaliteta podataka u popisima i vitalnoj statistici često van obuhvata javnih politika. Rezultati istraživanja mogu predstavljati osnovu za preispitivanje odabira izvora podataka na osnovu kojih se formulišu i sprovode politike prema etničkim manjinama u Srbiji. Kako su demografska istraživanja jedan od osnovnih elemenata strateških i planskih izveštaja, rezultati rada bi mogli da omoguće prevazilaženje metodoloških problema etnostatistike, objektivniju demografsku analizu i poboljšanje obuhvata nacionalnih manjina merama javnih politika.

## KLJUČNE REČI

etnostatistika, kvalitet podataka o etnicitetu, etnodemografski trendovi, statistički varijabilne etničke grupe, Srbija







# Populism and the migrant crisis in Europe – political implications

Zoran Lutovac<sup>1</sup> 

## SUMMARY

Dealing with the migrant crisis in Europe has shown that the regulations, principles, and values of the European Union are overshadowed by the individual interests of its member states. On the one hand, EU member states have faced internal political challenges caused by populism, while on the other hand, there has been a lack of rapid, coordinated, and synchronised measures to solve the problems at hand.

The mass influx of migrants from Asia and Africa to Europe indicates demographic shifts on a historic scale and possible global consequences, but EU member states have been observing the issue and are still observing it primarily from their own national point of view.

A comparative analysis of electoral support for populist parties and movements in Europe since the beginning of the migrant crisis has led to an indicative conclusion that there is a direct correlation between increasing support for populists and the large-scale migrant crisis. The significant influx of migrants has contributed not decisively, but to a significant extent to the creation of a great populist wave that has engulfed almost all of Europe.

## KEYWORDS

populism, migration, migrant crisis, electoral support, Europe

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# Populizam i migrantska kriza u Evropi – političke implikacije

## SAŽETAK

Migrantska kriza 2015. godine pokazala je da su države članice Evropske unije prvenstveno vodile računa o sopstvenim interesima suočavajući se sa masovnim i snažnim prilivom migranata. Na jednoj strani države članice EU su se suočavale sa unutrašnjim političkim izazovima populizma, dok su na drugoj strani izostale brze, usklađene i sinhronizovane mere kojima bi se rešavali problemi.

Na političkom planu još uvek su dinamične rasprave o narušavanju etničkih slika pojedinih država. Te rasprave vrlo brzo su potisnule u drugi plan debate o razvojnim potencijalima „svežeg“ ljudskog kapitala, odnosno integracije migranata u društveno-ekonomske sisteme država članica EU.

Može se reći da je uporedna analiza izborne podrške populističkim strankama i pokretima u Evropi posle migrantske krize dovela do zaključka o tome da postoji direktna korelacija između porasta podrške populistima i velike migrantske krize. Upravo je veliki migrantski talas u dobroj meri doprineo stvaranju velikog populističkog talasa koji je zahvatio gotovo celu Evropu.

Promene unutar Evropske unije nisu išle u pravcu jačanja integrativnih procesa povodom migrantske krize, dok su na unutrašnjem planu država članica jasna pomeranja u pravcu snaženja političkih opcija koje se zalažu za jačanje nacionalnih država. EU bi morala da sprovede institucionalne reforme koje bi ojačale integrativne procese, vrednosni sistem i demokratsku političku kulturu kako bi uticala i na države članice i države kandidatkinje u obuzdavanju populističkih trendova i gušenja liberalnih elemenata u predstavničkoj demokratiji, a u krajnjem, i pluralizma samog.

## KLJUČNE REČI

populizam, migracije, migrantska kriza, izborna podrška, Evropa

## 1 UVOD: DEFINISANJE PROBLEMA, OSNOVNIH POJMOVA I ISTRAŽIVAČKOG OKVIRA

Populizam i migrantska kriza su dva fenomena koja su bila u središtu pažnje javnosti u isto vreme – u vreme velikog migracionog talasa prema Evropi započetog 2015. godine.

Baš u to vreme populizam je u Evropi doživeo ekspanziju. Da li je ekspanzija populizma neposredna posledica velikog migracionog talasa i kakve su političke implikacije u nekim evropskim državama?

Osnovna hipoteza je da bi uporedna analiza političkih prilika u nekim evropskim zemljama potvrdila da je snažna ekspanzija populizma ispoljena baš u vreme velikog migracionog talasa, te da postoji jasna korelacija između ova dva globalna fenomena. Takvu korelaciju je moguće utvrditi na osnovu analize podrške populističkih stranaka i pokreta na talasu njihove antimigrantske retorike i izbornih programa. Činjenica koja potvrđuje tu korelaciju je da su takve stranke i pokreti uvećali podršku u mnogim državama Evrope, kao što je i činjenica da rast podrške koju su dobili nije kratkog daha.

Naravno, važno je napomenuti da je ključni generator populizma sistemskog karaktera – u prvom redu su to neki strukturni defekti i slabosti predstavničke demokratije, kao i porast društvene nejednakosti, te kampanja borbe protiv terorizma.

U ovom radu će se poći od **definicije populizma** kao „tanke“ ili slabo utemeljene ideologije i sve većeg broja autora koji populizam vide kao nešto više od načina političke komunikacije, političkog stila, pokreta ili političke mobilizacije (Albertazzi i McDonell 2008; Mény i Surel 2002; Mouffe 2013; Mudde 2007). *Dakle, populizam je „tanka“ ili slabo utemeljena ideologija koja je odraz volje*

*naroda suprotstavljene korumpiranoj eliti, ali i opasnim ili neželjenim drugima (out groups), onima koji svojim delovanjem ugrožavaju vrednosti i prava naroda.*

Pored elita i „**opasni drugi**“ su oni koji se isključuju iz odrednice narod: nacionalne, verske, jezičke manjine, **imigranti** – svi oni koji narušavaju homogenost i čistotu naroda, ugrožavaju ga ili mu mogu biti pretnja. Otuda ih neki autori (Albertazzi i McDonell 2008) svrstavaju u jednu od ključnih odrednica definicije populizma, dok ih drugi ne uvrštavaju u neophodan sastojak definicije, ali ih povezuju sa radikalnim desnim populizmom, dakle samo jednim od pojavnih oblika populizma. Čini se, ipak, da se opasni drugi ne mogu povezivati samo sa radikalno desnim populizmom s obzirom da i levi populizam, na primer, ima svoje „opasne druge“ poput velikih korporacija, banaka, krupnih kapitalista koji su pretnja narodu (Lutovac 2020).

**Migrantska kriza** u ovom radu označava masovno kretanje stanovništva iz Azije i Afrike, pre svega ka državama EU. To masovno kretanje različitih grupa ljudi, izazvano izbegličkim talasom iz Sirije tokom 2015. godine, naziva se mešoviti migracijski tokovi (Lutovac 2016a). **Mešoviti migracijski tokovi** podrazumevaju u ovom radu „kompleksna kretanja stanovništva, koja uključuju izbeglice, lica koja traže azil, ekonomske migrante i druge migrante“ (IOM 2009).

**Imigracija** prema definiciji iz „uredbe o statistici Evropske zajednice o migraciji i međunarodnoj zaštiti“ podrazumeva dolazak osoba koje su imale boravište na teritoriji neke države u drugu državu, čiji boravak traje ili se očekuje da će trajati (Bobić i Babović 2013).

Migracije su jedan od najkompleksnijih fenomena u društvenim naukama koji zahteva interdisciplinarni pristup u proučavanju (Lutovac 2018b). Da bi se

taj fenomen sveobuhvatno izučavao potreban mu je pristup kroz više naučnih disciplina, od prava, sociologije, demografije, preko istorije, antropologije, pa sve do filozofije i politikologije. Živimo u doba globalizacije, regionalnih i ratnih vojnih sukoba, raskoši i siromaštva koje odlikuju velika kretanja stanovništva. U ovom radu predmet istraživanja će biti sužen na migrantsku krizu 2015. godine i političke posledice po neke evropske zemlje, prvenstveno kroz opštu političko-lošku analizu u okolnostima ekspanzije populizma u kojima se odvijala migrantska kriza i političkih implikacija po neke od država članica EU, a time, u širem smislu, i po EU kao nadnacionalnu zajednicu.

Populisti koriste strah od priliva migranata za jačanje sopstvene političke agende. Migrantska kriza je pokazala da strah od drugačijeg i podsticanje netrpeljivosti prema „drugome“ imaju veliku političku upotrebnu vrednost. Pokazalo se da i u društvima koja su integrativno utemeljena i institucionalizovana, društvima koja uvažavaju i garantuju različitosti, u kriznim situacijama profitiraju političke opcije koje narušavaju te vrednosti (Lutovac 2016b).

## 2 POPULIZAM I IMIGRANTI KAO „OPASNI DRUGI“

Kada se razmatra odnos prema opasnim drugima valjalo bi napraviti razliku između radikalnog i *instrumentalnog* populizma. Ovaj prvi je „narodna“ antielitistička i **„tanka ideologija“** koja deli društvo na narod i protivnike – neprijatelje naroda, teži da zaobilazi ustaljene demokratske procese i na taj način slabi političke institucije. U kategoriju nepoželjnih drugih (neprijatelja) desni radikalni populisti obično svrstavaju, pored političkih elita, i **strance, imigrante**, odnosno nacionalne manjine.

Neka istraživanja javnog mnjenja (Flecker et al. 2004; Mudde 2007) pokazala su da osobe sklone desnom radikalnom populizmu imaju jako izraženu tendenciju ka ksenofobiji, nacionalizmu i autoritarnim stavovima, što je pogodno socijalno tlo i za antimigrantske stavove. Dakle, oni slabo utemeljenu populističku ideologiju simbiotski vezuju za neke elemente radikalno desnog političkog diskursa, nudeći se kao autentični zastupnici nacionalnog interesa i tumači narodne volje (Lutovac 2018a).

Desni radikalni populisti proizvode odbojne narative prema imigrantima i strancima uopšte, u političkom smislu zalažu se za njihovo **isključivanje iz društva i za zatvaranje u nacionalne okvire**. Na takvim temeljima otvara se prostor autoritarnosti, a pluralizam biva prigušivan posredno ili neposredno. Za njih imigranti nisu odbojni samo iz kulturoloških razloga, jer narušavaju ustaljeni kulturni obrazac, nego i zato što zauzimaju radna mesta.

Instrumentalni populizam nije „tanka ideologija“, nego bi se pre mogao definisati kao *način političke komunikacije* mejnstrim političkih aktera. Oni s populizmom koketiraju i koriste ga za pridobijanje što šire podrške na izborima, čak mogu da koriste populistički stil koji sadrži neke elemente radikalnog populizma, ali akteri koji ga koriste zadržavaju pluralističko viđenje političkog sistema ne dovodeći u pitanje ključne institucije liberalne demokratije i ne antagoniziraju radikalno društvo na „nas“, narod, i „njih“, političku elitu i ostale „opasne (neželjene) druge“. Ipak, moguće je da, iako formalno ne dovode u pitanje ključne institucije, svojim delovanjem obezvređuju značaj i uticaj tih institucija, a instrumentalizujući za sopstvene potrebe opasnost od „neželjenih ili opasnih drugih“ mogu stvarati antagonizme u društvu (Lutovac 2020).

### 3 SLABOSTI PREDSTAVNIČKE DEMOKRATIJE, IMIGRANTI I OTUĐENE ELITE – PROSTOR ZA USPON POPULIZMA

Borba za suverenost naroda protiv otuđene elite i slabosti predstavničke demokratije su zajednička nit koja povezuje raznorodne populiste. Nepoverenje, pa i sumnje u demokratske institucije često se javljaju u vreme ekonomskih kriza, kao što je bila ona u Grčkoj ili u vreme „opasnosti po kulturni identitet“ i bezbednost koja se mešovitim migrantskim talasom preko Turske i Grčke širila dalje po Evropi. I naravno, ako se tome dodaju gubitnici globalizacije, odnosno žrtve globalne podele rada i razvoja tehnologija, onda se dobija gotovo kompletna slika potencijalnih nezadovoljnika i podržavalaca populističkih odgovora na životne izazove.

Institucije i etablirane političke stranke kroz ustaljene demokratske prakse u mnogim zemljama nisu se uspešno nosile sa tim izazovima, tako da su u prazan politički i socijalni prostor ušle populističke stranke, pokreti i pojedinci nudeći jednostavna rešenja za suočavanje sa tim izazovima. Jedna od velikih tema na kojima su populistu prozivali etablirane stranke bila je upravo migrantska kriza. Narativi populista, ali i ekstremista, svodili su se na to da su etablirane stranke propustile šansu koju su imale, da su institucije bile u službi korumpiranih i otuđenih političara a ne naroda, i da se pojavljuju nove društvene snage (pokreti) koje će u ime naroda i u interesu naroda i u direktnoj komunikaciji s narodom rešavati probleme koje etablirane stranke nisu htele ili nisu umele da rešavaju (Lutovac 2020).

Kao vrhunac populizma u **Velikoj Britaniji** može se označiti ishod referenduma o Bregzitu. I pored snažne kampanje kreatora javnog mnjenja, političke i ekonomske elite, univerziteta (ili baš uprkos

toj kampanji), građani Britanije su glasali za Bregzit. **Imigranti su imali važnu ulogu u referendumskoj kampanji.** Opšti je utisak kod pristalica Bregzita da su *imigranti* iz EU doneli korist bogatijima i obrazovanijima u srednjoj klasi, dok su istovremeno njihovo prisustvo doživljavali kao realnu opasnost za manuelne radnike i radnu snagu u ruralnim sredinama.

U Britaniji je bilo veoma rasprostranjeno gledište da se u *Brisel* šalju ogromne količine novca koje se troše nenamenski od strane *neodgovornih elita* i da EU administracija parazitira na račun poreskih obveznika iz Britanije. I ne samo to, nego i nameće gomilu nepotrebnih regulativa koje opterećuju slobodno bavljenje malim biznisom ili biznisom uopšte. Takođe, svojstveno razvoju populizma u drugim razvijenim demokratijama, građani doživljavaju političke i ekonomske elite, pa i novinare, kao posebnu političku klasu (kastu) potpuno otuđenu od običnih ljudi, zaokupljenu isključivo sopstvenim interesima, nesposobnu da rešava životne probleme građana, uključujući nekontrolisani priliv imigranata.

**U Italiji** je Bepe Gril došao na vlast obećavajući da će preuzeti vlast od zadovoljne gerijatrijske „političke kaste“ i da će se boriti za moderniju i tolerantiju Italiju. Kada je Pokret pet zvezda postao jak, prema populističkoj matrici vrlo brzo je preuzeo antisistemske narative. Njegovi napadi na korupciju i afere pojedinih političara polako su se pretvarali u radikalno odbacivanje ključnih aspekata političkog sistema, uključujući i sam parlament. Nezadovoljstvo političkim establišmentom jedan je od glavnih pokretača populističkog angažmana, toliko jak da je pokrenuo ekspanziju teorija zavere i otvorenih laži o političkim protivnicima, pretvarajući se iz antiestablišmentskog u antistemski diskurs. Imigranti su bili samo vetar u leđa takvom antiestablišmentskom diskursu.

**Na istoku Evrope** populističke partije sve češće pobeđuju tradicionalne partije na izborima ili su pak dovoljno jaki da budu neizbežni koalicioni partneri ili u najmanju ruku da budu glavne opozicione snage. Od 15 istočnoevropskih zemalja, populističke partije u 2018. godini imaju vlast u sedam, pripadaju vladajućoj koaliciji u još dve i glavne su opozicione snage u tri države. Populističke partije dobile su 20% ili više glasova u samo dve istočnoevropske zemlje 2000. godine, a posmatrajući njihov domet 2018. godine takvi rezultati su postignuti u deset zemalja na istoku Evrope (Sierakowski 2018a). Najezda populizma bi izgledala još dramatičnije kada bi se svemu ovome pridodale različite forme i sadržaji u okviru etabliranih stranaka. Od migrantske krize 2015. godine antimigrantski narativi su izraženi, naročito u Mađarskoj, Poljskoj, pa i Češkoj, a populizam je u ekspanziji i naletu.

**Sve više je potvrda da prolazimo kroz populističku epohu.** Pitanje je u kojoj će meri ovo uticati na osnove liberalne demokratije i „svetski demokratski poredak“. **Demokratija je stabilna kada se svi glavni politički akteri pridržavaju osnovnih pravila demokratske igre. Neka od ovih pravila su formalna, a neka običajna,** prećutna, podrazumevajuća. Sve više je zemalja u kojima se to, zahvaljujući populistima, više ne podrazumeva. Imigranti su samo jedan od izgovora. I to je ključni razlog zašto fenomen populizma nastavlja da bude jedna od glavnih politikoloških tema.

#### **4 STRUKTURALNI I SPOLJNI UZROCI EKSPANZIJE POPULIZMA U EVROPI**

Jačanje populizma u Evropi povezuje se, na jednoj strani, sa jačanjem **otpora ekonomskoj globalizaciji**, dok se na drugoj strani ubrzano jačanje populizma

preklopilo sa **migrantskom krizom** koja je vrhunac dostigla 2015. i 2016. godine. Oba ova uzroka (povoda) jačanja populizma otvorila su i pitanje mesta i uloge **nacionalnih država u okviru EU.**

Da li je pitanju, ipak, samo koincidencija? Da li su navedeni uzroci precenjeni u odnosu na **strukturne slabosti predstavničke demokratije?** Ako nisu, izazov za društvene nauke je svakako baviti se istraživanjima kojima bi se utvrdilo u kojoj meri je migrantska kriza uticala na ekspanziju populizma. Asocijacije na populizam su različite i brojne: jačanje u Poljskoj Stranke prava i pravde (*Law and Justice Party*) Jaroslava Kačinjskog (Jaroslav Kaczynski) koji snagu potvrđuje oktobra 2015, a potom juna 2016. godine Britanci izglasavaju Bregzit. Zabeležen je i porast popularnosti i uticaja radikalne desnice u Holandiji, Francuskoj, Nemačkoj, Austriji, potom i na istoku Evrope, pre svega u Mađarskoj. „Obrana Evrope od imigranata“ postaje važna politička tema.

U Italiji su populističke partije osvojile vlast početkom 2018. godine, a marta meseca Putin je demonstrirao snagu na izborima u Rusiji. U aprilu 2018. godine Viktor Orban je vodio populističku kampanju protiv „opasnih drugih“, neprijatelja mađarske države: migranata i spoljnog neprijatelja iz sveta finansija oličnog u Džordžu Šorošu – i dobio ubedljivu većinu.

Erdogan je faktički i institucionalno ojačao pre i posle referenduma za koncentraciju vlasti, udarajući na unutrašnje i spoljne neprijatelje... Zaoštravanje retorike i politike unutar i među balkanskim vlastodršcima – više ili manje se povezuju sa populizmom, a snaženje populizma i sa velikim migrantskim talasom, iako to na Balkanu ipak nije dominantna politička tema.

**Upravljanje strahovima** i manipulacije pretnjama dominiraju međunarodnom političkom scenom, što koriste desni

populisti unutar sve većeg broja evropskih zemalja, dok se **redistribucijom ekonomske moći** bave levi populisti, bacajući u senku posrnule socijaldemokrate koje birači sve manje žele da čuju.

Upravo je populizam fenomen koji se više ili manje opravdano povezuje sa ovim, naizgled neuporedivim, državama i režimima. Na drugoj strani, postavlja se pitanje da li populizam koji je sam po sebi kontroverzan može biti najmanji zajednički sadržalac izučavanja političkih zbivanja i fenomena u tako različitim državama?

Populistički pokreti i narativi traže i nalaze svoje uporište ne samo u velikoj migrantskoj krizi, nego i u tradicionalnim izvorima: **nacionalizmu, antielitizmu, antiliberalizmu, nativizmu i sve više u antiglobalizmu**. Upravo antiglobalizam regrutuje veliki broj populističkih kreatora i sledbenika, dominantno obeležavajući fenomen populizma 21. veka.

Manipulacije medijima, proizvodnja kvazidogađaja, politizacija sudskih presuda, proglašavanje političkih oponenta za neprijatelje, proizvodnja i negovanje „opasnih drugih“.

Populizam se ne pojavljuje samo kao „alternativa“ etabliranim strankama, nego se istovremeno infiltrira u njih i društvo u celini. U populističkom narativu produbljuje se jaz između političke klase i društva, **ali nema racionalnih odgovora na krizu reprezentativne demokratije**. Populizam narasta u ambijentu političkih i društvenih podela, kompromisu suprotstavlja uništavanje „neprijatelja naroda“. Nastaje i izgrađuje se na izgubljenom poverenju građana u etablirane stranke, pa i u institucije reprezentativne demokratije, ali i nestaje na iznevernim očekivanjima. **Na kraju se ispostavi da se olako data obećanja ne ispunjavaju i populisti gube poverenje**. Tako se zatvara krug nepoverenja, olako

datih i neispunjenih obećanja i izneverenih očekivanja.

Osim primera prodora populizma, postoje i primeri koji se navode kao **uspešni otpori populizmu**: od Makrona u Francuskoj, preko stvaranja velike koalicije u Nemačkoj koja je spojila CDU-CSU i SPD – umerenu desnicu i umerenu levicu, „everything-but-the-populists“ u Holandiji, te umerena levica u koaliciji sa radikalnom, ali proevropskom levicom u Portugalu (Botopoulos 2018).

Austrija je sasvim drukčiji primer suočavanja sa populizmom: kooptiranje desnih populista u vladajuću koaliciju. Iako može pokrenuti procese za otklanjanje defekata reprezentativne demokratije, primer Austrije pokazuje da je populizam u osnovi najčešće iracionalan, antipluralistički orijentisan, opasan po demokratske vrednosti – te se samim tim ne može suzbijati isto tako populističkim metodama i sredstvima. Upravo obrnuto – odgovarajućim racionalnim narativima, boljom komunikacijom, češćim kontaktima i bliskijim vezama sa građanima neophodno je tražiti načine za otklanjanje defekata demokratije i neposrednije i aktivnije učešće građana u formulisanju i sprovođenju političkih ciljeva.

## 5 DEMOKRATIJA SE NEGUJE, NE UZIMA SE ZDRAVO ZA GOTOVO

Da bi opstali i bili konkurentni autoritarnim populistima, mejnstrim političari bi trebalo da shvate uzroke građanskog (narodnog) nezadovoljstva i da obnove temeljne principe demokratije. „Donedavno je liberalna demokratija bila neprikosnovena. Uprkos nedostacima, većina građana bila je duboko posvećena ovom obliku vlasti. Ekonomija je rasla. Radikalne stranke su bile beznačajne. Političari su mislili da je demokratija u mestima poput Francuske ili Sjedinjenih



Država davno postavljena u temelj i da će se u narednim godinama malo šta promeniti. Politički gledano, izgledalo je da budućnost neće biti mnogo drugačija od prošlosti“ (Mounk 2018).

Građani su, međutim, razočarani partijama, vladama, uopšte politikom; postali su uznemireni, ljuti, čak i ogorčeni. Postali su nezadovoljni i predstavničkom demokratijom u načelu i svim njenim konkretnim slabostima. Autoritarni populisti su na talasu tog nezadovoljstva u ekspanziji širom sveta. Niti oni sami, niti oni koji glasaju za njih ne vide u tome bilo kakav problem. Naprotiv, autoritarci smatraju da su oni pravi odgovor na sve slabosti predstavničke demokratije, dok birači glasaju za njih iz različitih razloga, ali sa zajedničkim nezadovoljstvom time **kako demokratija funkcioniše i otuđennošću političkih elita.**

**Primer Donalda Trampa** često se navodi kao najupečatljivija manifestacija demokratske krize na globalnom nivou. On je tipičan primer populiste koji se poziva na narod, definišući ga tipično populistički: „Jedina važna stvar je ujedinjenje naroda, jer drugi nisu bitni“, jasno aludirajući da među građanima SAD postoje i oni koji ne pripadaju narodu. Pokrenuo je izgradnju antimigrantskog zida na granici, pooštrio mere za ulazak u SAD. Medije je nazvao neprijateljima naroda, tako popunjavajući rubriku obaveznih elemenata za jasno profilisanje populizma. Dakle, drugi ili nisu bitni ili su bitni kao neprijatelji naroda, što se označava kao centralna osobina autoritarnog populizma.

Populisti koji su u simbiozi sa radikalnim idejama su u usponu, baš kao i oni koji jesu radikalna desnica i u Nemačkoj, Austriji, Francuskoj, Italiji, Španiji, Holandiji, pa čak i u Švedskoj, krijući svoj ekstremizam iza patriotskih parola. U javnoj sferi su im u tom „prikriivanju“ pomagali

kreatori javnog mnjenja svodeći njihov ekstremizam na populizam.

**Desni ekstremisti nisu isto što i populist i takvo njihovo označavanje vodi razblažavanju njihove ekstremne prirode.** Oni koriste populističke narative i populistički način javne komunikacije, ali njihovo delovanje je pogubnije po političku kulturu i temeljne institucije predstavničke demokratije nego populizam umerenijih političkih grupacija bilo koje ideološke podloge. U Grčkoj i Španiji populist su svojim pobedama, odnosno etablirane stranke svojim porazima, doveli u pitanje temelje partijskog sistema, ali ipak to nije bio ekstremizam koji bi urušavao temelje evropskih vrednosti.

U nekim drugim državama ekstremne desne opcije, razblaženo imenovane populistima, udaraju upravo na te vrednosne temelje. U Austriji, kandidatu krajnje desnice malo je nedostajalo da postane predsednik. U Francuskoj su ekstremni desničari na predsedničkim izborima ujedinili sve ostale u podršci protivniku njihovog kandidata. Politički ambijent se brzo menja širom Evrope, desni ekstremizam je sve vidljiviji, levica je ispustila tradicionalno biračko telo koketirajući sa krupnim kapitalom i podržavajući manje ili više otvoreno finansijski fundamentalizam.

I tu bi jasno trebalo postaviti **granicu između desnog populizma i desnog ekstremizma: nedovođenje, odnosno dovođenje u pitanje demokratskih i liberalnih evropskih vrednosti.**

I na kulturnom planu je ekstremna desnica nametala teme i dovodila u pitanje osnovne evropske vrednosti: Jerg Hajder je podrivao vrednosne temelje liberalne demokratije prevrednovanjem austrijske nacističke prošlosti, tvrdeći da „naši vojnici nisu kriminalci; najviše su žrtve“. Gert Vilders, vođe stranke Holandske slobode kaže da je islam „opasna totalitarna



ideologija“. Dok su drugi ekstremisti koji su nazivani populistima pokušavali da zabrane minarete ili burke, Vilders je išao korak dalje zahtevajući zabranu Kurana (Mounk 2018).

## 6 POPULISTIČKA ITALIJA

Politički zemljotres u inače politički veoma trusnoj Italiji izazvali su populistu „Pokreta pet zvezda“ i „Lige“. Oni su Italiju učinili prvom zapadnoevropskom razvijenom državom koja je potpuno dospela u ruke populista (Cotta 2018).

Populistički Pokret pet zvezda (M5S) snažno je zakoračio na političku scenu tokom parlamentarnih izbora 2013. godine. Nastao je oko komičara Bepe Grila koji je okupljao ljude protiv „kaste“ – vladajućeg sloja profesionalnih političara i novinara.

Sa 32% osvojenih glasova posle migrantske krize, „Pokret pet zvezda“ postao je najjača politička grupacija u Italiji. Uspeh populista učinili su potpunim drugoplasirana „Liga“, koja se uspešno transformisala iz regionalne Lige za sever u Nacionalnu ligu, i „Forca Italija“, takođe populistička, koja je od 1994. godine bila dominantna u koalicijama desno od centra. Ovaj populistički trojac upotpunjuje sliku opšte ekspanzije populizma u Evropi i nagoveštava dominaciju u politički šarolikoj i stranački nestalnoj Italiji. Između 1994. i 2008. godine „Forca Italija“ je tri puta predvodila vladu, ali nikad populistu nisu dobili dovoljno glasova kao ovog puta. Ovaj put, populistički narativ „Forca Italije“ nije bio toliko atraktivan, što zbog nefokusirane kampanje i ograničenog pojavljivanja lidera Berlusconija. I nad, doskora, najvećim populistom pojavio se veći populistu.

Dve najjače populističke grupacije, koje čine više od 50% biračke podrške,

odlikuje izraženi **kriticizam prema nacionalnoj i evropskoj politici**, odnosno prema domaćim elitama i briselskoj administraciji. Kritički odnos prema prethodnoj vladajućoj garnituri i prema EU bile su ključne tačke u kampanji sa obećanjem održavanja referenduma o evru. Strukturalno posmatrajući, kao ključni razlozi za uspeh populista navode se kombinovani kontekstualni i politički činioci: pored negativnog odnosa prema EU, u percepciji građana na ekonomskom planu nije dovoljno učinjeno da se otklone posledice duboke recesije posle Velike ekonomske krize, što je izazivalo **strah od nezaposlenosti i pada životnog standarda**. Lideri „Pet zvezda“ i „Lige“ svoje izborne platforme zasnivali su na aktuelnim i veoma prohodnim temama: prvi na **moralizaciji** i kritici političke elite koja kreira politički život, a drugi na **migrantskom pitanju i evropskim izazovima** (Cotta 2018).

Opšti trend opadanja podrške levo pozicioniranim strankama iskazao se i u Italiji izbornim porazom vladajuće Demokratske partije. I u ovom slučaju, kao i diljem Evrope, pokazalo se da **etablirana levica gubi socijalnu osnovu**: predgrađe Milana, na primer, masovno je glasalo za nacionalističke populiste (Ligu), dok su u Torinu i Rimu najsiromašniji delovi grada glasali za Pokret pet zvezda. U sva tri grada za Demokratsku partiju, koja pripada etabliranoj levici, najviše se glasalo u najbogatijim delovima grada (Melloni 2018).

Na industrijski razvijenom severu birači su podržali Ligu koja je u prvi plan stavljala smanjenje poreskih stopa i **protivila se dolasku imigranata**, dok su ekonomski zaostali regioni na jugu, gde je velika neapostlenost mladih (negde i do 60%), natprosečno glasali za Pokret pet zvezda koji je u središte kampanje stavljao borbu protiv korumpirane elite i garantovane osnovne prihode (Reichlin 2018).

Ideološki zaokret ka neoliberalizmu nekada pojedinačno najjače Komunističke partije uništio je njene socijalne korene, gurnuvši od sebe tradicionalno biračko telo. Opredeljujući se za „Treći put“, **socijaldemokrate su u Italiji, kao i u drugim zemljama, u pokušaju da prošire biračku bazu ostali bez one koju su nekada imali.** „Takav pokušaj je primereniji za dvopartijske političke sisteme“ (Melloni 2018). **Demokrate su govorile o finansijskom tržištu i odgovornoj ekonomskoj politici, ali ne i o eksploataciji i nejednakosti što su njeni nekadašnji i potencijalni birači želeli da čuju.** I dok su oni ukazivali na značaj protržišne ideologije, nejednakost i siromašenje koji su erodirali srednju klasu postali su teme populista.

Branko Milanović je ukazao da su upravo radnici i srednja klasa stvarni gubitnici globalizacije. Izborne trke pomeraju se od centra ka ekstremima (u Engleskoj, SAD) preko populističkih platformi. Protestno glasanje u Italiji nije moglo naći predstavnika na leviци. „Slobodni i jednaki“ (Free and Equal – partija nastala od Demokratske partije, osvojila je tek oko 3% glasova). Pokazalo se da ne postoji više kredibilna stranka na leviци koja može da zadobije poverenje radničke klase. Sloboda i jednakost je shvatila suštinu gubitka podrške Demokratske partije, ali nije razumela da nije dovoljno suočiti se sa greškama iz prošlosti i da oni *ne žele samo dostojniju verziju predstavnika establišmenta.*

Potvrđujući prirodu populizma kao slabo utemeljene ideologije koja ulazi u simbiozu sa etabliranim ideologijama, Pokret pet zvezda je u svom programu imao klasične izborne komponente radikalne levice, što im je pomoglo da pobeđe u najsiromašnijim regionima zemlje i među mladim glasačima. Takođe, osvojili su podršku i 50% glasova nezaposlenih

(Melloni 2018), kapitalizujući **frustraciju birača političkom klasom** (narod protiv oligarhije, „korumpirane političke kaste“) i pokušavajući da relaksiraju ekonomsku nesigurnost birača pledirajući za univerzalne osnovne prihode. Dakle, sve ono što etablirana levica nije nudila ponudili su populistu preuzimajući njihovo biračko telo. *Ipak, u njihovom programu ili narativu nije bilo suštinski važnih odgovora na ekonomska pitanja poput odnosa radnici–kapital, nejednakosti ili o kapitalizmu samom.* Čini se i van Italije. Levica bi morala da postavi suštinska pitanja i ponudi realnu alternativu funkcionisanju neoliberalne ekonomije, odnosno ekonomije tržišnog fundamentalizma.

Može se reći da je posle izbora 2022. godine populizam učvršćen kao dominantan politički koncept i da su se stvari uz to još pomerile udesno, prelivajući se preko granica desnog populizma u radikanu desnicu. Pojedinačno najjača stranka postala je krajnje desna stranka *Braća Italije*, koju predvodi Đorđa Meloni, a njena desna koalicija ima uverljivu većinu u parlamentu.

## 7 POPULISTIČKO ISKUŠENJE I ETABLIRANI ODGOVOR U NEMAČKOJ

Budući da populizam nije sam po sebi ideologija, nego mu je potrebno simbiotsko vezivanje za pojedine potpune ideologije, mnoge etablirane političke partije različite ideološko-programске orijentacije koriste populizam kao način komunikacije za pridobijanje veće podrške: republikanci u Sjedinjenim Državama, konzervativci i laburisti u Velikoj Britaniji i republikanci pod novim rukovodstvom u Francuskoj. Manifestacija ove pojave održava se i na vladajuću CDU /CSU u Nemačkoj naročito posle lošijih rezultata na parlamentarnim izborima

2017. godine i uspeha radikalno desne Alternative sa Nemačku (AFD), koji su izazvali turbulencije (naročito unutar CSU).

Osim u bivšim komunističkim državama Istočne Nemačke, najbolje rezultate AfD je postigao u uporištu CSU-a u Bavarskoj, tako da je odbrana desnog krila od AfD-a postao jedan od prioriteta CSU. U tom cilju, dugogodišnji lider CSU, Horst Zehofer, dao je novi populistički ton partiji. Kao novoosnovani ministar unutrašnjih poslova u novoj velikoj koalicionalnoj vladi kancelarke Angele Merkel, on je simbolički nagovestio populistički zaokret uključujući reč domovina (Heimat) u ime ministarstva i zaoštravajući odnose sa CDU. Osim toga, Zehofer je poznat po svojim dobrim vezama i odnosima sa drugim autoritarnim populistima poput Orbana i Putina.

U javnom diskursu Zehofer je zaoštrio desno-populističku retoriku (u intervjuu za tabloid Bild provokativno je izjavio da „islam ne pripada Nemačkoj“) kako bi pridobio, odnosno preoteo od AfD-a birače antimigrantskih stavova. U martu 2017. godine, dok se Merkel pripremala za svoj prvi sastanak sa američkim predsednikom Donaldom Trampom, Zehofer je otišao u Moskvu demonstrirajući naklonost prema ruskom predsedniku Vladimiru Putinu. Od tada se dosledno suprotstavlja svim sankcijama prema Rusiji, po bilo kom osnovu. Zehofer je takođe blagonaklono govorio o vladajućim populistima u Poljskoj i javno iznosio simpatije prema mađarskom populistu Viktoru Orbanu (Sierakowski 2018b).

CSU pod njegovim liderstvom pomena pažnju **sa ekonomskih tema na kulturne i identitetske**. No to je trend koji nije izražen samo u Bavarskoj i Nemačkoj, nego istovremeno širom istoka i zapada Evrope: u Mađarskoj, Poljskoj, Češkoj, Austriji, Holandiji i Italiji... Istovremeno, kancelarka **Angela Merkel,**

**koja je najavila povlačenje, zastupa antipopulističke stavove. Ona je ukazala na rastući nacionalizam i populizam u Evropi, vodi proimigrantsku politiku i umesto nacionalizma zalaže se za jačanje Evropske unije i bilateralne saradnje unutar nje. Oni koji se zalažu za sasvim drugu politiku pozivaju se na identitetsko ugrožavanje.**

U čemu je specifičnost Nemačke kada je populizam u pitanju?

I pored rasta popularnosti AfD-a (Alternative für Deutschland) i stabilnog rejtinga stranke Linke koju neki svrstavaju u levi populizam, za Nemačku se može reći da je, u poređenju s drugim evropskim državama, u manjoj meri bila pogođena populističkim talasom. Neki autori smatraju da za to postoje strukturalni razlozi: **1. istorijsko iskustvo koje Nemce čine obazrivijim – iskustvo desnog i levog totalitarizma,** nasleđe Trećeg rajha i realsocijalizma u istočnom delu zemlje; **2. ekonomska snaga – nezaposlenost na istorijskom minimumu i stabilan veliki rast od 10% od 2013. do 2017. godine,** te **3. funkcionalan socijalni sistem** (Bröning 2017).

Prema The Global Trust Report, od 2016. godine jaz između političara i građana pokazuje se i u pogledu odnosa prema nekim ključnim političkim pitanjima kao što je na primer **imigracija: za razliku od establišmenta većina građana bi zatvorila vrata imigrantima, a čak 70% njih veruje da „islam ne pripada Nemcima“.**

Dakle, osim strukturalnih razloga, poput pogubnih istorijskih iskustava i tabua proisteklih iz takve prošlosti i ekonomske ekspanzije, postoje osnove za razvijanje populizma u Nemačkoj i pitanje je kada će taj strukturalno prigušeni potencijal doći do izražaja. Jedan od načina je da se relativizacijom mračne prošlosti oslobode ti potencijali, a drugi je slabljenjem ekonomske moći.

## 8 POPULIZAM U SKANDINAVIJI

Jedan od primera nadolazeće plime populizma u Evropi je i **Danska**. Nekada nejak, nacionalistička Danska narodna partija danas predstavlja drugu partiju po snazi. Osim toga, stavovi i politike koji su pre dvadesetak godina bili svrstavani u ekstremističke, danas su deo narativa i politika većine etabliranih političkih partija. Dakle, ne samo da se radikalna desnica u javnoj sferi nazivala anestetizirajućim terminom populizam i na taj način uticala na to da bude prihvatljivija u društvu, nego joj je takav tretman, između ostalog, omogućio rast podrške među građanima.

Prema nekim ocenama, do ovih promena došlo je i iz spoljnih razloga: uticaja 11. septembra i nametanja **tema islamskog terorizma**, zatim zbog **priliva izbeglica** iz Sirije, ali i domaćih nacionalističkih odgovora na ove spoljne izazove. U međuvremenu se *pojavila „nova desnica“, koja dalje zaoštrava identitetsko-kulturološka pitanja* ne rizikujući pri tome da će favoriti na ekstremnoj margini, nego se, naprotiv, približava ulasku u parlament šireći oko sebe *zaoštrenu retoriku, manipulišući strahovima i podelama, apokaliptično nagoveštavajući građanski rat* sa islamistima (Brygger 2017). Briger upozorava na to sa kolikom lakoćom su mejnstrim političari spremni da prihvate nacionalno ekstremne pozicije kada to postane deo glavnog političkog toka i ukoliko ima praktičnu upotrebnu vrednost u svakodnevnom političkom životu: „Čim je nacionalizam mejnstrim, ljudi zaboravljaju koliko je politički ekstremna ta pozicija [...] *autoritarni nacionalistički pokret je najbrže rastući i najopasniji politički pokret na svetu* [...] u različitim državama se pojavljuje u drugačijim formama, ali postoje neke zajedničke odlike ovih ideja. Prva i osnovna ideja je da zemlja treba da bude prvi prioritet

građanima. Trampova ‘prvo Amerika’ je savršeni primer“ (Brygger 2017).

Jačanje ekstremizma kod Skandinavaca, gde se to najmanje očekivalo, upozoravajući je indikator opšte radikalizacije u Evropi i pomeranja fokusa politike iz socioekonomske u identitetsku sferu.

Uspeh desničarskih i ksenofobičnih stranaka u **Švedskoj** obično se objašnjava populističkom platformom „mi protiv njih“, koja se zasniva na stvaranju percepcije **sukoba između naroda i elite**. U onim populističkim pokretima desničarske orijentacije, koji su najviše porasli, postoji i jasna **kritika otvorenosti, globalizacije i liberalne demokratije** – tipičnih populističkih narativa. Takođe, jedno od najčešćih objašnjenja za povećanje podrške desničarskim populistima je **imigracija**. U Švedskoj su mnogi političari i lideri profitirali ukazujući na „velikodušnu migracionu politiku“ koalicione vlade.

Međutim, ima i onih koji ukazuju na druge uzroke jačanja populizma. Stokholmski think-tank „Futurion“ upućuje na to da se rastući populizam može objasniti brigom ljudi za to šta se dešava na tržištu rada. Političari i mnogi stručnjaci su potcenili značaj privrede i zaposlenosti i preцениli pitanje imigracije. Zbog toga je često pogrešna reakcija etabliranih stranaka na jačanje populizma (Enarsson i Enarsson 2018).

Iako Futurionov izveštaj (Pravi uzroci populizma – o automatizaciji i drugim promenama na poslu) ukazuje na to da rezultati izbora u Švedskoj i drugim zemljama ne pokazuju korelaciju između imigracije i podrške populizmu, čini se da ipak postoji korelacija.

Izveštaj ukazuje na to da su za porast populizma važnije promene na tržištu rada i u ekonomskim trendovima. Upućuje se, na primer, na studiju ekonomiste Sirusa Dehdarija na Univerzitetu u Stokholmu koja ukazuje na **snažnu korelaciju**

**između viška nezaposlenih i podrške za desne populiste – švedske demokrate.** Oni su na iznenađenje mnogih pobedili na izborima 2022. godine. Ipak, metodološki je sporno umanjiti značaj imigrantskog faktora ukazujući na to da je višak nezaposlenosti osnovni izborni motiv za glasače u Švedskoj. Naprotiv, prisustvo ili priliv novih migranata samo pojačava taj strah i učvršćuje populističku izbornu orijentaciju.

Populisti u strahovima građana od gubitka posla vide temu za jačanje rejtinga, a ne problem koji bi trebalo sistematski rešavati i uticati na smanjivanje teskobe i strahova, pa i ličnih troškova povodom tehnoloških promena. Preobuka i obrazovanje za nove poslove su najvažniji instrumenti, ali i efektivno osiguranje od nezaposlenosti. No, instrumentalizovanje strahova može biti politički profitabilnije. U mnogim zemljama se i etablirane stranke u tome nadmeću sa populistima. Nekada se nadmeću i u **antimigrantskoj retorici i ksenofobiji**. Ovo je, međutim, bitka u kojoj će populisti uvek biti jači. Ako bi se nepopulistički političari umesto toga fokusirali na ekonomiju i radna mesta, imali bi bolje šanse za uspeh, a i građani za poboljšanje kvaliteta života. Populističke stranke retko imaju bilo kakav odgovor na to.

## 9 JAČANJE POPULIZMA U ŠPANJI

Na vanrednim parlamentarnim izborima u Španiji, koji su održani aprila 2019. godine, pobedili su vladajući socijalisti, ali ipak nisu dobili dovoljnu većinu za formiranje nove vlade ni sa levičarskim Podemosom. Ove izbore obeležio je i ulazak u parlament desnih populista, partije Vox, koja se bori protiv separatizma, unapređenja prava žena, imigracije, tolerancije i otvorenosti u društvu. „Dvadeset četiri nacionalistička poslanika u parlamentu

će biti ponosna što su Španci i neće ćutati kada zakonodavac prekrši ustav, podsmeva se našoj zastavi ili pokušava da uništi nacionalno jedinstvo“, rekao je Santijago Abaskal, lider Voxa.

Pod pritiskom rasta nezaposlenosti i rastućeg nacionalizma, i socijalisti su u kampanji pre svega govorili o borbi protiv katalonskog i baskijskog separatizma. Dobili su najveću pojedinačnu podršku, ali im je bilo neophodno bar 12 glasova opozicije da bi formirali vladu: „Budućnost je pobedila, a prošlost je izgubila. Jedini uslov koji ću tražiti za ulazak u koaliciju je poštovanje španskog ustava i težnja ka socijalnoj pravdi, suživotu i političkom čišćenju“, rekao je španski premijer Pedro Sančes. Socijalisti su prošli bolje nego što je najavljivano, što je svojevrsna nagrada za podizanje minimalnih zarada i bolju zaštitu i promociju žena.

Španija, ipak, i posle ovih izbora ostaje duboko podeljena zemlja. Politička stabilnost nije na vidiku, a nacionalne teme su u prvom planu. Težnja za nezavisnošću Katalonije uzdrmla je čitavu Španiju, koja je na ovim izborima odgovorila novim i snažnijim nacionalizmom. Plan o reformama potisnut je u drugi plan. Podrška Narodnoj stranci, koja je vodila Španiju do maja 2018. godine, drastično je opala. Narodnjaci su ostvarili najlošiji rezultat do tada, osvojivši tek 66 mandata u poređenju sa 137 u prethodnom sazivu parlamenta.

Ovi izbori su potvrdili da tradicionalno dvostranačje u Španiji postaje prošlost i da populizam ulazi snažno u politički život Španije na talasu visoke nezaposlenosti i korupcije. U potrazi za alternativnim političkim opcijama pojavili su se politički akteri poput Podemos na levisi, Građana na centru ili Voxa na desnici. No, od uvođenja demokratije od pre 40 godina Španija na nacionalnom nivou nikada nije imala koalicionu vladu.

Dakle, evropski trendovi nastavljeni su i u Španiji: čak i tamo gde su levičari dobili većinsku podršku dominirale su nacionalne teme, a ta podrška nije dovoljna za formiranje stabilne vlade. Nastavljen je evropski trend sve većih političkih fragmentacija i pravljenja komplikovanih koalicija. Nastavljen je trend uspona desnog populizma, koji je u tesnoj vezi sa teškim porazom konzervativaca zbog korupcijskih skandala. S obzirom na težinu njihovog poraza, uspeh Voxa i nije tako veliki bez obzira što ulazak u parlament sa 10% jeste izuzetan rezultat. Nije tako veliki i zbog toga što su ključne teme kampanje bile upravo takve da je rezultat mogao biti bolji: korupcija, **imigracija** i katalonska nezavisnost.

Podemos je kažnjen zbog unutrašnjih podela, skandala i ne tako čvrstih pozicija o ključnim pitanjima, naročito o katalonskoj nezavisnosti – epilog je da je izgubio skoro trećinu podrške u odnosu na 2016. godinu. Sve u svemu, socijalno-političke okolnosti su bile i još uvek su povoljne za razvoj populizma, pa se može reći da su glavni protagonisti desnog i levog populizma u takvim okolnostima prošli lošije nego što su mogli.

## 10 SNAGA DESNOG POPULIZMA U MAĐARSKOJ

Mađarski građanski savez (Fides), na čelu sa premijerom Viktorom Orbanom, ponovo je 2018. godine osvojio ubedljivu većinu na parlamentarnim izborima. Prethodne pobjede u 2010. i 2014. godine omogućile su Orbanu da korenito promeni mađarski ustav. Sistematski je slabio mehanizme demokratske kontrole i ravnoteže vlasti, gradeći ono što se danas navodi kao neliberalna demokratija. Orban je novom pobjedom na izborima učvrstio poziciju predvodnika populističke politike na desnom političkom spektru

Evrope. Orban i Fides osvojili su 133 od 199 mesta u parlamentu na izborima velike izlaznosti (68,13%) i uz porast podrške od preko 3,6%. Dvotrećinskom većinom dobio je mogućnost da dodatno marginalizuje opoziciju i otvori prostor za dalju institucionalizaciju nadmoći.

Izborni uspeh FIDES-a zasnivao se na desno-populističkim porukama – na evroskeptičnoj, **antimigrantskoj i ksenofobičnoj retorici**. O odnosu liberalnog i demokratskog u Orbanovoj Mađarskoj svedoči i činjenica da je Mađarska prva zemlja članica EU koja je u izveštaju Freedom Hausa (Freedom House) kategorizovana kao delimično slobodna.

Pobeda na izborima 2022. godine bila je još ubedljivija nego ona četiri godine ranije: „Ostvarili smo pobjedu koja je toliko velika da se vidi sa Meseca, a svakako se vidi i iz Brisela“, rekao je tom prilikom Orban. Na taj način njegova evroskeptična, antimigrantska i ksenofobična politička agenda dobila je još jednu verifikaciju, a Mađarska je ostala predvodnica populizma na istoku Evrope.

## 11 POPULIZAM U POLJSKOJ

Poljska *Pravo i pravda*, poput autoritarnih populističkih partija i organizacija, sklona je da *ograničava vladavinu prava u ime naroda*, odnosno da eliminiše u što je moguće većoj meri ograničenje sopstvene vladavine. Takođe, sklona je da preispituje standarde i vrednosti EU i neke aspekte globalizacije, kao i da u hijerarhiji vrednosti bezbednost stavlja iznad slobode. Neki autori liberalne orijentacije manifestaciju populizma u Poljskoj vide i na ekonomskom planu kroz tzv. „repolonizaciju“, odnosno ponovnu nacionalizaciju nekih preduzeća – „umesto završetka privatizacije, vlada jača kompanije u državnom vlasništvu“ (Tatal 2017).



Tatal ukazuje posebno na ekonomske troškove populizma koji su u Poljskoj sakriveni ili rasuti i, generalno, na to da se razvoj i ekonomski rast i stabilnost ekonomije podređuju kratkoročnim političkim koristima (Tatal 2017).

Sklonost ka autoritarnom populizmu iskazuje se kroz pokušaje kontrole medija, izbornu zakonodavstvo koje bi ojačalo vladajuću garnituru ili politički uticaj na pravosuđe. Antimigrantska retorika nije dominantan faktor izbornih uspeha, ali je svakako nezaobilazan.

Veliki migrantski talas 2015. godine pospešio je antimigrantsko raspoloženje u Poljskoj do te mere da je antiislamsko raspoloženje bilo veoma izraženo i u sredinama gde nije bilo muslimana, što je autor Adam Balcer nazvao islamofobijom bez muslimana. I to je bio ne samo antimigrantski sentiment, nego pre svega odraz široko rasprostranjenog evroskepticizma, otpora liberalnim vrednostima razvijenog zapada i podrške konzervativnim tradicionalnim vrednostima. Paradoks je da da je najširi konsenzus na toj platformi nađen upravo na antimigrantskim, odnosno antiislamskim stavovima (Balcer 2019).

## 12 ZAVRŠNO RAZMATRANJE

U vreme migrantske krize države članice EU su se suočavale sa unutrašnjim političkim izazovima populizma, dok su na

drugoj strani na nivou Unije izostale brze, usklađene i sinhronizovane mere kojima bi se rešavali problemi. Na političkom planu još uvek su dinamične rasprave o narušavanju etničkih slika pojedinih država. Te rasprave vrlo brzo su potisnule u drugi plan debate o razvojnim potencijalima integracije migranata u društveno-ekonomske sisteme država članica EU.

Može se reći da je uporedna analiza izborne podrške populističkim strankama i pokretima u Evropi posle migrantske krize dovela do indikativnih zaključaka o tome da postoji direktna korelacija između porasta podrške populistima i velike migrantske krize. Upravo je veliki migrantski talas u dobroj meri doprineo stvaranju velikog populističkog talasa koji je zahvatio gotovo celu Evropu.

Promene unutar Evropske unije nisu išle u pravcu jačanja integrativnih procesa povodom migrantske krize, dok su na unutrašnjem planu država članica jasna pomeranja u populističkom pravcu i pravcu jačanja političkih snaga koje se zalažu za jačanje nacionalnih država. EU bi morala da sprovede institucionalne reforme koje bi ojačale integrativne procese, vrednosni sistem i demokratsku političku kulturu kako bi uticala i na države članice i države kandidatkinje u obuzdavanju populističkih trendova i gušenja liberalnih elemenata u predstavničkoj demokratiji, a u krajnjem, i pluralizma samog.

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# Workforce aging and decent work in the era of the digital economy – towards a holistic public policy approach

Sanja Stojković Zlatanović <sup>1</sup>  Predrag Jovanović <sup>1</sup> 

## ABSTRACT

The aging of populations and the labour force, combined with the process of digitalisation, have a significant impact on labour markets, employment, and labour rights worldwide. Industries and jobs that rely on age-appreciating skills, which improve with age, are positively affected by both aging and digitalisation, since automation compensates for the lower physical abilities of older workers, thereby increasing their productivity. On the other hand, automation threatens physical and routine jobs that require low skills. In this paper, the authors used an empirical approach and inductive method to analyse the simultaneous influence of aging and digitalisation on workforce skills and demand for employees. In the future, governments' efforts to stimulate employment and decent work should include providing high-quality education that prepares the workforce to gain and upgrade creative and social skills. These changes require policy and regulatory interventions to address the issues of skill shifts and the transition towards both digital and green economies, while simultaneously promoting and standing for decent work conditions. This presupposes that businesses introduce and adopt sustainable, dynamic, and inclusive workplace practices. The authors propose the age management mechanism as a human resource tool, as well as its legal counterpart, the age-responsible due diligence approach, for managing the necessary changes.

## KEYWORDS

aging workforce, digitalisation, age-appreciating skills, decent work standards, human rights due diligence approach

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Overall, labour markets are undergoing significant transformations globally, with many workers employed in informal, precarious, and nonstandard forms of work, leading to increasing inequalities (ILO 2019). Unemployment is a major challenge for policymakers, as it is a leading cause of poverty. Therefore, it is crucial to assess how demographic changes and the automation of production will affect future employment needs.

The demographic trend of population aging, which has intensified in the past three decades, is considered one of the major obstacles to economic growth that is expected to strengthen in the future as the participation of the elderly population increases (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2017). The prime reason for the potentially constraining effect of the aging labour force on economic growth lies in its declining productivity, as workers are expected to reach their peak performance in their 40s (Murphy and Welch 1990). According to a 2016 IMF study, Japan's annual total factor productivity was 0.7–0.9% lower between 1990 and 2007, mainly due to a decreasing share of employees in their 40s (Liu and Westelius 2016). The trend of declining birth rates and increasing life expectancy, particularly in highly developed countries such as Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2019), is transforming the age structure of the labour force in those countries, consequently changing their economic and foreign trade structures. As some cognitive capacities tend to decline with age, countries with higher aging rates may experience a decrease in both the

quantity and quality of those cognitive skills, which could affect industries that rely on them for competitive advantage.

Psychological research has shown that certain abilities, such as language capacities, can improve with age (Cai and Stoyanov 2016). However, other abilities, including speed of information processing, multitasking, memory, capacity to learn new skills and adapt to changes in working processes, and physical abilities like mobility, speed, endurance, and coordination tend to deteriorate with age (Phiromswad, Srivannaboon and Sarajoti 2022). The ability to combine knowledge and skills is crucial for each occupation or industry, and understanding how this ability relates to age can help us estimate the effects of an aging labour force on future employment, economic structure, and competitiveness. Another significant factor that has influenced employment in the past two decades is computerisation, which encompasses artificial intelligence (including machine learning and cognitive computing), robots (including service robots, robot-assisted procedures, and robotic process automation), and automation technologies (Coombs et al. 2017).

One of the defining features of this century is the rapidly increasing use of digitalisation in labour operations, which includes the automation of production, the use of robots in services and manufacturing, and the wider use of artificial intelligence and machine learning. In many countries, particularly highly developed ones where labour is more expensive than in developing economies, certain types of jobs have already been widely automated, such as cashiers in supermarkets, bank tellers, and car manufacturing. This has raised concerns around the world that millions of employees could lose their jobs in

the future due to being replaced by machines (Hawksworth, Berriman and Saloni 2018; McKinsey & Company 2017).

The aim of this paper is to elaborate upon the expected simultaneous impacts of the aging population and workforce, as well as automation on future employment and economies. The method applied in this research is multi-disciplinary, as the authors discuss the main economic and legal implications of workforce aging and computerisation. Moreover, they try to identify the key elements for improving public policy and regulatory frameworks towards shaping a decent and sustainable working environment. The study has been limited to the European public policy framework and industrialised Western countries' human resources management practices, since population aging and digitalisation are recognised as among the most significant challenges facing societies and economies in the coming decades.

## **2 AUTOMATION, POPULATION AGING, AND GLOBAL WORKFORCE SKILL TRENDS – AN OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS**

Research by Oxford Economics foresees that approximately 20 million manufacturing jobs on a global scale – representing 8.5% of the employees working in the global manufacturing industry – may be replaced by robots by 2030 (Alcover et al. 2021). According to a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), nearly half of existing jobs in the 32 countries covered by the research will probably be significantly affected by automation (Nedelkoska and Quintini 2018). More than 66 million workers are employed in jobs with the highest probability of

automation (70% probability or higher), with that number representing 14% of total jobs. In addition, 32% of jobs in the 32 observed countries have an above average risk of automation, with the probability ranging from 50% to 70% (Nedelkoska and Quintini 2018). The widespread impact of automation affecting every second job would result in significant changes to how these jobs are performed, leading to a shift in the skills and abilities required.

Frey and Osborne (2017) estimated that almost half (47%) of 702 occupations in the USA are at high risk of computerisation. Furthermore, a study on the influence of automation on employment in Finland and Norway found that approximately each third worker in these two countries is at high risk of computerisation (Pajarinen Rouvinen and Ekeland 2015), while in Singapore it was a quarter (Fuei 2017). A comparable study on the effects of digitalisation on employment predicts that 12% of current jobs will become automated (Schinner et al. 2017).

In the UK, approximately 7% of existing jobs could be affected by automation with a probability of 70% during the next five years. In a 10-year period, the share of jobs impacted by automation would increase to 18% and reach 30% after 20 years (PwC 2021).

Since the processes of population and workforce aging are taking place simultaneously with the computerisation of production, and are among the major forces that affect the labour market, our aim is to analyse their interactions and explore the results of their joint influence on employment and labour in the future. The level of employment at national level and its structure by industries depends on marginal labour productivity. Demand for labour will be

on the rise until the marginal revenue product of labour equals the cost of labour (wages). In that case, companies will cease to employ new workers, since each additionally hired employee brings lower revenue than his/her wage. In addition, other factors remain constant due to the law of diminishing marginal return. The demand for labour can be increased by raising productivity that depends on workforce skills and abilities, and by using more efficient equipment and machines in places where automation plays a significant role.

As Cai and Stoyanov (2016) argue, a country with an above average share of elderly people and workers would turn to production styles where age-appreciating skills are more important than age-depreciating ones. Demographics and the age distribution of the workforce determine the productivity of industries and the economy. An aging workforce is favourable for the development of industries that rely on age-appreciating skills, but is problematic for industries whose productivity declines due to their dependence on age-depreciating skills.

For example, in industries such as construction that rely on age-depreciating skills such as coordination, divided attention, and agility, aging reduces workers' competitiveness and their share in the national economy. On the other hand, the same tendency supports occupations where age-appreciation abilities – such as written or oral communications skills – are important, as is the case with sales representatives, for instance. Cai and Stoyanov (2016) confirmed the effects of aging on industry and occupational structures as well as on countries' competitiveness in their study, which included 86 industries and covered the period between 1962 and 2010.

Some studies focus on activities (job tasks) instead of aggregate occupation levels (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003). These studies classify tasks into abstract, routine, and manual ones, matching them with the skills they require: cognitive and physical abilities. Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn (2016) analysed the effects of digitalisation on jobs in 21 OECD countries based on task approach and concluded that only 9% of occupations are endangered by automation. They claimed that Frey and Osborne overestimated the effects of computerisation on the labour market, since automation replaces specific tasks within each occupation, rather than the whole occupation.

Further research brought a new approach to evaluating the potential impacts of computerisation on job replacement. Brynjolfsson, Mitchell and Rock (2018) pointed out that there was a difference between ways in which machine learning technology (MLT) and computerisation affected occupations. In two-thirds of occupations, MLT is expected to replace not more than 20% of tasks within those occupations.

When analysing the impact of aging on employment, working abilities can be classified as: age-appreciating cognitive ability, age-depreciated cognitive ability, and age-depreciated physical ability (Phiromswad, Srivannaboon and Sarajoti 2022). The first category refers to skills that typically improve with age, such as verbal abilities and written expression. Age-depreciated cognitive abilities like memory, divided attention, and speed of processing information decrease with ages. Physical skills are age-depreciated, since physical abilities such as agility, body coordination, strength, and stamina weaken as individuals get older.

Phiromswad, Srivannaboon and Sarajoti (2022) found that the probability of computerisation was highest for office and administrative support (83.65%), manufacturing (81.81%), and food preparation and serving occupations (78.90%). The first of these occupational groups consists of routine, highly standardised, and predictable tasks, such as creating documents in standard forms and scheduling meetings, which are easy to computerise. In such cases, computers are a much more productive and cost-effective solution than human workers.

The occupations with the lowest chances of being replaced by computers are social service providers (6.91%) and healthcare practitioners (17.05%), since the most important abilities required in these occupations are social intelligence, perception, communication, and empathy (Phiromswad, Srivannaboon and Sarajoti 2022). The study provided examples of occupations where workforce aging was advantageous, such as in fields like legal (58.62), business and financial operations (50.38), and community and social services (49.74). For those occupations, oral comprehension and oral expression are of crucial importance. In these areas, aging employees positively contribute to productivity with marginal revenues being higher than marginal cost. Because of that, workforce aging has a positive effect on employment. At the same time, aging has the highest negative effects in construction and extraction (10.02) and maintenance and repair occupations (16.37). For these occupations, physical abilities that decrease with age are of key importance, as are age-depreciated skills such as time sharing and perceptual speed.

In their 2022 study, Phiromswad, Srivannaboon and Sarajoti concluded that computerisation can enhance the

productivity of workers in occupations that require age-appropriate cognitive ability, but whose physical skills decline with age, such as healthcare and social care. Therefore, automation could be beneficial in these industries. When analysing the impact of digitalisation and population aging on the labour market, it is crucial to consider their interactions.

### **3 WORKFORCE AGING AND SKILL SHIFTS IN THE DIGITAL ERA**

Research conducted by Abeliansky et al. (2019) predicted that between 2020 and 2030, 98% of the new job needs for the working-age population (aged 15–64) would be generated in lower-income countries. During the same period, higher-income countries will undergo a 66% increase in their number of older people (65+). As a result, the majority of older workers will likely be employed in highly developed countries that have invested heavily in digitalisation (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020). However, a Harvard study estimated a low increase (11%) in job needs for those aged 15–24 until 2030 (Abeliansky et al. 2019).

The job replacement effect resulting from automation is strongest for physical, routine jobs that require low skills and are typically intended for younger workers in lower-income countries. This is due to the fact that automation poses a threat to a young workforce of lowly educated people performing routine tasks, who face severe competition in their lower-income countries, as well as automation replacement in higher-income countries.

On the other hand, automation is not expected to have adverse effects on demand for the aging working force in higher-income countries, since it has little impact on jobs requiring



age-appreciating abilities. Computerisation can have a positive effect on the work of aging employees by helping them perform routine tasks, thus making their work more productive. For example, legal assistants are at high risk of being replaced by computers because they perform routine tasks such as searching for documents. However, lawyers who rely on input from their assistants are at low risk of being affected by automation, since the abilities of persuasion and social perceptiveness are of key importance for their work. It can be concluded that routine jobs that consist of precisely defined tasks, such as manufacturing and administrative tasks, could easily be replaced by automation. This is what encourages workers to move from middle-income manufacturing to low-income service jobs, where flexibility and adaptability are more valued (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003; Goos, Manning and Salomons 2014; Autor and Dorn 2009).

On the other hand, as Frey and Osborne (2017) pointed out, jobs that rely on the following skills are hard to replace with computers: 1) social perceptiveness – referring to awareness of others' reactions and understanding of what lies behind those reactions; 2) negotiation – bringing people together, using management skills to help them work as a harmonious team by reconciling differences; 3) persuasion – influencing people to shift their opinions or behaviour and, 4) assisting and caring for people – providing personal assistance, medical attention, emotional support, or other personal care to colleagues, clients, and patients. Jobs based on the above-mentioned abilities may actually benefit from automation. For example, doctors' jobs could be made more efficient by introducing a data management

system that would support their work, thus freeing them from administrative tasks and making them more productive.

Goos, Manning and Solomon (2014) highlighted an increasing polarisation of the labour market, with automation affecting low-skill and low-wage jobs in particular. As Bordot (2022) pointed out, the impact of automation was 2.5 times higher for younger workers (aged 25–34) with secondary education or below than for older workers (aged 55–64) with tertiary education. Moreover, robots could replace workers with a medium level of education, thus contributing to the polarisation of the labour market. With automation progressing further, low-skilled workers will get additional incentives to move towards jobs that are based on creativity, social perceptiveness, and social intelligence, as these jobs are less susceptible to automation.

In Europe, the general digitalisation trend is expected to affect the labour force twofold by: a) increasing demand for high-skilled white-collar workers and b) raising polarisation and shortages in the labour market (Eurofound 2021). Changes in the labour market require an adequate employment policy from each country, with the aim of achieving and sustaining high employment rates while simultaneously creating decent working conditions for all categories of workers, particularly the most vulnerable ones.

One of the key instruments in lower-income countries would be to provide high-quality education that would prepare the workforce to gain and upgrade creative and social skills. This means that the creators of public policies should consider the fact that needs for certain skills (for example technological, social and emotional) would be on the rise, while the demand for other skills such as physical and manual ones would



decrease. In higher-income countries i.e. industrialised Western countries with an aging labour force, the government's strategic goals would be to keep older workers healthy and to enable those who would like to stay active within the labour market after the age of 65 to use their age-appreciating abilities. Moreover, governments should support the application of automation in workplaces where age-appreciating skills are the key competitive factor in order to help older workers overcome their disadvantages in specific tasks requiring age-depreciating and physical skills. Thus, policymakers should focus on providing high-quality health and occupational care. Furthermore, legal amendments are needed to allow people to work after 65, and there is a need to create incentives for companies to hire older workers.

#### **4 REVISITING PUBLIC POLICY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS – TOWARDS DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH**

The key employment and labour policy interventions that could prepare the existing regulatory framework for the digital revolution and workforce aging can be identified as follows: 1) the development of specific vocational and skills training programs for categories of workers who are the most affected by change, especially younger and older ones; 2) an application of so-called age management practices at the macro (state) and micro (company) level as a measure of corporate sustainability; 3) an improvement of health and safety protection in the workplace; 4) the introduction and implementation of flexible working arrangements, and 5) revision of existing anti-discrimination legislation in terms of setting positive discrimination

measures for older workers, as well as the adoption of specific measures to combat age discrimination practices in workplaces based on prejudice and negative age-related stereotypes, which can be found at individual, organisational and institutional levels.

The above-mentioned interventions serve to meet the targets of the UN's sustainable development goal 4 (SDG4), pertaining to the need for "ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all", as well as of SDG8, which is "decent work and economic growth". The first two interventions (1 and 2) could be classified as policy instruments, mainly related to the broader institutional (1) and organisational practice (2) at the micro and macro level. They are usually applied as soft law rules (mechanisms), while the remaining three (3 to 5) are traditional legal (hard law) instruments in the domain of labour law. However, it is important to note that many labour law scholars have expressed concern about the legitimacy of soft law rules by stressing the negative effects of "a rapid expansion of quasi-legal labour rules, i.e. soft law rules and privatisation/corporatisation/politicisation of labour regulation" that could significantly weaken labour laws (Blackburn 2006: 7). Those concerns relate to the specific nature of labour standards – both hard and soft rules – that are often "framed as open norms with a high level of abstraction" (Kun 2018: 23). However, as has been pointed out in the literature, although soft rules are not legally binding and cannot be enforced in any court, their value lies in the potential to cover legal gaps *in favorem* the protection of basic human and labour rights (Vinković 2013).

In this section, we will discuss soft law interventions (1, 2) as practical and operational tools and potentially effective instruments toward digital and green ('twin') transitions amidst the aging of the workforce. In this respect, we will argue for the method of human rights due diligence as an effective risk management tool for identifying, analysing, and evaluating compliance with basic labour rights in work practices at the organisational level. This method could also be a valuable instrument for dealing with age discrimination issues in the workplace. Due diligence investigation is not strictly legal in nature, but rather an objective assessment of the situation. It presupposes the analyses of the company's operations from the social, political, and economic perspectives, while evaluation focuses on the interpretation of these facts from a human rights perspective (Taylor, Zandvliet and Forouhar 2009). The social perspective also includes the demographic angle, as population/workforce aging inevitably "requires changes in the human resources strategies and labour market policy" (Ciutiene and Railaite 2015: 391). Thus, the human rights due diligence method will be explored in the context of the introduction of the age management practice as a specific tool that follows and supports vocational and skills training programs by providing equal opportunities for training and skills development to all age groups and making employers more adaptable to arising changes.

The development of specific vocational and skills training programs at the level of member states has been grounded on the first principle, i.e. "Education, training and life-long learning" highlighted in the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), and launched by the European Commission in 2017.

The training programs aimed to integrate social standards into the EU's economic policies, specifically in relation to the twin transition to the green and digital economy. In 2020, the commission introduced a Proposal for a council recommendation on vocational education and training (European Commission 2020a). The aim of this proposal is "to support both youth employability and adults in need of continuous up- and reskilling", with a focus on sustainable competitiveness, social fairness, and resilience.

In the proposal, the most important action in implementing the national vocational and training policy framework is the establishment and promotion of centres of vocational excellence. The role of the centres is to drive a transition from sectors that are in decline to new growing sectors by enabling skill development, with a special focus on the inclusion of vulnerable workers, such as people with disabilities, low-skilled adults, and ethnic and racial minorities, including Roma and migrant workers. The centres must be embedded in national skills strategies.

Furthermore, the EU policy initiative that supports lifelong learning and the development of national skills strategies as part of the European Skills Agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness, and resilience was also introduced in 2020 (European Commission 2020b). Measures that support access to up- and reskilling programs for all categories of workers in order to generate new job opportunities for unemployed and short-term engaged workers had to be included in national skills strategies in the context of the digital and green transition. The Agenda followed and relayed on the Proposal for a council recommendation on vocational edu-

cation and training (2020), particularly pointing to the establishment of centres of vocational excellence, by emphasising that young and older workers were most affected by the twin transition. This presupposed the engagement of all relevant actors: public bodies, educational and training providers, employment agencies, social partners, and research organisations. The Agenda also stressed the importance of introducing tools to identify skill gaps and particular measures to address up- and reskilling in the organisation at both macro (state) and micro (company) levels.

In relation to the previous point, age management represents one of the potential tools for maintaining workers' employability, improving employee health and safety, and achieving better work results. It also offers opportunities to upgrade flexible working time practices (Pedro et al. 2020). There is no universally accepted definition of age management in the literature. The researchers considered it in terms of active aging policy strategies, using it as a tool to combat discrimination at the national or macro level or as a company-level strategy for the employment of older workers (Fabisiak and Prokurat 2012). Ciutiene and Railaite (2015) define age management as "a set of measures of mitigating the consequences of aging," which is the prevailing definition among academics. In a broader sense, it is considered to be a part of human resource management or a public policy initiative.

Walker (2005) considers the introduction of age management through collective bargaining, pushing it toward the issue of labour law consideration. Barnett, Spoehr and Parnis (2008) go further and offer a more comprehensive and integrated definition of the age management concept. Their definition

includes assessments of risk factors and analysis of the working capacities of all workers, not just older ones, by applying a holistic approach that encompasses health, education, and training issues. Having said that, Pedro et al. (2020) presented an overview of research studies on age management practices. Most of the studies address the issue of workplace health promotion, while only one study, conducted in the Netherlands, investigates the efficacy of human resource practices for improving sustainable employment. Besides health, that study also considers the issues of knowledge transfer, lifelong learning, and career development. This indicates that too little attention has been paid to education and training in recent age management practices, highlighting the need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to the subject.

Accordingly, the human rights due diligence method could be a valuable risk management approach in this regard. By employing a due diligence approach, age management practice could gain additional value and provide efficiency and universality by assessing the exercising of all basic labour rights for workers throughout their entire life course, not just in old age, in terms of decent working conditions and anti-discrimination. The concept of human rights due diligence correlates to the concept of age management in an operational and technical sense. Both concepts presuppose two processes. The first one is the investigation of the facts, such as the characteristics of work organisation including the structure of human resources. The second process is the evaluation of the facts in terms of the relevant standard of care, which includes human and labour rights standards (Taylor, Zandvliet and Forouhar 2009).

Gutterman (2022) introduced the age-responsive human rights due diligence concept by arguing for the integration of age issues into due diligence. This approach could serve as a starting point for the intersection of the age management concept in human resources and due diligence concept in law. The age-responsive human rights due diligence concept should be understood as a process in which employers develop action plans for identifying, preventing, and mitigating adverse human rights impacts associated with their internal operations and their business relationships, including those related to the transition towards a green and digital economy. Special attention should be paid to recruitment procedures, training, and career opportunities.

The impact of business operations on exercising basic labour rights in a transition process to a low-carbon economy could be further assessed by employing the Decent Work Check mechanism. The Decent Work Check was developed in 2008 by the WageIndicator Foundation, a global non-profit organisation that collects, analyses, and shares information about working conditions and labour standards across the globe. The mechanism works on a double comparison model, consisting of two separate procedures that follow one another. In the first stage, national laws are compared with international labour standards, and in the second stage, workers compare their real working conditions with national law standards; this information is gathered through face-to-face surveys. Workers then compare their own scores at both national and international levels.

The Decent Work Check is known as a *de jure* mechanism focusing on employment and labour regulation to inform workers of their rights throughout their

entire employment across the whole employment life cycle. In the context of implementing the age-responsive human rights due diligence concept, the Decent Work Check mechanism could be applied to workers of various age groups to identify their actual work situation by classifying them in various age groups, aiming to identify their real work situations, and specifying the current legal mechanisms in national law. In the subsequent stage, the results would be compared and evaluated in terms of universal international (decent work) standards. The test should be applied separately for all determined age groups.

On the other hand, in the context of the workplace digitalisation process, it seems that vocational and skills training programs are of great importance for helping workers of all ages keep their jobs. Therefore, Dworschak and Zaiser (2014) presented two scenarios to describe the changing role of digitalisation in work organisation: 1) the automation scenario, where new technology completely guides the working process. Here, highly skilled workers are responsible for installing, modifying, and maintaining the technology, while workers with poor skills are being replaced by robots; and 2) tool scenarios, where highly skilled workers guide the technology that supports workers – who remain responsible for decision-making and problem-solving – while ‘new’ tasks focus much more on enhancing communication, collaboration, and creativity in the workplace. This means that the focus will be on highly skilled workers regardless of age. According to Schinner et al. (2017), many studies have confirmed that for relatively simple tasks, such as tasks that require low cognitive load, age is not relevant. On the other hand,

in the time of the digital revolution, simple, repetitive job will mostly be performed by robots and highly automated artificial intelligence. However, when the centres of vocational excellence are set out in the national skills strategies as soft law instruments, policymakers need to consider the influences of aging processes on knowledge, as well as on working capacities (physical and mental) in different economic sectors, including inter-individual differences that are more noticeable among older workers than their younger counterparts.

## 5 CONCLUSION

The processes of population and workforce aging, as well as emerging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence, industrial robots, and machine learning will continue to develop rapidly in the future. Societal, demographic, and technological changes, particularly those related to increasing age diversity within the labour market and the automation of production, are expected to affect businesses and influence economic growth, as well as decent work standards. Therefore, the increasing longevity will certainly pose some challenges to policymakers, requiring them to offer an alternative, more inclusive policy framework for older workers.

Besides macro-level policy interventions, employers need to adopt new and adapt old practices to suit the changing age distribution of workers in order to achieve a just, twin transition. The transition process will require managers to employ additional tools to ultimately address the issues of discriminatory practices related to age at the company (micro) level. The empirical evidence shows that automation will affect low and medium-skilled workers, pushing

them to find new incentives and move towards jobs that are based on creativity, social perceptiveness, and social intelligence. Notably, the impact of computerisation on the labour market is different, as automation replaces specific tasks within each occupation rather than the whole occupation. The highest replacing effect of automation on the labour market would be for routine, highly standardised, and predictable tasks, such as administrative ones. On the other hand, it's much less likely that social service providers and healthcare practitioners will be replaced by computers, as the social abilities required for these occupations – social intelligence, perception, communication, and empathy – cannot yet be replicated by machines.

Digitalisation will have a positive impact on employment in occupations that require age-appreciating cognitive abilities and where physical skills decline with age. In these cases, workers can benefit from automation, as it can increase their productivity rather than replace them. However, the job replacement effect of automation is strongest for physically demanding, routine, and low-skilled jobs intended for the younger working-age population in lower-income countries. The automation process poses a threat, particularly to young workers who aren't highly educated and perform routine jobs.

Older workers with a high level of education will be significantly less affected by automation, and are less likely to be replaced by industrial robots. However, it is necessary to adjust the working environment and conditions under which older workers operate to meet their needs, taking into account the diversity of skills among older workers of the same age. Thus, in higher-income countries, i.e. industrialised Western (EU)

countries with an aging labour force, the government's strategic goals are to keep older workers healthy and enable those who want to stay active in the labour market beyond the age of 65 to use their age-appreciating abilities. Governments should support the process of automation in workplaces where age-appreciating skills are a key competitive factor, in order to help older workers overcome their disadvantages in specific tasks that require age-depreciating physical skills.

The authors advocate for a human rights due diligence approach to be applied to workers of different age groups, which corresponds to Gutterman's (2022) age-responsive human rights due diligence concept. They suggest that this approach could gain further legal validity by using the Decent Work Check mechanism to assess compliance with universal decent work standards at both national and company levels.

The question that remains open relates to the legal instrument that should be employed to tackle these changes:

should policymakers opt for a hard or soft law approach when creating rules? When faced with uncertainty about how best to implement a novel concept, both governments and businesses tend to prefer soft law instruments. The uncertainty is expected to continue to have a significant impact on business productivity in future. Parella (2020) points out the role of soft law mechanisms as "an opportunity for business organisations to learn new practices through soft law by giving them time to experiment with best practices". According to the prevailing views in academia and practice, the age-responsive human rights due diligence concept could initially be introduced as a soft law mechanism. However, in recent years, much more attention has been given to human rights due diligence as an emerging mechanism that contributes to the prevention of corporate human rights abuses, stressing its "huge potential to become part of legislation" (McCorquodale and Nolan 2021).

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# Starenje radne snage i dostojanstven rad u eri digitalne ekonomije – ka holističkom javnopolitičkom pristupu

## SAŽETAK

Starenje stanovništva i radne snage u kombinaciji sa sve intenzivnijim procesom digitalizacije sve više utiču na zaposlenost, uslove rada, kao i na ostvarivanje i delotvornu zaštitu prava na radu i u vezi sa radom. Delatnosti i poslovi zasnovani na veštinama koje se unapređuju sa godinama imaju koristi od procesa starenja i digitalizacije, s obzirom na to da automatizacija kompenzuje slabljenje fizičkih sposobnosti do kojih dolazi kod starijih radnika, čime se pak povećava njihova produktivnost. S druge strane, proces automatizacije pretili da zameni radnike koji obavljaju rutinske, odnosno repetitivne, tj. manuelne poslove koji traže nizak stepen znanja i veština. Stoga bi napori kreatora javnih politika, u budućnosti, a vezano za podsticanje i obezbeđenje sigurnosti zaposlenja, kao i osiguranja dostojanstvenog rada za sve kategorije radnika, a posebno one vulnerabilne, trebalo da idu u pravcu stvaranja uslova za inkluzivnije i inovativnije obrazovanje, na način koji omogućava da radnici steknu potrebna znanja, odnosno kreativne i socijalne veštine. S tim u vezi, javnopolitički i normativni okvir koji podržava, te predstavlja odgovor na društvene, odnosno demografske, kao i tehnološke promene treba da se zasniva na obaveznoj adresiranju pitanja dokvalifikacije i prekvalifikacije u smislu usvajanja novih znanja i veština shodno potrebama tržišta rada, a vezano za tranziciju ka zelenoj i digitalnoj ekonomiji, uz istovremeno promovisanje i osiguranje dostojanstvenih uslova rada i života radnika. Osim toga, na mikro nivou, odnosno na nivou radne organizacije tj. poslodavca, neophodno je promovisanje tzv. održive, dinamične i inkluzivne organizacione i radne prakse. Stoga, autori u ovom radu ukazuju na značaj primene mehanizma tzv. menadžmenta, odnosno upravljanja starenjem radnika (eng. *age management*) kao efikasnog instrumenta u oblasti ljudskih resursa, odnosno njegovog pravnog pandana, *due diligence* pristupa ljudskim, odnosno radnim i socijalnim pravima, kao potencijalno adekvatnim, na holističkom pristupu zasnovanim metodama upravljanja nastupajućim promenama.

## KLJUČNE REČI

starenje radne snage, digitalizacija, veštine koje se unapređuju starenjem, standardi dostojanstvenog rada, *due diligence* (dužna pažnja) pristup ljudskim pravima



# The effects of Chinese population policy on the labour market

Sanja Filipović<sup>1</sup>  Jelena Ignjatović<sup>2</sup> 

## ABSTRACT

Faced with high levels of poverty, China introduced its “one-child policy” in 1980 and began economic and systemic reforms that led to the country’s strong economic development. Thanks to the improvement in the average standard of living, certain socioeconomic aspects related to women’s employment, the pursuit of higher education, delays in childbirth, and the number of children have changed. These changes have not only reduced the number of children being born and led to population aging, but have also affected the labour market. The aim of this paper is to determine the effects of Chinese population policy on selected labour market indicators: labour force by age and sex in rural/urban areas, the labour force participation rate, and the unemployment rate. Research results from 2010 to 2020 show the growth of the labour force, while the unemployment rate has been growing since 2018. It is noticeable that the number of workers in the labour force is growing in cities, while it is declining in rural areas. On the other hand, the unemployment rate is lower in rural areas, while the growth of unemployment is evident in urban areas. The research shows that the long-term implementation of this population policy has resulted in a larger number of men, leading to greater participation of men in the labour force. Despite measures to improve the position of women at work, women’s social security is still not guaranteed, and it is more difficult for women to decide to expand their families. As China has ambitious plans for economic development, defining adequate population and social policies is crucial for their implementation.

## KEYWORDS

China, population, policy, labour, market

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the 20th century, all countries in the world recorded population growth (Feng, Cai and Baochang 2013). The total world population was 2.5 billion in 1950, 4.4 billion in 1980, and according to the last census in 2020, 7.7 billion (United Nations 2022b). The highest growth rates among the Chinese population were recorded from 1965 to 1970 (2.67%), after which a downward trend occurred. According to the latest data from 2015 to 2020, the current population growth rate is only 0.46%, and this trend is expected to continue into the future.

China is the world's most populous country, and after the Second World War recorded population growth from 554 million in 1950 to today's 1.4 billion<sup>1</sup> (United States Census Bureau 2022).

After the Second World War, China was an undeveloped agrarian country. Accelerated industrialisation during the 1950s resulted in the sudden abandonment of agriculture and the mass exodus of people to cities (Filipović and Ignjatović 2021a). A lack of workers to cultivate agricultural land amidst the country's otherwise underdeveloped agricultural production together with unfavourable weather conditions (floods and droughts) resulted in food shortages that led to mass starvation amongst the population. It is estimated that 3–7% of the Chinese population died of starvation from 1958 to 1961. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), economic recovery was not prioritised, so the economic crisis deepened.

<sup>1</sup> Followed by India with 1,389,637,446 residents (United States Census Bureau 2022)

Although the Chinese fertility rate<sup>2</sup> had a downward trajectory between 1965 and 1990, in response to high levels of poverty, China introduced a one-child policy in 1980 to further reduce fertility and slow population growth. At the same time, the nationalisation of agriculture weakened Chinese institutions, thus undermining the birth planning administration. The process of structural reforms and liberalisation of the economy took place in parallel, which led to the country's economic growth (Cai et al. 2002; Fang and Wang 2005; Antevski 2013). Although the stated goal of the policy was to improve people's quality of life (Perić and Filipović 2021), the policy was condemned by the global community over concerns that it violated sexual and reproductive rights and disrespected people's life choices to plan families.

The one-child policy was relaxed only in 2013 so that Chinese couples were allowed to have two children if at least one parent did not have any siblings. However, many couples who fell into this category decided not to have another child due to the high cost of living. Faced with the problem of an aging population, the Chinese Communist Party announced the abolition of the one-child policy at the end of 2015.

Just before the last Chinese census in 2020, it was speculated that birth restrictions could be lifted altogether. On the other hand, some experts believe that such a measure could potentially deepen the imbalances between rural and urban areas. It could mean

<sup>2</sup> The general fertility rate is the most common measure of fertility, which measures the number of live births in the geographical area in year per 1000 women of reproductive age (for the period 15–44 years) (The World Bank 2022).

that women, especially in expensive urban areas (cities such as Beijing and Shanghai), would delay or avoid childbirth, while women in the countryside would probably follow tradition by establishing large families. In addition, people in rural areas might be more willing to expand their families, which may increase poverty or create pressure on employment. Nevertheless, modern life trends and problems (e.g. young people's unwillingness to give birth, high costs of raising children in cities, insecure jobs, and lack of benefits and opportunities for absence based on maternity or paternity leave) discourage young people from giving birth. The census showed that China's population had grown at a lower rate than in previous decades, reaching a total of 1.4 billion inhabitants, while the country still has 34.9 million more men (51.2% of the population) than women. Meanwhile, the population between the ages of 15 and 59 has decreased by almost 7%, while the share of the population over the age of 60 has increased by more than 5% (AFP 2021).

The decrease in the birth rate has had a direct impact on the labour market, and the reduced supply of labour has led to a fall in the unemployment rate while also affecting the new working conditions. Thus, for example, the ratio of male and female workers within the labour force has changed, while working conditions in rural and urban China remain different. In modern times, more and more young women are deciding on further education and employment instead of starting a family earlier, while young Chinese people are facing the problem of overtime work in order to provide for their families.

As the census showed the shortcomings of the system, China's politburo, as the highest decision-making body of the Communist Party, in May 2021 announced that it would enable all Chinese couples to have three children. Thus ended the one-child policy (Wee 2021) under the pretence of implementing a national strategy in response to aging and changes in the age structure of the population (McDonnell 2021). Although the average standard of living has increased, changing socioeconomic factors (women's employment, the pursuit of higher education, and delaying childbirth) have had negative consequences for the labour market.

The aim of this paper is to determine the effects of Chinese population policy on selected labour market indicators from 2010 to 2020: labour force by age and sex in rural and urban areas, participation rate of different categories in the labour force, and unemployment rate by category of labour force. In addition to the introduction, the structure of the paper consists of three chapters. The first chapter analyses the evolution of population policy in China. The second chapter is based on the demographic picture of China, while the third chapter assesses the effects of population policy on the labour market. Finally, concluding remarks are given.

## **2 THE EVOLUTION OF POPULATION POLICY IN CHINA**

After the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Ping 2019), when Chinese population policy was first promoted, Chinese authorities encouraged families to have more children (White 2006), which resulted

in population growth shown in the 1954 census. As early as the following year, at the eighth Peoples' Congress, based on the Report on the Recommendations of Developing Economy in the Second Five-Year Plan and the Instructions on the Issue of Population Control, a birth control measure was proposed (Yang 2003), representing a turn in population policy. In 1962, the Central Committee and the State Council issued the Instructions on the Serious Promotion of Family Planning, which called for improved birth control in urban and densely populated rural areas. Shortly afterwards, in February 1965, the Family Planning Commission of the State Council held a conference to exchange experiences from individual Chinese districts, when the slogan "One is not less, two are perfect and three are more" appeared (Jiang et al. 2013).

The late 1950s and early 1960s were turbulent for the Chinese economy, and this was reflected in population policy (Chang 1992; Kaufman 1998). "The Great Leap Forward" was an economic and social campaign led by the Communist Party of China (1958–1962) that initiated the reconstruction of the country from an agrarian economy into a communist society through the formation of people's communes. It's believed there was a great Chinese famine in that period that is estimated to be the worst in human history (Smil 1999; Meng et al. 2015), with over 20 million people losing their lives (Harrison and Palumbo 2019). Shortly after the failed economic reform, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) followed as a socio-political movement that aimed to strengthen Chinese communism by eliminating remnants of capitalist and traditional elements and imposing the

ideologies of then-President Mao Zedong (Maoism)<sup>3</sup> (Phillips 2016). Both historical periods deepened poverty even more, which had a direct effect on family planning. Systemic reforms were necessary at the time, as were active population policy measures to reduce poverty. The framework of the new population policy was defined in the 1970s, and in 1978, economic and systemic reforms officially began. At the time, China was approaching a population of billions. Jiang et al. (2013) believe that the development of Chinese population policy took place in three phases: 1970–1979 (when population control was not strict); 1980–1999 (policy of strict population control) and after 2000 (low birth rate policy).

In the first phase of the development of China's flexible population policy (1970–1979), it was decided that population growth and control (urban and suburban areas) must be firmly integrated into economic planning. This policy allowed two children per family unit. In the late 1970s, the goal was to quadruple annual income per capita by 2000, highlighting the potential need for constraint on population growth (Greenhalgh and Winkler 2005).

In 1979, the National Family Planning Commission<sup>4</sup> initiated proposals to limit couples to one child, while state media outlets supported and promoted the idea. After the presentation of the Open Letter of the Central Committee in 1980, addressed to the members of the Communist Party and

<sup>3</sup> Maoism is a popular name for a Marxist-Leninist ideology based on the communist teachings of the former Chinese president Mao Zedong.

<sup>4</sup> The National Family Planning Commission was renamed to the Family Planning Commission (2003), and then to the National Health and Family Planning Commission (2013).

the Communist Youth League, on the issue of population growth control, the government began to implement measures that included limiting each family to one child (Goldman 2021), better known as the one-child policy. This began the second phase of the development of strict population policy in China (1980–1999). Policy formulation and implementation was localised. According to central government instructions, policy planning and implementation was under the control of local governments, especially provincial ones. In order to meet the social, economic and cultural goals of different regions, local governments were relatively flexible in implementing national population policy. Gu et al. (2007) believe that a rigorous implementation of the policy would result in no simple reproduction (1.465 children per woman), which according to Parant (2008) would affect the whole society.

Thus, the policy of forcing couples to have only one child was imposed. It was introduced by leader Deng Xiaoping in order to stop population growth and encourage economic development. In 1980, China had a billion inhabitants, which was twice as many as in 1950, when there were about 554 million inhabitants. In the same year (1980), Chinese provinces experimented with measures to control population growth, including providing additional meals for couples in Sichuan province who pledged to have only one child. Just two years later (1982), the National People's Congress adopted a new constitution that for the first time included birth control as the duty of every Chinese citizen (Reuters 1982). In this way, Chinese population trends over the years have largely been shaped by the one-child

policy, introduced to slow population growth. In addition to low fertility, this had broad effects on the Chinese economy and social development, and also produced side effects such as an imbalanced sex ratio at birth and rapid population aging. As a result, in the following decades, births (especially in rural areas) were not properly reported and there was a high rate of abortions of female foetuses, which affected the sex ratio in favour of male children.

Although the total fertility rate (births per woman) was considerably reduced (4.85 in the 1970s, 2.52 in the late 1980s, 1.83 in the 1990s, and 1.61 in the 2000s) (United Nations 2022c), the standard of living as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was still low (Banister 1984). The government saw a potential solution by further controlling population growth through the introduction of various population policy measures (Greenhalgh 2005; Guo et al. 2019). Since this policy has come into force, a large number of Chinese families who have failed to comply with the rules have faced fines, job losses, and sometimes forced abortions. The one-child policy itself has led to serious gender imbalances in the country, where the male population was higher by 30,835,000 in the early 1990s and 33,825,000 in the late 1990s (United Nations 2022a). The traditional preference for male children has led to the abandonment of large numbers of girls, who are placed in orphanages, or fall victim to sexually selective abortions or even female infanticide. This continued to cause problems for the "marriage market", especially for the male population, which had fewer socioeconomic resources.



The third phase of the development of Chinese population policy began after 2000 and is characterised by a low birth rate policy. An analysis of the 2000 census reveals that by that time, the fertility rate in China had fallen to 1.4–1.6 children per woman (Morgan et al. 2009). Despite that, in 2003, it became known to the public that in the province of Guangxi, where the regulations on family planning were strictly applied, parents had tried to sell their girls on the black market so they could have sons instead. It is estimated that as many as 80% of trafficked babies were girls (Rosenthal 2003). Decades of this policy disrupted gender relations, with the Chinese government saying some 400 million births were prevented, but despite concerns about demographic imbalances, the authorities were reluctant to end the one-child policy. Although Chinese authorities began easing measures on having more than one child in 2008 (Yardley 2008), there was still speculation and reports of forced sterilisation and abortions.

The preliminary results of the 2010 census reveal that the total fertility rate was 1.64 children per women, which is significantly below the level of simple reproduction (PCO 2012; United Nations 2022c), a phenomenon that is partly attributed to China's one-child policy. In March 2013, China abolished the Family Planning Commission, then established the National Health and Family Planning Commission. This step indicated a potential move away from the previous population policy. However, there was a further decline in fertility, which provoked even more criticism from many Chinese scientists, who agreed that new measures were needed. This was due to changes in

China's population policy from the initial strict control of population growth (1980s) to the over-stabilisation of low fertility (2010), then to the current population policies of "support and improvement", which have affected the national economy and social development (Jiang et al. 2013).

Given the fact that China had a population of about 1.39 billion in 2013 (United Nations 2019), the Chinese government relaxed the one-child policy for the first time in 35 years, allowing couples across the country to have two children only if one of the spouses was the only child in their family (Buckley 2013). However, since from May 2015 to May 2016, only 1.45 million couples reported having a second child, which was fewer than 15% of eligible couples (AFP 2021), it was announced that all married couples would be allowed to have two children (Buckley 2015). In an attempt to stop the rapid aging of the workforce, the abolition of the one-child policy was announced at the end of 2015, and the politics of two children was adopted. However, the constant decline in the birth rate in the country has not been reversed, which means that the new policy had a short-term effect and did not lead to a continuous increase in birth rates. The reason for that may be a social one, because generations of Chinese people have lived without brothers and sisters, and as such got used to small families. Smaller families cost less, and it seems many young Chinese people would rather give one child more opportunities than distribute the income to a larger number of children. As early as 2020, academics warned the Chinese government that decades of family planning initiatives had led to a sharp decline in popula-

tion, laying the groundwork for potential demographic, economic, and even political crises in the near future. They further stated that declining birth rates, along with rising life expectancy, meant that there would soon be too few workers to support a huge and aging population (Myers Lee et al. 2020).

At the end of 2020, a census was conducted showing that around 12 million babies were born in 2020 – a significant drop from the 18 million registered in 2016. This is the lowest number of births recorded since 1961 (McDonnell 2021; Wee 2021). Therefore, in May 2021, China's politburo, response to the change in the age structure of the population, announced that all Chinese couples would be able to have three children.


### **3 CHINA'S DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE**

Since official demographic data was unreliable and incomplete, the real effects of Chinese population policy (Aird 1982) could not be fully understood over the years. Population policy measures primarily aimed to limit population growth (Wu et al. 2008), but demographers predicted side effects as early as the mid-1980s (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985) in the form of potential labour shortages, rapid population aging, and disruption of the ratio between males and females (Greenhalgh and Winkler 2005; Cai and Zang 2013).

Sharping (2003: 110) noted that from 1979 to 1999, the share of women who used contraception during repro-

ductive age increased from 60–70% to 80–90%. The same author noted that there is a difference in the application of population policy measures in rural and urban parts of China because birth control in rural areas is more a consequence of administrative pressure than spontaneous changes caused by economic growth and development. In addition, the list of administrative penalties for non-compliance with measures has been steadily expanding, resulting in an increase in the number of women giving birth in hidden places, as well as the non-reporting of female children, falsification of documents, and false death records. Cai (2010) estimates that by the 2000s, the Chinese population was deprived of 100–400 million births, which, according to Greenhalgh and Winkler (2005), created enormous social problems and human suffering.

The total Chinese population in 1950 was 546.815 million. From 1950 to 2020, the Chinese population grew by as many as 865.305 million inhabitants to reach a total of 1,412.120 million inhabitants in 2020 (Figure 1). However, the number of children born per year in the same period decreased sharply: in 1950 it was 20,232,000 births per year, while in 2020 it was only 12,020,000 (National Bureau of Statistic of China 2022). According to forecasts of the high fertility variant from 2020 to 2100, the Chinese population should increase by only 143,663,000 people, which means that in 2050 the population will amount to 1,515.346 million, and in 2100 to 1,582.986 million people (United Nations 2022b).



**Figure 1** Total population and number of births in China (thousands), 1950–2020


Source: National Bureau of Statistic of China (2022)

Differences in the implementation of local family planning policy are manifested at the district level, where families – or more precisely women of reproductive age – have influence on the implementation of special policies (Chen et al. 2020). The total fertility rate (TFR) in China averaged 6.1 in 1950 and peaked at 6.3 in 1965. Just a decade, the TFR had been halved, amounting to just 3 in 1975. The subsequent decline resulted in a TFR of 1.83 in 1990 (Merli and Morgan 2011). However, in the last 30-year period from 1990 to 2020, the rate was constant: 1.7 on average (United Nations 2022c), implying that China had entered a period of below-replacement fertility (Figure 2). According to Retherford et al. (2005), a TFR of 1.4–1.6 is too low given the level before the introduction of the one-child policy, while Zeng (2007) assumes that the universal preference

for two children in China has set the minimum TFR level at 2.0.

According to the United Nations (2019), in 1950 the gender ratio was slightly in favour of men – 1:1.08 – i.e. there were 21,060,000 more men than women (287,740,000 men compared to 266,679,000 women). Over time, this difference has increased in favour of men. In 2020, there were 37,171,000 more men than women (738,247,000 men and 701,076,000 women). The reason for this was the one-child policy, which resulted in the creation of this imbalance, as millions of Chinese couples were determined that their only child should be a son (Denyer and Gowen 2018).

The close link between socioeconomic development and fertility is evident and can be seen through the relationship between the TFR and the standard of living measured by GDP per capita. The relationship between these




**Figure 2** Total fertility rate (TFR), 1950–2020

Source: United Nations (2022c)

two variables, defined by a simple regression model, is so robust that little has changed since 1975 (Cai 2010). The decline in population has contributed to an increase in GDP per capita, which in 1970 was only \$112. The highest

growth was achieved from 1970 to 2010, when GDP per capita was \$4,447. The trend of rising living standards continued in the following years, reaching \$10,229 per capita in 2020 (United Nations 2022d) (Figure 3).



**Figure 3** GDP per capita in China (\$), 1970–2020


Source: United Nations (2022d)

The rise in living standards in China has changed the quality of people's lifestyles. The Human Development Index (HDI), as a measure of quality of life and wellbeing (Engineer et al. 2008), is a summary measure of average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: long and healthy life, education, and a decent standard of living (UNDP 2016). China has a high level of human development, where according to the last HDI published in 2020, it was ranked 85th out of 189 countries (UNDP 2020). From 2014 to 2019, China advanced by 12 places, so it can be expected that in the coming period, if this trend continues, it will join the group of countries with very high human development. The average annual growth of China's HDI from 1990 to 2019 was 1.47%. The highest annual growth of the HDI was achieved from 1990 to 2000 (1.65%) and 2000 to 2010 (1.74%), while from 2010 to 2019 the growth of the HDI was 0.95%.

Changes in quality of lifestyle have affected family planning and delayed childbirth. The one-child policy has changed women's goals in China, with many women shifting their focus from family planning to pursuing future careers (stable jobs and financial security), contributing to lower birth rates. Namely, young Chinese women, in the pursuit of improving their quality of life, now mostly decide to start a family after the age of 30, i.e. once they're already employed (Vanderhorst 2018). On the other hand, many young Chinese people accept overtime work (Allen 2021), which has become endemic, so modern "dilemmas in the workplace" for fathers who go on paternity leave often stand out, because there are no basic reproductive benefits.

## 4 THE LABOUR MARKET IN CHINA


The dramatic decline in the TFR from 1965 to 1990 directly affected the workforce. Thus, the peak share of the working-age population in China was reached in 2011 (59.8%). In the observed period from 2010 to 2020, the total labour force grew, but in 2020 there was a decline in the labour force. Observing data by age and sex, there was a decline in both the male and female labour force among people aged 15 to 24, while in those aged 25+, the growth of both populations is evident. Figure 4 gives a comparative overview of labour force participation by age categories (15–24 and 25+ years of age) in rural and urban areas, where labour force growth in urban areas and decline in rural areas are noticeable. However, if the labour force participation rate (LFPR) is observed in the same period, it can be noticed that for those aged 25+, participation is 14% higher, while in the population aged 15–24 it is 17% higher in rural areas than in urban areas. According to the same categories, the share of women in the labour force in the 15–24 age group is 15.8% higher in rural areas than in urban areas, while in the 25+ population it is 12% higher. Unlike females, the LFPR in the male labour force among those aged 15–24 is 18.1% higher in rural areas than in urban areas, while in the 25+ population it is 14.5% higher. This suggests that the LFPR is growing markedly in rural areas, while declining in urban areas. The reduction in the labour force has caused a lack of labour profiles in the labour market and an increase in wages (Li et al. 2012), especially in coastal regions where the participation of the young population is higher.



**Figure 4** Labour force by age in rural/urban areas (thousands), 2010–2020  
 Source: ILOSTAT (2022)

The evolution of the working age population is also influenced by the unbalanced gender ratio, since the size of the male population (which otherwise has a higher percentage of employment) has grown (Angrist 2002). For example, considering data from 2010 to 2020, the LFPR of the female workforce in the population aged 25+ compared to the male population was

15% lower, while for the 15–24 population, the LFPR was 6.8% lower. According to the latest data (ILOSTAT 2022), the LFPR of the female population aged 25+ in 2020 was 64.8%, while for the male population it was as high as 78.6%. In the same year, the LFPR for the female population aged 15–24 was 42.6%, and for the male population 51.3% (Figure 5).



**Figure 5** LFPR by age and sex (%), 2010–2020  
 Source: ILOSTAT (2022)

There are a number of empirical studies about the negative effects of fertility on the supply of female labour (Borjas 2000). He and Zhu (2015) found that fertility has relatively little effect on the supply of female labour in urban parts of China, while Li et al. (2015) show that reducing fertility does not increase the supply of female labour in rural parts of China. Some experts believe that a new policy of family planning without limiting the number of children would not contribute to GDP growth by stimulating labour supply, while Becker and Lewis (1973) suggested that reducing the number of children based on higher standards would provide greater opportunities (e.g. education) for each child born. According to Wang et al. (2016), China's family planning policy has led to a reduction in the number of children, but has affected the quality of education. Thus, the average number of years of education (up to the age of 25) increased by about 50%, i.e. from 5.8 to 8.9 years. Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) analysed the impact of the number of children born on the quality of life in rural areas, where the public education system is otherwise poorer. Studying the effects of the one-child policy, the authors found empirical data indicating that the effects are greatest in terms of increasing the probability of attending college and the number of children attending school, the quality of health, and the level of school grades. Nevertheless, Qian (2009) believes that the birth of a second child increases the likelihood of enrolment of the first-born child in rural China, because children from the same family can share textbooks and clothes.

The Chinese government has implemented a number of policies to

promote women's employment in the public sector (Pan 2002; Ma 2011). Women's participation in the total labour force (LFPR of 63.5% in 2019) is higher in China than in other Asian countries. This might be a consequence of constitutional rights under which women in China are considered equal to men in all spheres of life (Yu and Liu 2010). According to Disgupta et al. (2015), the Chinese government, after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1978), began providing measures designed to increase women's participation in the workforce through the creation of childcare and social security systems.

The period after 1990 was very important for the development of gender equality in China. Thus, in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, with the aim of giving women the right to political, economic, cultural, and social decision-making. The National Program for Women's Development in China (1995–2000) was adopted immediately afterwards to achieve gender equality in social and economic spheres. The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (1992) defined the equal rights of women in the spheres of politics, education, labour, property, personal rights, and the right to marriage and family. This law clearly emphasised the principle of "equal pay for equal work" in order to protect women's employment, benefits, and income. The China Employment Promotion Law has been in force since 2008, prohibiting discrimination based on religion, race, ethnicity, or gender. In 2011, the 12th Five-Year Plan of China (2011–15) was defined, with the aim of maintaining




gender equality in employment, health-care, social aging, poverty reduction, and legal aid for women. In the same year, the National Program for Women's Development in China (2011–2020) confirmed that discrimination existed against women in employment, education, and earnings in relation to men. For this reason, in this national program, women's social security was improved through the topic entitled "women and social security," with the aim of strengthening women's social security scheme (maternity, health, and pension insurance, unemployment insurance, and occupational injuries). Based on this, Disgupta et al. (2015) found an increase in women's participation in the categories of basic medical insurance, unemployment insurance, injury insurance, and maternity insurance. The same authors stated that the improvement of women's social security has resulted in the growth of socially inclusive women in urban areas, as well as the increasing participation of women in the development of social security schemes. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) insists on employment that focuses on improving skills and talents and appropriate compensation for all employed women and men, without discrimination.

However, despite these measures, Ma and Zhang (2019) showed that increasing the number of children in Chinese families has reduced the likelihood that the mother will become a regular worker and will be ready to have a second or third child. Since grandparents play a significant role in raising children, China's plans to gradually postpone retirement over the next few decades could significantly affect the labor supply and earnings of young highly educated women, especially

those in urban areas (Yu et al. 2018). As China's working age population shrinks, the Chinese government has decided to gradually postpone retirement. The law prescribes a retirement age (60 for men, 55 for women in the public sector and 50 for women working in factories), which will be gradually raised until it reaches the level of advanced economies (65 or more) by 2040 (The Economist 2021).

The shortage of skilled labour is exacerbated by technological pressures, and the mismatch between jobs and skills is becoming a major problem within the labour market. This discrepancy is also present amongst young people, who are a vulnerable group everywhere in the world because they lack experience. In China, the general unemployment rate has increased since 2018, reaching 5% in 2020, which is a low level of unemployment (for both Chinese and Western standards) and close to the so-called natural rate of unemployment. The youth unemployment rate (15–24 years) was three times higher than the national unemployment rate (ILOSTAT 2022). In the observed period from 2010–2020, the unemployment rate for the population aged 15–24 was 20.9%, while it was 7.3% for the population aged 25+. On the other hand, the unemployment rate in urban areas compared to rural areas was 1.4% higher for the population aged 25+ and 3.7% higher for the population aged 15–24 (Figure 6). However, youth unemployment accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to data for 2020, the unemployment rate for the population aged 15–24 was 23.3%, while it was 8.1% for the population aged 25+. In 2020, the unemployment rate in rural areas for the population aged 15–24



**Figure 6** Unemployment rate by rural and urban area (%), 2010–2020

Source: ILOSTAT (2022)

was 9.5%, while it was 3.4% for the population aged 25+. In urban areas, the unemployment rate was 13.8% for the population aged 15–24 and 4.8% for the population aged 25+. In order to reduce the youth unemployment rate, the government has worked to improve vocational education. The result is evident in an increase in people’s average years of education, from 10.8 to 11.3 years (Bloomberg Equality 2021).

According to data for 2020, the sectors that employ the most labour in China are agriculture (47.7%), industry (28.7%), and services (23.6%) (Textor 2021). China has 170 million skilled workers, but among the total employed population, only 7% are highly skilled (about 48 million) (Ke and Li 2021). Currently, the biggest problem is the lack of skilled labour in the manufacturing sector. It is estimated that by 2025, there will be a shortage of about 30 million workers in the manufacturing sector and 10 million in other jobs (Nulimaimai-

ti 2022). The shortage of manpower will be even more pronounced as the high-tech industry develops. In the development strategy entitled “Made in China 2025”, China defined its goal to become the world’s leading manufacturing power by 2049 (Filipović and Ignjatović 2021b). With the development of advanced technology, China is gradually using more and more domestic instead of foreign technology, which will create additional jobs. The biggest deficit of workers will be in the manufacturing industry, i.e. the automotive industry and the clothing industry. Demand is high not only for engineers, but also for skilled workers. According to the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), 55 million jobs are expected to be created in cities and the unemployment rate should be limited to 5.5%, with employment policy becoming the highest priority of Chinese economic policy. This is especially important because of the pressure to reduce inequality, but also to improve workers’ rights, especially in the tech-

nology industry, where overtime work is particularly problematic (The State Council the People's of Republic of China 2021). Despite these problems, it is important to emphasise that China has a huge labour force in rural areas, where as much as 47.7% of the labour force is employed in agriculture, where productivity is up to three times lower than in industry (Gollin et al 2014; Wu et al. 2022). Therefore, it can be expected that the continuation of migration to urban areas during the 2020s and 2030s will significantly alleviate the problems of the shortage of certain labour profiles that the country is facing (Krugman 2021).

## 5 CONCLUSION

Faced with high levels of poverty, China introduced a one-child policy in 1980 with the aim of reducing fertility and slowing population growth. Although the goal of the policy was to improve the quality of life, the policy was condemned by the global community, who argued that it violated sexual and reproductive rights and failed to respect people's life choices to plan their own families. The one-child policy was relaxed only in 2013, when Chinese couples were allowed to have two children, only if at least one parent didn't have siblings of their own. Despite that, many couples in that category decided against taking that step due to the high cost of raising children. At the end of 2015, as a response to the aging population, the abolition of the one-child policy was announced, meaning that couples would be allowed to have two children. Then in May 2021, it was announced that all Chinese couples

would be allowed to have up to three children. In this way, the one-child policy was completely abolished under the pretence of actively responding to aging and changes in the age structure of the population in China.

However, declining birth rates have caused changes in the labour market. Based on the analysis of empirical data from 2010 to 2020, several conclusions might be drawn. First, although the overall number of participants in the labour force increased during the observed period, an increase in the unemployment rate has been noticeable since 2018. Secondly, it is noticeable that the number of labour force participants in cities is growing, while in rural areas it is declining. Hence, the unemployment rate is lower in rural areas, while unemployment is evident in urban areas. Third, the long-term implementation of population policy has resulted in a larger male than female population in China, which has also affected the gender structure of the workforce. Fourth, despite measures to improve the position of women at work, women's social security is still not guaranteed, making it more difficult for them to decide to expand their families, especially in rural areas.

The long-term application of the one-child policy has undoubtedly had effects on the labour market. The further development of China will be conditioned by resolving the distortions in the labour market, i.e. defining adequate measures of social and employment policy. The country's strategic plans to take a leading role in high-tech production require an urgent solution to the lack of both skilled and highly skilled workers.

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# Uticaj kineske populacione politike na tržište radne snage

## PROŠIRENI SAŽETAK

Suočena sa problemom visokog nivoa siromaštva, Kina je 1980. godine uvela „politiku jednog deteta” i započela sistemske privredne reforme koje su dovele do snažnog privrednog razvoja zemlje. Unapređenjem prosečnog životnog standarda promenjeni su i određeni socioekonomski aspekti koji se odnose na zaposlenje žena, težnju za višim obrazovanjem i odlaganje rađanja i broj dece. Te promene ne samo da su uticale na smanjen broj rođene dece i starenje stanovništva, nego su se odrazile i na tržište rada. Kako je dugi niz godina prikupljanje zvaničnih demografskih podataka bilo nepouzđano i nepotpuno, stvarni efekti višedecenijske populacione politike na tržište rada nisu se mogli u potpunosti sagledati. Pa ipak, evidentan trend smanjenja ukupne stope rađanja ukazao je na problem starenja nacije i nedostatak radne snage, što je dovelo do toga da se 2013. godine parovima prvi put dozvoli da, pod određenim uslovima, mogu imati po dvoje dece. Međutim, kako mera nije dala efekte, vlada je 2015. godine ukinula „politiku jednog deteta”. Ograničavajući se na period 2010–2020. godine, cilj istraživanja je da utvrdi efekte kineske populacione politike na izabrane pokazatelje tržišta rada: radna snaga po godinama i polu u ruralnim i urbanim sredinama, stopa učešća različitih kategorija u radnoj snazi i stopa nezaposlenosti po kategorijama. Rezultati istraživanja za posmatrani period (2010–2020) pokazuju rast radne snage, dok od 2018. godine raste stopa nezaposlenosti. Primetno je da raste broj radne snage u gradovima, dok u ruralnim sredinama opada. S druge strane, nezaposlenost je niža u ruralnim sredinama, dok je u urbanim sredinama evidentan rast nezaposlenosti. Istraživanje je pokazalo da je dugogodišnja primena populacione politike rezultirala većim brojem muške populacije, odnosno većim učešćem muškaraca u radnoj snazi i takav trend će se nastaviti. Uprkos merama za unapređenje položaja žena na radu, još uvek socijalna sigurnost žena nije zagarantovana, te se žene teže odlučuju na proširenje porodice. Kako Kina ima ambiciozne planove u ekonomskom razvoju, definisanje adekvatne populacione i socijalne politike je ključno za njihovu realizaciju. Nedostatak radne snage će biti još izraženiji kako se bude razvijala visokotehnološka industrija, jer će naročito nedostajati visokokvalifikovana radna snaga. Kina ima 170 miliona kvalifikovanih radnika, ali među ukupno zaposlenom populacijom samo 7% je visokokvalifikovanih radnika. Trenutno najveći problem je nedostatak kvalifikovane radne snage u proizvodnom sektoru, a očekuje se najveći deficit radnika u prerađivačkoj industriji, odnosno automobilskoj industriji.

## KLJUČNE REČI

Kina, populacija, politika, radna snaga, tržište rada





# Implications of labour migration on the European labour market – labour law aspects

Bojan Urdarević <sup>1</sup> 

## ABSTRACT

During the 21st century, migrations have become increasingly intense, since they are often planned with a specific goal and could cause major social changes. Unfortunately, since there is no definition of the term 'migrant', countries face a particular challenge in protecting migrant workers' right to work. The International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe, and the European Union have made significant contributions to establishing and developing the migrant worker protection system. At the national level, governments and trade unions contribute to migrant workers' protection by adopting laws to control migrations. However, with many social, political, and economic factors at play, countries can't always control immigration within their own territory.

The author's hypothesis is that the position of migrant workers depends significantly on the host country's immigration and labour policies. The paper concludes that the application of general provisions prescribed at the international level cannot and does not fully protect the rights of migrant workers. Given this, it is not surprising that certain countries and trade unions have begun to protect their interests by adopting legal regulations to manage migration within their territory. The paper identifies the fear that labour migration will negatively affect trade unions' image in those countries where trade unions are weak and disjointed, without real power to influence decision-makers. Finally, when analysing the position of migrant workers in the Republic of Serbia, the author points that the motives for labour force emigration from Serbia are extremely strong, so even if certain changes were to be made to labour conditions, there would be no reduction in emigration. This is because workers' motives for emigration go beyond mere dissatisfaction with labour conditions, but are rather linked to their general dissatisfaction with the quality of life in Serbia.

## KEYWORDS

International Labour Organisation, migrant worker, trade union, country of origin, labour market

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# **Implikacije radnih migracija na evropsko tržište rada – radnopravni aspekti**

## **SAŽETAK**

Migracije, odnosno kretanje stanovništva u raznim pravcima i iz različitih razloga, u poslednje vreme postaju sve intenzivnije, planirane sa određenim ciljem i mogu da izazovu velike društvene promene. S obzirom da ne postoji jedinstvena definicija migranta, poseban izazov za države predstavlja ostvarivanje prava na rad radnika migranata koje je skupčano sa ispunjenjem osnovne svrhe ekonomskih migracija.

U radu, autor polazi od hipoteze da položaj radnika migranata značajno zavisi od politike države prijema, te da se neretko radnici migranti nalaze u prekarnom položaju na tržištu rada. U prvom delu rada fokus je postavljen na migracije i položaj radnika migranata na prostorima država Evropske unije, kao i na uticaj pojedinih međunarodnih dokumenata koji se neposredno ili posredno odnose na položaj i zaštitu radnika migranata. Drugi deo rada posvećen je značaju uloge sindikata u pospešivanju nezavidnog položaja radnika migranata, kao i ključnim motivima za emigraciju srpskih radnika u inostranstvo. Zaključno, autor ističe da postoji opravdana bojazan da će radne migracije negativno uticati na sindikalnu sliku u onim državama u kojima su sindikati slabi i razjedinjeni, kao i da je neophodno da se nastavi sa praćenjem migracionih procesa kako bi se omogućio realan uvid u brojne socijalne, ekonomske i političke implikacije migracija radnika.

## **KLJUČNE REČI**

Međunarodna organizacija rada, radnik migrant, sindikat, zemlja porekla, tržište rada

## 1 UVOD

Ljudi su od svog postanja težili da pronađu najbolje uslove za život, neretko menjajući prostor na kome žive. Zbog toga se danas često ističe da istorija ljudskog društva nije ništa drugo nego istorija migracija (Harzig, Hoerder i Gabaccia 2009). Još je Kant tvrdio da svi ljudi imaju podjednako pravo nad planetom Zemljom te da, shodno tome, svako može biti na onom delu Zemljine kugle koji izabere za život (Kant 1955).

Migracije stanovništva predstavljaju sastavni deo procesa globalizacije i tokom vremena njihov obim se povećava, a njihove društvene i kulturne karakteristike umnožavaju. Usled tehnološkog razvoja, sve veći broj migranata se usmerava ka životu u dva ili više društava paralelno, što podrazumeva konstantnu potrebu za razumevanjem ovog fenomena. Glavni cilj ovog rada je da pruži uvid u radne migracije, odnosno motive, prepreke, uslove i ograničenja za zapošljavanje radnika migranata.

Načelno, migracije predstavljaju izraz uživanja prava svakog da se kreće u širokom prostoru i po slobodnom izboru. Pored slobode kretanja i slobode izbora mesta boravka na teritoriji određene države, ovo pravo pretpostavlja i mogućnost prelaska državnih granica, što se u literaturi često navodi i kao pravo na emigriranje (Hucker 1978). Drugim rečima, svako lice ima pravo da napusti teritoriju sopstvene države, ali i pravo da se u nju vrati. Međutim, u ovom trenutku ne postoji pravo na neograničen slobodan ulazak i nastanjivanje u svakoj državi, jer one suvereno odlučuju o ulasku i zapošljavanju stranaca na svojoj teritoriji (Dauvergne 2008). „Svaka država ima pravo da primi samo strance koji ispunjavaju uslove propisane domaćim zakonodavstvom i među-

narodnim ugovorima koji je obavezuju“ (Kovačević 2020).

Postoji više razloga usled kojih se jedno lice odlučuje da napusti teritoriju svoje države i oni su najčešće vezani za negativne faktore koji ga potiskuju iz zemlje u kojoj živi i pozitivne faktore, odnosno dobrobit koju bi mogao imati u zemlji destinacije (Predojević Despić 2010). Međutim, radne migracije, kao možda i najvažnija potkategorija ovog fenomena, bazirane su na prostornim razlikama između ponude i potražnje za radnom snagom. Razlike koje postoje u svetu u pogledu zarada i uslova rada motivišu radnike da prelaze iz područja sa niskim zaradama, lošim uslovima rada i prezasićenim tržištem rada u područja sa višim zaradama, boljim uslovima rada i većom potražnjom za radnom snagom.

Podstaknuti jednim od najvećih istraživanja koja su ikad sprovedena na temu migracija u vezi sa radom, koje je realizovala „The Boston Consulting Group“ sa ciljem da se utvrdi spremnost ljudi na migracije i osnovni uzroci istih i koje je obuhvatilo 366.000 ispitanika iz 197 zemalja (Strack i dr. 2018), kreiran je upitnik i sprovedeno pilot-istraživanje koje je obuhvatilo 300 zaposlenih u Republici Srbiji kako bi se stekao uvid u osnovne razloge migracija povezanih sa radom na teritoriji naše države (Urdarević 2019a). Dva najzanimljivija rezultata istraživanja koje je sprovedla „The Boston Consulting Group“ odnose se na to da je 2018. godine spremnost za migracije (64% ispitanika izražava spremnost za preseljenje uzrokovano boljim zaposlenjem) na svetskom nivou opala u odnosu na 2014. godinu (57% ispitanika izražava spremnost za preseljenje uzrokovano boljim zaposlenjem) i da je spremnost za migracije porasla u zemljama sa nestabilnom političkom i ekonomskom situacijom u kojima je niži životni standard. S obzirom

da je Republika Srbija država koja je u poslednjih nekoliko decenija prolazila kroz period tranzicije koji su karakterisali, a nažalost još uvek karakterišu, izrazito nestabilna ekonomska i politička situacija i nizak životni standard, nametnula se neophodnost sprovođenja istraživanja u vezi sa radnim migracijama, polazeći od pretpostavke da su jedan ovako dugotrajan proces tranzicije i celokupna ekonomska i politička situacija doveli i do visoke motivisanosti stanovništva za radne migracije i do vrlo specifičnih potreba koje leže u osnovi istih.

Uzorak koji je obuhvaćen ovim pilot-istraživanjem obuhvatio je 300 ispitanika starosti od 20 do 62 godine. U pogledu polne strukture, 48,8% ispitanika bile su osobe muškog, dok su 51,2% bile osobe ženskog pola. Struktura uzorka u pogledu godina radnog staža je sledeća: 37,1% ispitanika ima manje od 10 godina radnog staža, 15,3% ima između 10 i 15 godina radnog staža, 14,7% ispitanika ima između 15 i 20 godina radnog staža, 12,9% ispitanika ima između 20 i 25 godina radnog staža i 20% ispitanika ima preko 25 godina radnog staža. Obrazovna struktura uzorka je sledeća: 4,1% ispitanika je završilo samo osnovnu školu, 65,3% ispitanika ima srednju stručnu spremu, 30% ispitanika ima visoku stručnu spremu i 0,6% ispitanika su magistri. Analiza rezultata istraživanja je pokazala da bračni status i broj dece ne predstavljaju značajne faktore za donošenje odluke o migracijama povezanim sa radom.

Upitnik koji je korišćen u istraživanju bio je baziran na podeli svih faktora radnih migracija na tri velike grupe: (1) faktori povezani sa razvojem ličnosti i kompetencijama, (2) faktori povezani sa poslom i razvojem karijere i (3) faktori povezani sa životnim standardom i širim društvenim kontekstom.

Rezultati istraživanja su nedvosmisleno pokazali da su se faktori povezani sa poslom i razvojem karijere i faktori povezani sa životnim standardom i širim društvenim kontekstom značajno izdvojili kao važniji za donošenje odluke o preseljenju u drugu državu od faktora koji su povezani sa razvojem ličnosti i kompetencija. Redosled pojedinačnih faktora koji utiču na donošenje odluke o preseljenju u Republici Srbiji je sledeći: (1) sistem vrednosti koji je uspostavljen u Republici Srbiji (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,22); (2) veća zarada (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,20); (3) bolji životni standard (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,19); (4) veće vrednovanje sposobnosti i znanja od političke pripadnosti (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,10); (5) bolji uslovi rada (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,07); i (6) veća ekonomska stabilnost (prosečan skor na tvrdnji 4,01).

Faktori povezani sa razvojem ličnosti i kompetencijama pokazali su vrlo nisku povezanost sa donošenjem odluke o preseljenju. Prosečna vrednost po stavkama koje su obuhvaćene ovim faktorom kreće se od 2,90 do 3,30 i značajno je niža od prethodno navedene dve grupe faktora.

Rezultati istraživanja sprovedenog u Republici Srbiji potvrdili su rezultate koje je u svom istraživanju dobila „The Boston Consulting Group“, gde je utvrđeno da u ekonomski i politički nestabilnijim sredinama primarni faktori povezani sa migracijama jesu upravo oni koji su vezani za uslove rada, zaradu, sistem vrednosti i bolji životni standard.

Najznačajniji zaključak proistekao iz ovog istraživanja je da migracije, ili kako se to danas popularno naziva „odliv mozga“, nisu kategorija povezana isključivo sa uslovima rada i zaradom, već i sa širim društvenim kontekstom, gde rad predstavlja samo jedan njegov aspekt. U tom smislu, moguće je zaključiti da



poboljšanje samih uslova rada i povećanje zarada nezavisno od poboljšanja opšte društvene klime i promena u sistemu vrednosti ne može zaustaviti migracije i obezbediti ostanak kvalitetne radne snage u državi.

Istraživanje je pokazalo da 68% ispitanika izražava spremnost da napusti državu u potrazi za boljim poslom i boljim uslovima rada. Takođe, pažnje vredan podatak je i da se stariji mnogo teže odlučuju na migracije od mladih ispitanika (Pirsonov koeficijent korelacije na nivou značajnosti od 0,001 između starosti ispitanika i spremnosti za radne migracije).

Korelacije varijabli obuhvaćenih istraživanjem koje bi bilo značajno pomenuti i koje pružaju detaljniji uvid u prirodu samog procesa migracije i motivaciju koja stoji u njegovoj pozadini su sledeće:

1. Uočena je statistički značajna razlika i negativna povezanost između godina radnog staža i mogućnosti napredovanja, želje da se upoznaju druge kulture i stekne veće iskustvo i bolje obrazovanje, što znači da su ljudima sa više godina radnog staža ovo najmanje važni razlozi i imaju vrlo mali značaj za donošenje odluke o preseljenju;

2. Uočena je statistički značajna negativna korelacija između ispitanika koji imaju decu i onih koji nemaju u pogledu važnosti mogućnosti za razvoj novih poslovnih veština, u smislu da je za ispitanike koji imaju decu ovaj faktor od vrlo malog značaja za odlučivanje o preseljenju;

3. Bračni status je varijabla koja nije statistički značajno povezana ni sa jednim faktorom koji utiče na odlučivanje, te se može smatrati irelevantnom pri odlučivanju o preseljenju. Ljudi se odlučuju na migracije bez obzira na bračni status;

4. Uočena je statistički značajna pozitivna povezanost između stepena

obrazovanja i važnosti upoznavanja drugih kultura i jezika pri odlučivanju o preseljenju. Što znači da što je viši nivo obrazovanja, to faktori povezani sa razvojem ličnosti i kompetencijama postaju značajniji.

Dobijeni podaci jasno ukazuju na to da postoji izražena potreba nalaženja hitnih i konstruktivnih rešenja koja će umanjiti migracije i zaustaviti trend povećanja prosečne starosti populacije, jer će to voditi formiranju sistema koji će biti u potpunosti ekonomski neodrživ.

Ipak, radne migracije ne mogu se sagledati isključivo sa ekonomskog aspekta već kroz prizmu ljudskih prava, te se migrantima mora obezbediti pristup svim ljudskim pravima i slobodama koji su zajamčeni svakom pojedincu brojnim međunarodnim dokumentima univerzalnog i regionalnog karaktera (Urdarević 2019b). Pokretljivost radnika migranata, pored viših zarada i boljih uslova rada, motivisana je i njihovom potrebom za sigurnijim zaposlenjem, profesionalnim usavršavanjem, napredovanjem na radu, ali i osiguranjem većeg stepena pravne sigurnosti koju u državi porekla nemaju. Ovo posebno važi za migracije visokokvalifikovanih radnika i stručnjaka. Takođe, razvitak informacionih i komunikacionih tehnologija omogućio je radnicima migrantima da se na različite načine povežu sa geografski udaljenim i kulturno različitim sredinama, a da u njima ne moraju da budu fizički prisutni. Primer za to je masovni rad kod kojeg digitalne platforme deluju kao posrednici u zapošljavanju i omogućavaju poslodavcu korisniku da u svakom trenutku pristupi određenoj grupi radnika koji su spremni da izvrše određeni radni zadatak uz novčanu nadoknadu (Urdarević 2021). Konačno, važno je istaći i pitanje reintegracije radnih migranata u društvo države porekla, odnosno pitanje njihove

sposobnosti da sva znanja, iskustva i veštine koje su stekli tokom života u različitim kulturnim sredinama prenesu u društvo države porekla.

## **2 MEĐUNARODNOPRAVNI POLOŽAJ RADNIKA MIGRANATA**

S pravnog gledišta, pitanje zaštite radnika migranata i njihovih porodica je od velike važnosti jer se na njih ne primenjuje radno zakonodavstvo države porekla već države prijema, odnosno one države u kojoj se rad obavlja. Čest je slučaj da radnici migranti nisu upoznati sa merodavnim pravnim okvirom države prijema, pa čak i ne poznaju običaje i jezik države prijema, što ih čini ranjivom kategorijom radnika podložnoj radnoj eksploataciji (Valticos 1979). Da bi se izbegle sve loše posledice po radnike migrante i članove njihovih porodica, primenjuje se načelo jednakog postupanja, ali koje ne znači da su oni u svemu izjednačeni sa domaćim radnicima. Drugim rečima, države garantuju jednako postupanje prema stranim radnicima samo u korist državljana određenih država, i to u pogledu određenih prava, a sve u skladu sa relevantnim međunarodnim pravnim aktima. Većina država pruža garantije u pogledu jednakosti u zapošljavanju i uslovima rada.

S obzirom na to da načelo jednakog postupanja ne podrazumeva izjednačavanje položaja domaćih i stranih radnika, države prijema zadržavaju mogućnost da propišu posebne uslove koje bi strani radnici trebalo da ispune pre nego što zasnuju radni odnos. Na ovaj način države štite, pre svega, domaće tržište rada, ali i sprečavaju da strani radnici smanje cenu rada i na taj način destimulišu domaće radnike da obavljaju rad. Sve češće je u pojedinim državama prisutan i sistem kvota radnih dozvola

za zapošljavanje koje se godišnje mogu izdati strancima.

### **2.1 MEĐUNARODNA ORGANIZACIJA RADA**

Pre svega, potrebno je ukazati na činjenicu da danas na međunarodnom nivou ne postoji univerzalno prihvaćena definicija pojma migrant. Upravo ovakva pojmovna neodređenost dovodi do izvesnih problema, s obzirom da od statusa koji pojedine kategorije lica uživaju zavisi i način postupanja prema njima. U teoriji ljudskih prava preovladava shvatanje da se pojedinim kategorijama lica, koje su posebno ugrožene, moraju dati i neka posebna prava specifična samo za tu grupu lica, čime bi se postigla jednakost i ravnopravnost svih građana, koja se, u suprotnom, ne bi mogla postići (Paunović, Krivokapić i Krstić 2013).

Dakle, pojam migrant predstavlja krovni pojam koji obuhvata različite kategorije lica koje imaju različit status, te u najširem smislu međunarodnog migranta možemo definisati kao svako lice koje se nalazi izvan države čiji je stanovnik, a u slučaju lica bez državljanstva, države u kojoj je rođen ili uobičajeno boravi. U zavisnosti od statusa migranta uređuje se i postupak njegovog zapošljavanja, odnosno uslovljavanje njegovog zapošljavanja prethodnim postojanjem dozvole za rad. Pojedine države su relativizovale uslove za zapošljavanje radnika migranata ukoliko se radi o pojedinim delatnostima. Tako, na primer, u Španiji, ukoliko prethodno postoji saradnja između dveju država u oblasti nauke, kulture, umetnosti i informisanja, za zapošljavanje stranaca dovoljno je da o tome budu samo obavestene javne vlasti (Olea, Rodríguez-Sañudo i Guerrero 2018). S druge strane, u grčkom pravu dopušteni izuzetak vezuje se samo za rad u rudarskoj industriji,

i to pod uslovom da je zapošljavanje hitno potrebno zbog otklanjanja štete koja je nastala na mašinama, opremi i uređajima (Douka i Koniaris 2001).

Prema podacima Međunarodne organizacije rada za 2019. godinu, populacija migranata iznosila je 272 miliona; njih 245 miliona bilo je starije od 15 godina, 169 miliona migranata obavljalo je neku profesionalnu aktivnost, dok su radnici migranti činili 4,3% ukupne radno aktivne populacije u svetu (International Labour Organization 2021). Posebno zabrinjavaju podaci prema kojima se 150,3 miliona radnika migranata bori da nađe pristojan posao i koji obavljaju poslove podložne automatizaciji, što znači da će u jednom trenutku postati „tehnološki višak“ (International Labour Organization 2015). Ovo je iz razloga što najveći broj radnika migranata obavlja poslove u sektoru usluga, a ti poslovi se lako mogu automatizovati, dok su visokokvalifikovani migranti izuzetno traženi na globalnom tržištu (CFR 2018). Interesantno je pomenuti još jedan trend, a on se odnosi na brzo starenje radne snage u industrijski razvijenim državama, koje stvara prostor za potražnju u oblasti ličnih usluga i nege starijih i bolesnih lica. Prema pojedinim procenama, poslovi u okviru „ekonomije nege“ mogu da stvore 475 miliona radnih mesta do 2030. godine (International Labour Organization 2019).

Pozitivne strane međunarodnih radnih migracija ogledaju se i u tome što su ti radnici prilagodljivi i spremni da prihvate da obavljaju one poslove koji neretko nose društvenu stigmju u državama prijema (Peromingo i Pieterston 2018). Međutim, postoje i mnoge neizvesnosti vezane za njihov položaj, a one se tiču nepoznanice u pogledu toga koliko će države prijema i privatni sektor biti odlučni u tome da obučavaju migrante da popune nova radna mesta.

Danas, na međunarodnom planu radnici migranti zaštićeni su kroz sistem zaštite ljudskih prava, te se zahteva od država da konstantno menjaju i unapređuju svoj pravni okvir koji se odnosi na njihov pravni i društveni položaj. Dakle, države moraju da štite prava migranata tako što će normativno ojačati korpus ljudskih prava i primeniti ga na sve radnike migrante bez diskriminacije. Dakle, svaka država ima obavezu da štiti sve ljude koji su na njenoj teritoriji, da smanjuje potrebu za imigracijom, ali i da istovremeno štiti one koje migriraju. Ovo iz razloga što ljudska prava pripadaju svima, uključujući i radnike migrante (Lerner 2002). To znači da većina međunarodnih dokumenta kojima se štite ljudska prava ne pravi razliku prema državljanstvu, odnosno postoji jasan međunarodni konsenzus o tome da se ljudska prava moraju primenjivati kako na državljane, tako i na one koji nisu državljani.

Osnivanjem Međunarodne organizacije rada otpočinje se sa organizovanjem zaštitom stranih radnika. Najvažniji međunarodni radni standardi iz oblasti zaštite prava radnika migranata odnose se na priznavanje migrantima statusa posebno osetljivih kategorija radnika. U tom smislu, Konvencija Međunarodne organizacije rada br. 97 o migraciji u cilju zapošljavanja (Uredba o ratifikaciji Konvencije br. 97 1968), u članu 11 propisuje da termin „radnik migrant“ označava lice koje migrira iz jedne zemlje u drugu da bi se zaposlilo na bilo koji način osim za svoj račun, i obuhvata sva lica redovno primljena u svojstvu radnika migranta. Dalje, Konvencija propisuje i obavezu svake države članice da pruži informacije o nacionalnim politikama, zakonima i propisima koji se odnose na emigraciju i imigraciju, kao i informacije o opštim sporazumima o posebnim aranžmanima u vezi sa migracijama. Vrlo važno je istaći

da član 6 Konvencije propisuje obavezu da svaka država članica primenjuje, bez diskriminacije u pogledu narodnosti, rase, vere ili pola, na imigrante koji su zakonito na njenoj teritoriji tretman koji nije nepovoljniji od tretmana koji ima prema svojim državljanima u pogledu pitanja koja se odnose na socijalno obezbeđenje, uz ograničenje da mogu postojati određeni aranžmani za očuvanje stečenih prava, kao i da nacionalni zakoni zemalja migracije mogu da propišu specijalne aranžmane u pogledu davanja ili delova davanja koji se u celini isplaćuju iz javnih fondova.

Pored ovoga, Konvencija Međunarodne organizacije rada br. 143 o migracijama u uslovima zloupotreba i unapređenju jednakih mogućnosti i tretmana radnika migranata iz 1980. godine (Zakon o ratifikaciji Konvencije br. 143 1980) dopunjuje Konvenciju br. 97 u delu u kome svaka država članica mora da poštuje osnovna ljudska prava svih radnika migranata. Svaki član za koga je ova konvencija na snazi sistematski treba da nastoji da utvrdi da li na njegovoj teritoriji ima nezakonito zaposlenih radnika i da li sa njegove teritorije polaze, preko nje prolaze ili na nju stižu migraciona kretanja u cilju zapošljavanja, pri čemu su migranti u toku puta, po dolasku, za vreme boravka i rada izloženi uslovima kojima se krše međunarodni odnosi, multilateralni ili bilateralni instrumenti ili sporazumi ili nacionalno zakonodavstvo (Betten 1993).

Konačno, Konvencija Međunarodne organizacije rada br. 102 o minimalnoj normi socijalnog obezbeđenja (Uredba o ratifikaciji Konvencije br. 102 1952) primenjuje se na sve grane socijalnog osiguranja i usvaja princip prema kome svi nedržavljeni države prijema moraju imati isti status kao i državljani. Ovaj princip je ublažen kroz član 68 Konvencije, u kome je propisano da stanovnici

strani državljani treba da imaju jednak status kao i domaći državljani. Međutim, u pogledu davanja ili delova davanja koji se finansiraju isključivo ili pretežno iz javnih fondova, kao i u pogledu prelaznih režima, mogu se za strane državljane propisati posebne odredbe. Ovo je posebno važno u sistemima socijalnog obezbeđenja zasnovanim na doprinosima, gde je zaštita lica uslovljena postojanjem bilateralnog ili multilateralnog sporazuma na bazi reciprociteta. Bilateralni sporazumi o socijalnom osiguranju predstavljaju osnovne i, po svojoj sadržini, jednostavne instrumente socijalne sigurnosti putem kojih se štite radnici migranti. Njihova prednost je u tome što se zaključuju između dve države, tako da je jednostavnije pomiriti specifičnosti i jedinstvenosti svakog od dva različita sistema socijalne sigurnosti država ugovornica (Latković 2015). Oni zvanično uobličavaju obaveze svake strane potpisnice da obezbedi da se ostvarivanje prava odvija u skladu sa dogovorenim načelima i postupcima, odnosno njima se definišu postupci kojima se bliže uređuje način ostvarivanja prava na socijalna davanja i pružaju određene garancije državljanima države porekla da će biti dovoljno zaštićeni u zemljama odredišta.

Na kraju, treba primetiti da su pomenute konvencije Međunarodne organizacije rada zaključivane u različito vreme, sa državama bitno drugačijeg ekonomsko-socijalnog sistema i sa nejednakim stepenom zainteresovanosti zemalja imigracije. Upravo iz tog razloga, kao posledica, u konvencijama su sadržana dosta različita rešenja, ali ono što je zajedničko za ove konvencije jeste da su regulisale princip jednakosti šansi i postupanja između državljana jedne države i državljana države prijema, a u vezi sa pravima iz socijalnog osiguranja i uslovima za njihovo sticanje.

## 2.2 EVROPSKA UNIJA

Proširenje Evropske unije otvorilo je značajnu debatu o uticaju migracije radne snage iz istočne Evrope na ekonomije, zapošljavanje i industrijske odnose u zapadnoj Evropi. Uopšteno govoreći, postoje dve koncepcije vezane za implikacije migracija radne snage na tržište, kao i uslove rada na teritoriji Evropske unije. Prva, koja migracije na teritoriji Evropske unije vezuje neposredno za opasnost od socijalnog dampinga, odnosno od bojazni da će priliv radnika migranata značajno poremetiti industrijske odnose u evropskim državama. Ovde se, pre svega, misli na to da će do socijalnog dampinga doći onda kada se proizvodnja premesti sa zapada na istok, jer je tamo jeftinija radna snaga i nepovoljniji su uslovi rada. Iz tog razloga, veliki broj radnika će migrirati sa istoka na zapad, a razlike u životnom standardu mogu dovesti do „trke do dna“ i, konačno, smanjenja životnog standarda državljana države prijema (Caro i dr. 2015).

Druga koncepcija vezuje se za tzv. „integracionističku“ perspektivu koja posmatra migraciju radne snage kao povoljan izgled za ekonomski rast država Evropske unije. Drugim rečima, radnici migranti su korisni za tržište rada Evropske unije kome je neophodna nova radna snaga da bi se nadoknadilo starenje stanovništva i popunila ona radna mesta koja su neatraktivna za domaće državljane i koja neretko karakterišu nesigurni oblici radnog angažovanja, odnosno nestandardni ugovori o radu i niske zarade (Kahanec, Zaičeva i Zimmermann 2010).

Ono što je svakako primetno u državama članicama Evropske unije jeste velika međusobna razlika u odnosu na rad, zapošljavanje i mere socijalne politike. Načelo slobodnog kretanja radnika i kapitala širom država članica Evropske unije

dovelo je, između ostalog, do nekoliko negativnih trendova koji se ogledaju u smanjenju zarada, povećanju stope nezaposlenosti širom država članica Evropske unije, slabljenja moći sindikata i jačanja moći poslodavca. Razloge za ovo treba tražiti u spremnosti radnika koji dolaze iz slabije razvijenih država članica Evropske unije ili trećih država, i koji su spremni da rade za niže zarade u odnosu na domaće radnike, što posledično dovodi do povećanja stope nezaposlenosti među lokalnom radnom snagom (Cremers, Dolvik i Bosch 2007).

Na nivou Evropske unije, naročito od sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, liberalizovan je režim zapošljavanja u državama članicama, te su mnogi usvojeni dokumenti išli u smeru pune slobode kretanja i zapošljavanja, ali po pravilu radnika iz država članica. S obzirom na to da je postojala potreba za ukidanjem dugotrajnih, složenih i vrlo skupih postupaka izdavanja odobrenja za boravak i dozvola za rad, Direktivom Evropskog parlamenta i Saveta 2011/98/EU (Official Journal L 343) uvedeno je pravilo o sprovođenju objedinjenog postupka za izdavanje jedinstvene dozvole boravka i rada državljana trećih država na teritoriji države članice EU. Direktivom, međutim, nije određeno okvirno trajanje jedinstvene dozvole, a što u praksi redovno podrazumeva to da rok važenja jedinstvene dozvole zavisi od trajanja ugovora o radu (Špadina 2012).

Usled intenzivnog priliva radne snage iz trećih država, donete su dve direktive, i to: Direktiva br. 96/71/EZ o detaširanim radnicima (Directive 96/71/EC 1996) i Direktiva br. 52/09 o sankcijama za poslodavce koji zapošljavaju ilegalne migrante van područja Evropske unije (Directive 2009/52/EC 2009). Ono što je primetno jeste trend da u poslednje vreme ima više detaširanih radnika koji dolaze iz

država koje nisu članice Evropske unije nego onih koji su iz država članica. Drugim rečima, radnici iz država članica Evropske unije nevoljno pristaju da budu detaširani i upućeni na rad u neku drugu državu članicu, dok je sasvim suprotno kod radnika koji dolaze iz država koje nisu članice Evropske unije (Danaj i dr. 2023).

U pogledu primene Direktive br. 96/71 posebno je značajan predmet Rifert (*Rüffert*), u kome je nemačka kompanija *Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co* angažovala poljske radnike i plaćala im manje od jedne polovine od iznosa zarade predviđene važećim kolektivnim ugovorom. Evropski sud pravde zaključio je da implementacija odredaba Direktive br. 96/71 EZ mora da bude u duhu Osnivačkog ugovora EZ, koji propisuje uklanjanje svih prepreka koje bi dovele u nepovoljan položaj bilo koju kompaniju koja ima sedište u nekoj drugoj državi članici. Na ovaj način sprečava se ograničavanje slobode pružanja usluga „jer bi se u suprotnom stranim kompanijama koje dolaze iz slabije ekonomski razvijenih država članica Evropske unije nametnuo dodatan ekonomski teret, odnosno strane kompanije bi mogle biti dovedene u nepovoljan položaj jer bi im se onemogućio pristup tržištima najrazvijenijih država Evropske unije” (Urdarević 2013).

Sličan primer bio je i u slučaju Laval (*Laval*), u kome su švedski sindikati stupili u bojkot protiv litvanske građevinske firme „Laval” jer nije postignut dogovor oko potpisivanja kolektivnog ugovora, tačnije oko visine minimalne cene rada. Kompanija Laval je sa svojim radnicima potpisala kolektivni ugovor u Litvaniji, u skladu sa nacionalnim zakonima, i uputila ih na rad u Švedsku. Međutim, najveći granski sindikat u oblasti građevinarstva insistirao je na tome da se ponovo pokrene kolektivno pregovaranje u pogledu

minimalne cene rada, ali i o drugim pitanjima koja se odnose na radnopravni status ovih radnika. S obzirom na to da kompanija Laval nije želela da pregovara o dodatnim pravima radnika jer bi ista prouzrokovala dodatne troškove, sindikat je blokirao gradilište, a vremenom su se i drugi srodni sindikati solidarisali bojkotujući sva Lavalova gradilišta u Švedskoj. Na kraju, ugovor između javne vlasti u Švedskoj i Lavala je raskinut, a Laval je podneo tužbu protiv švedskih sindikata uključenih u kolektivnu akciju (Leczykiewicz 2014).

Odluke Evropskog suda pravde u slučaju Laval, ali i Viking, ukazuju na delikatnost balansiranja između ekonomskih sloboda i socijalnih prava. Naime, slučajevi Laval i Viking se u literaturi navode kao primeri potvrde da je Evropski sud pravde često priznavao veću zaštitu ekonomskim pravima u odnosu na socijalna, gde odluke Suda u navedenim slučajevima isto potvrđuju, na način da se sindikati prepoznaju kao jača strana u pravnom odnosu nasuprot kompanijama odnosno poslodavcima. Štrajkovi sindikata u navedenim slučajevima ilustruju kako tradicionalni nacionalni ekonomsko-socijalni sistemi, ali ni evropski socijalni model, ne uspevaju da reše problem zaštite konkurencije i migracija na tržište rada između novih i starih država članica Evropske unije.

### 3 SINDIKATI I RADNICI MIGRANTI – RAZLIČITOSTI KOJE SE PRIVLAČE

Imigracija je oduvek bila veliki izazov za radnički pokret još od pojave industrijskog kapitalizma. Iako se u osnovi prava na sindikalno udruživanje nalazi koncept međunarodne radničke solidarnosti, čini se da su radnici migranti ostali izvan ovog koncepta. Dok je svojevremeno



Marks pozivao da se radnici svih zemalja ujedine, nije mogao a da ne primeti da je radnička klasa u to vreme bila podeljena na dva neprijateljska tabora – engleske proletere i irske proletere. Prema njegovom kazivanju, „engleski radnik mrzi irskog radnika jer mu je on konkurent koji mu smanjuje životni standard. U odnosu na irskog radnika, engleski radnik sebe smatra pripadnikom vladajuće nacije i samim tim postaje oruđe engleskih aristokrata i kapitalista koji tako održavaju svoju moć” (Marks 1870).

Danas, posle izvesnog vremena, dilema deluje i dalje aktuelna. Sindikati se danas vrlo često protive radnim migracijama jer iste derogiraju zaključne kolektivne ugovore, što dovodi do umnožavanja privremenih i nesigurnih poslova koji često i nisu pokriveni odredbama kolektivnog ugovora (Krings 2009). Istovremeno, radnici migranti nisu previše zainteresovani da budu članovi sindikata, što može predstavljati problem za države u kojima se kolektivno pregovaranje odvija na nivou preduzeća i gde ne postoji veliki broj zaključenih granskih ili sektorskih kolektivnih ugovora (Holgate 2013). Na kraju, značajna je i jezička barijera koja predstavlja izazov za sindikate da regrutuju radnike migrante, a što može na kraju dovesti do njihove socijalne izolacije.

U načelu, radnici migranti povećavaju bojazan domaćeg radništva od smanjenja zarada i životnog standarda. Iz tog razloga, sindikalne politike imaju na raspolaganju nekoliko instrumenata koji im služe da amortizuju potencijalno nepovoljne trendove u pogledu priliva stranih radnika.

Prvi instrument se odnosi na imigracionu kontrolu, odnosno ograničavanje ulaska migranata na domaća tržišta rada. Dok je ovaj koncept i davao neki rezultat u periodu visoke nezaposlenosti doma-

ćih radnika i ekonomske krize, danas to više nije slučaj (Alberti, Holgate i Turner 2014). Iz perspektive evropskog tržišta rada, koje promovise slobodu kretanja rada i kapitala, gotovo je nemoguće sprovesti ovakvu imigracionu kontrolu. Doduše, danas u pravu Evropske unije postoji načelo preferencijalnog postupanja Evropske unije, po kome se službama za zapošljavanje zabranjuje posredovanje u zapošljavanju državljana trećih država pre nego što dokažu da kao kandidate za zaposlenje na slobodnim poslovima nisu mogle da identifikuju državljanice iz država članice Evropske unije. Dakle, iako svi državljanici Evropske unije uživaju slobodu kretanja i zapošljavanja na teritoriji svih država članica, moguće je uvesti određena ograničenja u pogledu državljana novoprimitljenih država članica. Tako je napravljena podela između starih i novih članica Evropske unije, gde stare članice, slabijeg ekonomskog razvoja u poređenju sa novim, mogu da ograniče priliv radne snage iz novoprimitljenih država članica, ali im se mora dati prednost u zapošljavanju u odnosu na državljanice trećih država (Vukorepa 2018).

Drugi instrument je izjednačavanje, najčešće kroz autonomne izvore prava (na primer, kolektivne ugovore) koji prepoznaju status stranih radnika i na taj način se, s jedne strane, smanjuje mogućnost eksploatacije migrantske radne snage, a s druge ograničavaju diskreciona ovlašćenja poslodavca (Baccaro i Howel 2017). Ovako zaključeni kolektivni ugovori predstavljaju glavni instrument ujednačavanja radnopravnog položaja stranih i domaćih radnika, ali uz preduslov da postoje jake sindikalne organizacije koje poseduju ozbiljnu pregovaračku moć.

Treći instrument odnosi se na sindikalno organizovanje radnika migranata, odnosno njihovo uključivanje u



sindikalne strukture u državi prijema. Ovo je i logično jer su sindikati uglavnom suočeni sa manjkom članstva, ali je i skopčano sa značajnim izazovima. Jedan od njih je što je najveći broj radnika migranata radno angažovan u sektoru nege koji nije dovoljno sindikalno organizovan i gde su poslovi obično privremenog karaktera (Hardy, Eldring i Schulten 2012).

Najčešće se ovi instrumenti koriste u kombinaciji, odnosno opredeljenije sindikata za određeni instrument uslovljeno je delovanjem više različitih faktora. Možda najvažniji jeste onaj koji se odnosi na stvarnu snagu sindikata u konkretnoj državi. Drugim rečima, ukoliko postoji velika sindikalna pokrivenost povećava se i sposobnost sindikata da autonomno utiču na uslove na tržištu rada i eventualno sankcionišu nesavesne poslodavce štrajkovima ili bojkotom. Ovde svakako ne treba potceniti ni organizacionu vezu koju pojedini sindikati imaju sa političkim izvorima moći, gde neposredno, kroz postupak konsultovanja i putem socijalnog dijaloga, mogu da utiču na imigracionu politiku pojedinih država (Bryson, Ebbinghaus i Visser 2011). Ovakvi sindikati će kroz postupke kolektivnog pregovaranja moći da „priušte” otvorene imigracione politike, jer će tako pokušati da izjednače cenu rada i uslove rada između domaćih i stranih radnika. U pogledu radnika migranata, ovo je svakako najbolje rešenje i najbolji izbor za sindikate jer vrši integraciju stranih radnika u radnopravni sistem države prijema.

Međutim, usled sveprisutnog opadanja sindikalnog članstva i trenda liberalizacije industrijskih odnosa u Evropi, vrlo je teško postići ovakvo rešenje. Iz tog razloga sindikati pokušavaju da dobiju pomoć od države kroz zakonsku regulativu koja bi na jedinstven način uredila pitanje zarada domaćih i stranih radnika,

a neretko definisala i sistem kvota u pogledu broja stranih radnika koji mogu da imaju pristup tržištu rada države domaćina. Dobar primer predstavljaju nemački sindikati koji su prihvatili zapošljavanje stranih radnika pod uslovom da se na njih primenjuju ista pravna pravila kao i na domaće državljane (Zahn 2018).

## 4 ZAKLJUČAK

Iako je analiza korišćena u ovom radu uglavnom kvantitativna i deskriptivna, ona pruža izvestan aksiološki uvid u vezi sa migracijama i njenim uticajem na ponudu radne snage u Evropi. Pored toga, više je nego evidentna činjenica da su radnici migranti u Evropi bili pokretačka radna snaga, naročito u situaciji kada je broj domaćih radnika u državama prijema bio smanjen.

Radnopravni položaj radnika migranata zasniva se, prvenstveno, na izvorima međunarodnog porekla, ali ipak, analizirajući broj ratifikovanih konvencija u ovoj oblasti, jasno se uočava da je on vrlo skroman, pa čak i da ne postoje adekvatni mehanizmi koji bi osigurali njihovu efikasnu primenu.

S druge strane, i pored utvrđenog značaja opštih odredbi navedenih u međunarodnim dokumentima, sasvim je jasno da se njihovom primenom ne mogu u potpunosti obuhvatiti sva pitanja vezana za zaštitu prava radnika migranata. U tom smislu ne čudi što su pojedine države i sindikati počeli da štite svoje interese donošenjem pravnih propisa u oblasti migracija i upravljanjem migracijama na svojoj teritoriji. U radu je ukazano na bojazan da će radne migracije negativno uticati na sindikalnu sliku u onim državama u kojima su sindikati slabi i razjedinjeni, odnosno bez prave moći da utiču na donosiocima odluka. Primer su švedski sindikati u slučaju *Laval*,

koji je pokazao da članstvo u Evropskoj uniji podrazumeva ne samo ograničenje državnog suvereniteta u pogledu granične kontrole, već i u značajnoj meri modifikuje industrijske odnose u državama članicama, pa tako tradicionalni načini očuvanja socijalnog mira više nisu dovoljno efikasni.

Analiza motiva za emigraciju radne snage u Republici Srbiji pokazala je da čak i ukoliko se izvrše određene promene na nivou radnih organizacija ne bi došlo do smanjenja emigracije, jer motivi za

istu proizlaze ne samo iz nezadovoljstva uslovima rada, već osnov nalaze u definisanim ekonomsko-socijalnim uslovima i uopšte sagledavaju se u širem društvenom odnosno etičkom, kulturnom i političkom kontekstu.

Na kraju, neophodno je nastaviti sa praćenjem migracionih procesa jer se jedino tako može steći pravilan uvid u brojne socijalne, ekonomske i političke implikacije dosadašnjih emigracionih trendova iz Srbije, a na osnovu toga i formulisati adekvatan društveni odgovor.

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**Osvrti i komentari**

**Reviews and reflections**





# Nov popis, nova rešenja, stari problemi

*Osvrt na nova metodološka rešenja Popisa 2022. i njegovu uporedivost sa prethodnim popisima stanovništva*

## New census, new solutions, old problems

*Review of the new methodological solutions of the 2022 Census and its comparability with previous censuses*

Poslednji popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u Republici Srbiji sproveden je u periodu 1–31. oktobra 2022. godine, sa kritičnim momentom popisa 30. septembra 2022. u ponoć. Popisivanje je prvobitno bilo planirano za april 2021. godine, ali je zbog nepovoljne epidemiološke situacije, izazvane pandemijom COVID-19, odloženo prvo za april 2022, a zatim za oktobar iste godine. Snežana Lakčević, pomoćnik direktora za Sektor društvenih statistika Republičkog zavoda za statistiku Republike Srbije (RZS), i Ljiljana Đorđević, načelnik Odeljenja za popis stanovništva, su na poziv Društva demografa Srbije dana 29. maja 2023. godine održale predavanje o Popisu 2022. Predstavile su detaljno organizacionu strukturu popisa, izazove tokom sprovođenja i neke od prvih konačnih rezultata (osnovne podatke vezane za starost i pol stanovništva Srbije). Takođe, prikazale su i objasnile razloge uvođenja novih metodoloških rešenja u popis.

Na osnovu njihovog izlaganja mogu se izdvojiti najvažnije promene u Popisu 2022. u odnosu na prethodne popise:

- Prvi popis bez papirnih obrazaca (elektronski unos informacija);
- Znatno manji broj popisivača i instruktora (niži troškovi popisivanja);
- Bolji kvalitet prikupljenih podataka (kontrolna aplikacije za unos podataka);
- Obezbeđena je veza između popisnih i geoprostornih podataka;
- Kvalitetnija zaštita podataka;
- Skraćena faza obrade podataka i brže publikovanje rezultata;
- Korišćenje administrativnih izvora za kontrolu ali i prikupljanje podataka.

Svi prethodni popisi sprovedeni su kao tradicionalni popisi (popisivanje „od vrata do vrata“, pri čemu su obučeni popisivači popunjavali papirne obrasce). U Popisu 2022. godine uvedena je velika novina koja se odnosi na popisivanje u digitalnom formatu (bez papirnih obrazaca) putem unosa u laptop računare i preko interneta momentalni prenos u centralnu bazu RZS-a. Na taj način popisivanje je postalo brže, jeftinije i kvalitetnije. Za razliku od popisa iz 2011. godine, kada je diseminacija konačnih rezultata počela 13 meseci nakon završetka popisa (novembar 2012. godine), sada je prva knjiga popisa publikovana već u aprilu 2023. godine, tj. već posle 5 meseci od završetka popisa. Prema tvrdnjama saradnica RZS-a, obuhvat popisanih lica u Popisu 2022. je značajno bolji od obuhvata prethodnih popisa. Najveća promena koju je doneo Popis 2022. odnosi se na korišćenje administrativnih izvora za popisivanje lica koja nisu od strane popisivača popisana na terenu. Administrativni izvori su, kako je naglašeno, korišćeni veoma pažljivo, a kriterijum da lice bude dodato ukupnom broju stanovnika je njegova prisutnost u najmanje dva administrativna izvora koja nedvosmisleno pokazuju da je lice u zemlji.

Iz RZS-a je navedeno da je pravni osnov za korišćenje administrativnih podataka u svrhu unapređenja obuhvata i kvaliteta popisnih podataka predviđen Zakonom o Popisu stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova 2022. godine, Zakonom o zvaničnoj statistici i Zakonom o zaštiti podataka o ličnosti (RZS 2023a). Administrativni registri i evidencije na osnovu kojih je utvrđen skup podataka za dopunu Popisa su: Centralni registar stanovništva, Centralni registar obaveznog socijalnog osiguranja (CROSO), Evidencija Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje, Jedinstveni informacioni sistem prosvete,

Evidencija Fonda za penzijsko i invalidsko osiguranje, Evidencije Ministarstva za rad, boračka i socijalna pitanja i Ministarstva za demografiju i brigu o porodici o korisnicima različitih vrsta socijalne pomoći, Evidencija Republičkog fonda za zdravstveno osiguranje o korisnicima zdravstvenih knjižica (RZS 2023b).

U nastavku biće dat kritički osvrt na one delove Popisa 2022. koji su bitni pre svega u demografskim istraživanjima. Kvalitet prikupljenih podataka u velikoj meri zavisi od načina unosa i njegove logičke kontrole. Najnoviji popis je upravo iskorak ka boljim podacima i, kako se najavljuje, prvi korak ka potpunoj digitalizaciji popisa 2031. godine. U popisu nije bilo mogućnosti samopopisivanja, iako se u tu svrhu mogla upotrebiti aplikacija koju su koristili popisivači, jer su metodolozi RZS-a procenili da bi kvalitet tako dobijenih podataka bio sporan. S obzirom da je samopopisivanje u mnogim državama već realnost, verujemo da u narednom popisu u Srbiji možemo očekivati i tu opciju, naročito jer bi znatno pojeftinila celu akciju. Pohvalno je i georeferenciranje objekata, što je put ka preciznijem određivanju prostorne distribucije stanovništva. Osnovna razlika između Popisa 2022. i prethodnih je u načinu određivanja ukupnog stanovništva, odnosno podatak o ukupnom broju stanovnika 2022. godine predstavlja zbir broja popisanih stanovnika i dopune iz administrativnih izvora.

Administrativni podaci su odavno uključeni u popise kroz razne vidove registara koji se koriste za popise zasnovane na registrima (engl. register-based census). Do sada je samo nekoliko zemalja, uglavnom evropskih, sprovedo popise u potpunosti zasnovane na registrima, ali mnoge zemlje su kombinovale upotrebu administrativnih podataka sa podacima prikupljenim na terenu, ili planiraju da

to urade u narednim popisima. Danska je 1981. godine bila prva zemlja na svetu koja je sprovedla popis stanovništva u potpunosti zasnovan na registrima, Finska potom 1990. godine (UN 2007). U našem okruženju, Slovenija od 2011. godine u potpunosti ima popis stanovništva na bazi registara (SURSTAT 2021). Primer skorije upotrebe kombinovanog popisa je Novi Zeland 2018. godine (Stats NZ 2019) i Severna Makedonija 2021. godine (MAKSTAT 2022).

Upotreba administrativnih podataka, pre svega, smanjuje troškove prikupljanja podataka. Baze često sadrže podatke za ukupnu populaciju, što nadilazi anketna istraživanja koja se koriste u statističkim istraživanjima kao dopuna za popisne podatke. Administrativni izvori podataka mogu u nekom smislu biti superiorniji od popisa, jer se na godišnjem nivou ažuriraju ili čak i češće, za razliku od tradicionalnih popisa koji se u velikoj većini zemalja sprovode svakih deset godina. Ipak, popisi pružaju mnogo širi spektar podataka na koje su se korisnici navikli, a kojih nema u administrativnim izvorima. Takođe, administrativne baze ne moraju nužno da obuhvataju čitavu populaciju, a može ostati nepoznato koji delovi su izostavljeni. Kada statistički zavod dobije pristup administrativnom skupu podataka, mora da proceni da li su podaci korisni za potencijalnu statističku upotrebu. Vladini subjekti prikupljaju administrativne podatke u svrhu programske administracije, regulative ili sprovođenja zakona, a ne u statističke svrhe, i oni u svom „sirovom“ obliku mogu biti neprikladni za statističku upotrebu iz različitih razloga. Administrativni podaci mogu imati mnoga ograničenja, pre svega nedostatak kontrole kvaliteta (Foley, Champion i Shuttleworth 2021). Statističke službe, pre primene ovih podataka, treba da obezbede da šira javnost razume prednosti

korišćenja administrativnih podataka u svrhu statističkih istraživanja i da postoji široko odobravanje ove upotrebe. Značajno je da postoji transparentnost u načinu na koji statistički zavodi koriste administrativne podatke, što su mnoge zemlje i zakonski regulisale (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2017).

Istraživači i drugi korisnici popisa u Srbiji su upravo najviše iznenađeni nenajavljenim korišćenjem administrativnih podataka, i to ne u cilju kontrole kvaliteta popisnih podataka nego za popisivanje lica koja nisu popisana od strane popisivača. Na taj način je ukupnom „na terenu“ popisanim broju stanovnika pridodato oko 200 hiljada lica, što je približno 3% ukupne populacije. Da li je time zaista postignut bolji obuhvat populacije i da li se upravo većim obuhvatom ukupnog stanovništva, kako je navedeno u odnosu na prethodne popise, može objasniti neslaganje između očekivanih rezultata popisa od strane stručnjaka i zvaničnih konačnih rezultata popisa? Ukoliko i prihvatimo da se administrativnim dodavanjem može postići veći obuhvat stanovništva, svakako se na taj način gubi u kvalitetu kod određenih obeležja stanovnika. Prva knjiga Popisa 2022. jasno je na to ukazala. Etnička struktura stanovništva Srbije, kao prvo obeležje koje se publikuje, upravo pokazuje osnovni nedostatak administrativnog načina prikupljanja podataka u odnosu na tradicionalno popisivanje. Tako je rubrika nepoznato dodatno brojčano uvećana, jer administrativni podaci ne sadrže informacije o etničkoj i verskoj pripadnosti, maternjem jeziku (RZS 2023a). Publikovanje ostalih obeležja dodatno će pokazati koliko su administrativni izvori dovoljni da nadomeste informacije koje se očekuju od popisa. Pouzdanost podataka upisanih

**Tabela 1.** Pregled metodoloških promena u popisima 1991, 2002, 2011. i 2022. godine

Godina popisa	Kritični momenat	Metodološki koncept	Kategorije stanovništva	Napomena
1991.	31. 03.	stalno stanovništvo	stanovništvo u zemlji + stanovništvo u inostranstvu	Bojkot albanskog stanovništva, ali dodate procene
2002.	31. 03.	stalno stanovništvo	stanovništvo u zemlji + stanovništvo u inostranstvu do 1 godine	Dodate izbeglice sa prostora bivše SFRJ, ali ne i interno raseljeni sa Kosova i Metohije (KiM)
2011.	30. 09.	uobičajeno stanovništvo	stanovništvo u zemlji + stanovništvo koje namerava da boravi u inostranstvu do 1 godine	Dodati interno raseljeni sa KiM, bojkot albanskog stanovništva, ali procene nisu dodate
2022.	30. 09.	uobičajeno stanovništvo	stanovništvo u zemlji + stanovništvo koje namerava da boravi u inostranstvu do 1 godine	Dodavanje nepopisanih lica na osnovu prikupljenih podataka iz administ. izvora

Izvor: Pripremljeno od strane autora.

u administrativne izvore, takođe, može biti upitna, a na istraživačima ostaje da kroz svoja istraživanja provere odnosno daju sud o kvalitetu istih.

Popisom 2022. godine nastavila se tradicija metodološke neusklađenosti sa prethodnim popisima. Različita metodološka rešenja počev od popisa iz 1991. pa u svakom narednom popisu čine da je praktično nemoguće imati metodološki korektno poređenje ukupnog broja stanovnika u poslednje tri decenije (Tabela 1). Metodološki problemi kod poređenja broja stanovnika u periodu 1991–2022. pre svega se odnose na promenu koncepta ukupnog stanovništva (stalno stanovništvo<sup>1</sup> i uobičajeno stanovništvo<sup>2</sup>),

<sup>1</sup> *De iure* prisutno, odnosno lica stalno nastanjena na teritoriji Republike Srbije.

<sup>2</sup> Prema ovom konceptu, lice se smatra stanovnikom onog mesta u kojem sâm (u slučaju samačkog domaćinstva) ili sa članovima svog domaćinstva provodi najveći deo svog vremena, odnosno dnevni/noćni odmor, nezavisno od toga gde ima prijavljeno prebivalište. Time su u ukupno stanovništvo određenog mesta uključena lica koja su u tom

zatim kategorija koje ulaze u ukupno stanovništvo (stanovništvo u zemlji i stanovništvo u inostranstvu; stanovništvo u zemlji i stanovništvo u inostranstvu do 1 godine; stanovništvo u zemlji i stanovništvo u inostranstvu sa namerom boravka do 1 godine), tretmana interno raseljenih lica sa AP Kosova i Metohije (prvo ne ulaze u ukupno stanovništvo 2002. iako su defakto prisutni, a zatim se dodaju 2011. godine), tretman bojkota popisa (zvanične procene se dodaju rezultatima 1991. ali ne i rezultatima 2011), i na kraju imamo administrativno dodavanje nepopisanih lica, što nije bio slučaj nikada ranije. Dodatno treba obratiti pažnju i na promenu tzv. kritičnog momenta popisa (zamenjen je 31. mart u ponoć sa 30. septembrom u ponoć) i na dužinu međupopisnog intervala (11; 9,5; 11 godina).

mestu živela neprekidno najmanje godinu dana pre kritičnog momenta popisa, kao i lica koja su u tom mestu živela kraće od 12 meseci, ali s namerom da u njemu ostanu najmanje godinu dana.

Na kraju možemo sumirati. Potencijalni doprinos Popisa 2022. godine u odnosu na prethodne je bolji obuhvat stanovništva i mogućnost izračunavanja preciznijih pokazatelja fertiliteta i mortaliteta, kao i brža i jednostavnija dostupnost podataka popisa. Osnovni nedostatak poslednjeg i prethodnih popisa u Srbiji je njihova metodološka neusklađenost i samim tim ograničena međusobna uporedivost. Takođe, nedostaju informacije o određenim obeležjima za stanovništvo koje je popisano isključivo preuzimanjem podataka iz administrativnih izvora,

što je značajan nedostatak u odnosu na prethodne popise.

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## LITERATURA

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Peter Zeihan

## **The End of the World is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization**

Harper Business, New York, 2022, p. 512

## **Kraj sveta je samo početak: mapiranje kolapsa globalizacije**

Harper Business, Njujork, 2022, str. 512

### **1 THE BOOK**

Last year, Peter Zeihan's book *The End of the World Is Just the Beginning: Mapping the Collapse of Globalization* became a bestseller, reaching 10<sup>th</sup> place on The New York Times (2022) non-fiction best-seller list. Zeihan's public appearances in the mass media and on podcasts (Rogan 2023) ensured that his arguments reached even more people. This reach was reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich's (1971) *Population Bomb*, in that the demographic argument was a central global issue at the time.

The book speaks to a general audience and does not claim to be a scientific monograph. Despite Zeihan's background as a demographer, the book doesn't solely focus on demography, but instead covers a wide range of topics including geography, geopolitics, resource management, and economics. The core thesis of the book revolves around the issues of population aging and food

and energy production, which are reminiscent of two separate debates that have been present in the demography discourse since its inception as a field.

The main thesis of the book is that many developed countries are facing population aging, which poses a significant challenge, as a shrinking workforce must support a larger, older population. While this demographic trend is not new, what makes Zeihan's book controversial is that he also postulates the end of the globalised economy. He predicts what the world will look like if global trade is disrupted and all countries need to become more or less autarkic. In this world, some countries have advantages over others. The countries in the best position are those with desirable demographics and, even more importantly, geography. Zeihan considers transport, finance, energy, resources, and manufacturing capacities in his analysis. He writes in some detail about how fertiliser production is distributed around the world,



and how even the slightest disruptions in the fertiliser industry could lead to potential famines. He uses the example of potassium-based fertiliser production, which is concentrated in very few countries (Jordan, Israel, Germany, Russia, Belarus, and Canada). Creating new production capacities in this field would require at least a decade. Given that some countries are completely dependent on such fertilisers, this would create huge vulnerabilities were we to see a collapse in global trade. Zeihan makes country-specific predictions of how this future would look. The resulting world (that presupposes the withdrawal of the only superpower) would be riddled with conflicts. The biggest loser in this new world would be China (which is mentioned 327 times in this 512-page book) with its unfavourable demographics, geography, and lack of endogenous energy and fertiliser inputs.

Zeihan argues that USA is one of the few countries that can get through the upcoming upheaval unscathed. According to him, the USA has better fertility levels than most other developed countries and is largely self-reliant when it comes to food and energy production. He contrasts that with China, which has had much lower fertility rates for some time and is completely reliant on imports for energy and, more importantly, food.

At the end of the book, Zeihan considers the effects of climate change on food production, specifically the challenges that will be faced in the places that produce most of the world's food.

Zeihan is sceptical towards the green transition, as it requires an order of magnitude more materials than the world is currently manufacturing to produce clean energy, such as wind turbines, solar power plants, electric vehicles, and batteries.

The book was published at an opportune time (right after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022) to support Zeihan's arguments, as both Ukraine and Russia are big producers of food and, maybe even more importantly, fertiliser. At some points in 2022, the disruption of the global food trade did indeed seem catastrophic.

## 2 THE CRITICISM

Zeihan's outlook is largely fatalistic. From a demographic perspective, his fatalism may be well placed; there is little countries can do to address the decades-long demographic challenges they're still facing. In other words, even if all the countries where fertility has been low suddenly experience an increase in fertility, the generations of young people who would express such increases in fertility are so small that the net effect of such an increase would be negligible. Increased immigration could help, but if the scenario Zeihan predicts happens even in part, the consequences would make the affected countries undesirable for migration. In his future, immigrants would flock to the US.

It is difficult to tell how likely the Zeihan scenario is. Pessimistic predictions so far have typically been wrong, but that tells us nothing about future predictions. From a demographic perspective, it is easy to project future outcomes, as the number of components is limited, but projecting the future in terms of geopolitics is simply impossible. In the author's own words: "Geography does not change, demographics do not lie". However, these two components are simply not enough to predict the geopolitical future with any kind of certainty.

Zeihan's main contribution to the debate is that he provides us with one

potential scenario. However unlikely it is, we should be aware of such a grim possibility for the future. What's more, some of the points Zeihan makes are important no matter whether he is right or wrong about the future. Food security and the pain points of our global food production and distribution system are not issues that the general or even scientific audience is very familiar with. The disruptions in logistics chains and production that we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Suez Canal blockage of 2022, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have made it evident that global supply chains are vulnerable.

The author insists that the things he writes about are not a matter of projecting the future, but rather that he is telling the readership *what will happen*. This is simply too strong an assertion as there are many unpredictable changes that can happen *than are dreamt of in his philosophy*. The author insists that his geopolitical predictions are grounded in a rich history of geopolitical precedents, but history is riddled with unforeseen events and technological and societal changes, many of which have made a mockery of previous predictions. For example, Zeihan could not have predicted the recent advances made in artificial intelligence and how they would impact not only the next decades, but also the years and even months following the publication of his book<sup>1</sup>.

The author also ignores the potential for increased longevity and general increases in productivity. Health and longevity effects could be more significant for welfare than nominal GDP, which may decline as populations age and fall.

<sup>1</sup> To be fair, the author addressed the advances made in AI in the public domain after the publication of his book in a way that fits into the general narrative outlined in the book (which is also telling).

GDP per capita may not decline similarly, as Miles (2023) argues.

Zeihan's book is very US-centric. In it, the US is the main protagonist, with its desirable geography, resources, and population age structure. This is understandable, as the author is from the USA and he seems to be writing to a US audience.

### 3 CASSANDRAS VS POLLYANNAS

Malthus's (1798) essay was the first such demographic argument in which he postulated that the growth of the population greatly exceeds the growth of its capacities to produce food, leading to the obvious conclusion that this is not sustainable. This view was later reflected by other similar arguments that were called neo-Malthusian, as they espoused the same principle, mainly focusing on the carrying capacity of the earth and centring around other necessary resources. While the classical Malthusian position refers to population and food, neo-Malthusianism is a concern that overpopulation will lead to overconsumption, which will increase resource depletion and/or environmental degradation, leading to ecological collapse or other disasters.

Today, the question of the future and arguments around Malthusian ideas are as relevant as ever. Many developed and developing countries are facing a fertility crisis, and pronatalism today means something completely different than it did 50 years ago. Today, the debate has more dimensions and has evolved significantly beyond the Malthusian and neo-Malthusian arguments. When it comes to debates around the future involving demographics, there are usually two important questions: will the future be favourable, and for the

optimal future outcome, is it better for people to have more children or fewer? Depending on the answers to these two questions, we can describe a position using a two-by-two matrix (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Different perspectives on future and population

	<b>Pronatalist</b>	<b>Antinatalist</b>
<b>Optimists</b>	Longermists	Post-Malthusians
<b>Pessimists</b>	Peter Zeihan	Malthusians Neo-Malthusians

Malthusians and neo-Malthusians are clear examples of antinatalists with a pessimistic outlook. Defining the other three positions in this matrix may be more difficult. Longermists argue that a higher birth rate can have positive long-term consequences, as it contributes to a larger, more diverse, and potentially more innovative population capable of solving future challenges. Post-Malthusians do not inherently fall into the pronatalist or antinatalist categories, as their focus is on the relationship between population growth,

resources, and technology. However, post-Malthusianism is often regarded in the context of the original Malthusian debate (population versus resources), and in this primary context, the post-Malthusian argument is closer to the antinatalist camp.

How does Peter Zeihan fit in the matrix shown in Table 1? His stance of being both pessimistic and pronatalist makes his perspective almost unique. While it is hard to imagine academics from the various disciplines covered in his book agreeing with him, reading his book may still be worthwhile, if not for anything else but its unconventional perspective.

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## DATA AVAILABILITY

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed.



Ankica Šobot

## **Niske stope rađanja i rodne uloge: Teorijski okvir i praktični izazovi**

Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 2022, str. 107

## **Low fertility rates and gender roles: Theoretical framework and practical challenges**

Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, 2022, p. 107

Sagledavanje korelacije fertiliteta i rodne dimenzije već decenijama zaokupira pažnju istraživača širom svetske naučne zajednice. Domaća demografska literatura neretko se suočavala sa sugestijom da istraživači iz sfere nauke o stanovništvu zanemaruju rodnu perspektivu. Bez težnje da se opovrgne ili potvrdi navedena konstatacija, važno je istaći da srpski demografi tokom poslednjeg perioda sve više u fokus svojih publikacija stavljaju sagledavanje veze fertiliteta i rodne dimenzije. Knjiga Ankice Šobot „Niske stope rađanja i rodne uloge – Teorijski okvir i praktični izazovi” je upravo skoncentrisana na ovu izuzetno značajnu i aktuelnu temu. Imajući u vidu da možemo naići na navode da su retke studije koje se bave rasvetljavanjem značaja rodnog pitanja u oblasti fertitnog ponašanja, doprinos navedene publikacije, koja je odnedavno na uvidu naučne javnosti, je izuzetno značajan.

Istraživanje o niskim stopama rađanja i rodnim ulogama sprovedeno je u okviru Programa istraživanja Instituta društvenih nauka za 2022. godinu, koji podržava Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije. Valjalo bi istaći da je dugogodišnja posvećenost autorke temi rodnosti iznedrila niz radova koji ovo pitanje stavljaju u demografski kontekst. Time je stekla epitet jedne od najrelevantnijih istraživačica koja otkriva nebrojene veze rodnosti i demografskih fenomena i ponašanja. Na spoju sociološkog i demografskog pristupa nastala je studija koja se ovim demografskim pitanjem bavi akcentujući važnost društvenog konteksta kao neophodnog okvira razumevanja uslovljenosti niskog fertiliteta. Rodne uloge kao princip organizacije društva već su dobro pozicionirane u istraživanjima koja proučavaju reproduktivna ponašanja. I pored toga, autorka s pravom ima potrebu da

osnaži argumentaciju o značaju rodne perspektive za razumevanje reprodukcije u postindustrijskim društvima.

Neosporno je da je nizak nivo rađanja konstantno u žiži interesovanja naučne zajednice, ali je značajna i zainteresovanost donosilaca odluka i kreatora javnih politika. Njihovo interesovanje, prisutno od početka 21. veka, još intenzivnije je motivisalo istraživanja u funkciji razumevanja karakteristika reproduktivnog ponašanja u čijoj su osnovi niske stope rađanja. Takav sled događaja rezultirao je formiranjem izdašne naučne građe, bazirane na eksplikaciji fertilnog modela u savremenim društvima. Fenomen nedovoljnog rađanja predstavlja centralno područje monografije, i dovodi se u vezu sa rodnom ne/ravnopravnošću u odabranim evropskim državama. Težnja da se rasvetli veza između niskog rađanja i rodne ne/ravnopravnosti, između ostalog, bazirana je na upotrebi Indeksa rodne ravnopravnosti (GEI), što je jedan vid novine u relevantnoj demografskoj literaturi. Polazni postulat istraživanja zasniva se na razumevanju rodne dimenzije niskog rađanja iz perspektive dostignutog nivoa rodne ravnopravnosti. Takođe je neupitan pozitivan pogled prema rodnoj ravnopravnosti kao društvenoj vrednosti, kao i stav o pozitivnom uticaju rodne ravnopravnosti na fertilni obrazac.

Uporedo sa prethodno ukazanim najvažnijim stavkama uvodnog dela, publikacija je strukturirana u još pet poglavlja. U drugom izlaganju, Rodni aspekt u razumevanju niskog fertiliteta – konceptualizacija pristupa, Ankica Šobot nam ukazuje na značaj upućenosti i međusobne povezanosti antropološkog i demografskog znanja. Otvorenost demografije kao naučne discipline možemo prepoznati u njenom približavanju antropologiji, što je rezultiralo pozitiv-

nim ishodom u naučnom tumačenju fenomena, i to putem formiranja veze kvantitativnog i kvalitativnog. U krajnjoj instanci, u naučnom istraživanju trebalo bi težiti dubljem razumevanju demografskih pojava i procesa. Da bismo dobili kompletnu sliku o određenom demografskom procesu, neophodno je prodreti u osobenosti pojedinaca, kao i u tumačenju fokusiranog fenomena pristupiti iz ugla interakcije individualnog i društvenog. Stav da je razumevanje demografskog ponašanja jedan od primarnih zadataka savremene demografije doveo nas je do prihvatanja rodni osobenosti kao značajnih u funkciji reproduktivnog ponašanja, što je impliciralo celovitijem razumevanju faktora niskog nivoa rađanja. Antropološka demografija značajan prostor pruža uvažavanju društvenog konteksta i specifičnosti određenih kulturnih normi. Antropološki demografski koncept stavlja ponašanje u fokus istraživanja, a objašnjenje spone između rodni uloga i odlučivanja o rađanju čini vidljivu kontekstualizaciju.

Rađanje i rodni režimi u izabranim evropskim državama tokom druge decenije 21. veka potpadaju pod treće i najobimnije poglavlje prikazane monografije. Autorka nas podseća na opšte poznate karakteristike fertilnog obrasca u postindustrijskim društvima, kao što su: odlaganje učestvovanja u reprodukciji, postmodernistički sistem vrednosti i uticaj rodni uloga na fertilno ponašanje. Indeks rodne ravnopravnosti je izabrani indikator za sagledavanje dostignutog nivoa rodne ravnopravnosti. Zatim, najprisutniji indikator rađanja u domaćoj literaturi, tj. stopa ukupnog fertiliteta (SUF) sagledana je tokom poslednje decenije (2010–2019) u izabranim evropskim državama. Prilikom izrade studije navirale su razne



nedoumice i pitanja, te je autorku zanimao nivo rodne ravnopravnosti u zemljama sa najvišim, kao i sa niskim fertilitetom. Korak dalje, u publikaciji su sagledani i nivoi rodne ravnopravnosti u pogledu domena plaćenog rada i korišćenja vremena, koji su prepoznati kao značajni sa stanovišta fertilnog ponašanja. U metodološkom pogledu istraživanje je obogaćeno uključivanjem još jednog aspekta koji se odnosi na sistem formalne brige o deci. Korelaciju niskog fertiliteta i rodne ne/ravnopravnosti autorka je sagledala putem već uobičajenih indikatora, ali i na osnovu pokazatelja koji nisu imali svoj prostor u domaćim istraživanjima. Izložićemo samo najznačajnije rezultate ove komparativne analize. Drugu deceniju 21. veka, u pogledu kretanja SUF-a, karakteriše blagi porast u pojedinim državama, dok je u drugim registrovan pad. Francuska, Danska, Švedska i Češka izdvajaju se kao zemlje sa najvišim vrednostima, dok su s druge strane Španija i Italija sa najnižim fertilitetom. U pogledu prosečne starosti žene pri rođenju prvog deteta, ne nameće se kao pravilo, ali vidljiva je paralela sa najnižim fertilitetom i najintenzivnijim odlaganjem rađanja (Italija i Španija). Razmatrajući indeks rodne ravnopravnosti, važno je istaći nekoliko zanimljivih konstatacija. Relativno visok nivo fertiliteta je prisutan i pri nižem nivou rodne ravnopravnosti nego u državama sa najboljim rezultatima u tom domenu. Takođe, relativno visoka SUF evidentirana je u državi sa pozitivnim promenama u kretanju GEI, kao i u državama koje konstantno imaju najveći indeks. Neosporno je da postoje i slučajevi koje se ne uklapaju u teorijske pretpostavke, te je pad SUF-a zabeležen i u zemljama sa relativno visokim nivoom rodne ravnopravnosti. U pogledu formalne brige o

deci postigle su ga države sa najvišim nivoom GEI. To konkretno implicira da je velika većina dece od tri godine do polaska u školu zbrinuta u ustanovama za čuvanje dece.

Naredni segment studije možemo oceniti kao najaktuelniji, s obzirom da izaziva značajnu pažnju naučne i šire (ne)stručne javnosti. Izazovi politika prema niskom fertilitetu iz perspektive rodni uloga čine četvrto poglavlje monografije, koje je ujedno sve više u fokusu brojnih polemika na raznovrsnim skupovima. U pogledu reproduktivnog ponašanja, uspostavljanje balansa između porodičnog i profesionalnog života najviše je propagiran koncept u naučnim i društvenim krugovima. U ovom poglavlju autorka nas upućuje na ključne segmente u pogledu odluke o rađanju i učestvovanja u reprodukciji, kao što su: zaposlenost žena, dostupnost formalne brige o deci, transformacija rodni odnosa i dr. Sledi i kratka retrospektiva političkih odgovora na nizak fertilitet u određenim evropskim državama, koji se razlikuju u zavisnosti da li je u pitanju eksplicitna politika podsticanja rađanja ili je fokus na socijalnom okviru i podrškama porodici. Perspektiva muškaraca u domenu fertiliteta ne sme ostati zanemarena, naročito imajući u vidu da strana istraživanja u većoj uključenosti očeva u privatnoj sferi vide potencijal za rast plodnosti. Sama autorka, izdvajanjem ovog segmenta u četvrtom poglavlju, šalje poruku o prepoznavanju značaja veće integracije muškaraca u privatnoj sferi. Švedska i Norveška se izdvajaju kao svetli primeri u pogledu postojanja mera koje imaju za cilj veću uključenost očeva, i to putem mogućnosti korišćenja roditeljskog odsustva. Upravo u navedenim zemljama su i najveće stope korišćenja roditeljskog odsustva od strane očeva,

dok su u Italiji i Španiji stope daleko niže (svega oko 12% očeva).

U petom poglavlju, Srbija – fertilitet i rodna ne/ravnopravnost, sam naziv naslova nam govori da je u fokusu analiziranje mesta stanovništva Srbije u pogledu SUF-a, kao i u domenu dostignutog nivoa rodne ravnopravnosti u odnosu na određene evropske države. Takođe je, na osnovu relevantnih domaćih istraživanja, predstavljena osobenost rodnog režima u Srbiji, i to sa akcentom na one segmente koji su značajni iz perspektive reproduktivnog ponašanja. Poslednja nepuna decenija (2010–2019) donela je blagi porast SUF-a (sa 1,40 na 1,52 deteta po ženi). Prosečna starost žene pri rođenju prvog deteta u Srbiji (28,9) približna je vrednosti Francuske (28,7), zemlji sa najvišom SUF (2020). Posmatrajući indeks rodne ravnopravnosti u Srbiji za dostupne godine, u 2018. (58,0) zabeležen je veoma blag porast u odnosu na 2014. godinu (52,4). Nažalost, ni registrovan porast indeksa ne može umanjiti činjenicu da Srbija, u odnosu na analizirane države u ovoj studiji, ima najnižu vrednost. U političkom diskursu Srbije problematika niskog fertiliteta prepoznata je kao suštinski važna, a uporedo je i rodno pitanje pronašlo svoj prostor u strateški važnim dokumentima naše zemlje. Najindikativniji svedoci su definisani Poseban cilj 2 i Posebni cilj 3 revidirane Strategije podsticanja rađanja 2018. godine. Prema prikazanim istraživanjima u monografiji, možemo zaključiti da se obrazovni faktor prepoznaje kao bitan element promene dominantnog modela rodnih odnosa u našem društvu, koji se i dalje ocenjuje kao tradicionalni. Visokoobrazovani muškarci su skloniji prihvatanju egalitarnijih normi, međutim zaostaje jasna podrška društva u pogledu

promocije „novog očinstva“. Autorka podvlači činjenicu da politika prema rađanju koja se zalaže za ravnomerniju uključenost oba roditelja u podizanju male dece ujedno znači unapređenje rodne ravnopravnosti.

Zaključna razmatranja čine poslednje poglavlje monografije i sistematizaciju nalaza iz relevantne literature. U završnom delu monografije takođe je naglašeno da se ne donose tvrdnje o kauzalnosti niskog fertiliteta i rodne ne/ravnopravnosti. S druge strane, u studiji su pruženi argumenti o značaju rodno pitanja za razumevanje fertilitetnog ponašanja i odlučivanja o rađanju u savremenim društvima. Pružanje najnovijih tendencija u kretanju SUF i GEI putem komparativne analize doprinosi sveobuhvatnijim zaključcima. Ukoliko bismo se skoncentrisali samo na Srbiju u pogledu karakteristika rodno režima, situacija se ne može oceniti kao zadovoljavajuća. Naime, Srbija pripada kategoriji zemalja sa nižim nivoom rodne ravnopravnosti. Zatim, empirijski nalazi svedoče o delimičnoj i sporog promeni rodno režima u našem društvu, uz dominantnost tradicionalne podele rodno uloga. Kao pozitivan segment se prepoznaje obrazovanje, koje može biti u korelaciji sa promenom rodno obrazaca.

Tokom poslednjih godina u demografskim istraživanjima je evidentan prodor rodno pitanja u kontekstu nedovoljnog rađanja. Da li su pozitivne promene u naučnom diskursu naše zajednice, u vidu sve brojnih publikacija na temu rodno dimenzije i fertiliteta, podstaknute isključivo sugestijama drugih naučnih disciplina? Ne osporavajući značaj konstruktivnih predloga, mišljenja smo da su sami demografi prepoznali važnost rodno perspektive u domenu rađanja, kao i da će proučavanja na tu

temu u budućnosti rasvetliti mnoštvo nedoumica. U prikazanoj monografiji, autorka nas upravo podseća da su srpski demografi prepoznali značaj rodnog okvira niskog rađanja, i u tom kontekstu izdvaja sledeće autore: Rašević, Vasić, Nikitović, Mirić i Šobot. Značajno je napomenuti i prepoznavanje donosilaca odluka o važnosti rodne dimenzije u kontekstu niskog fertiliteta. Jedna od poruka ove studije, upravo njima namenjena, bila bi da je neophodno da se politički odgovor na nisko rađanje prilagodi prilikama koje podrazumevaju egalitarniji rodni režim. Takođe, autorka smatra da je poželjno percipirati rodnu ravnopravnost kao okvir za definisanje političkog odgovora na nizak fertilitet.

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